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Aristotle’s view of rational thought is understudied and little understood. Scholarly energy
focuses on his deductive theory of science, knowledge and grasp of !rst principles, all of
which involve certainty and necessary truth. Aristotle also, however, pays systematic
attention to bounded rationality and reasoning about contingent matters.
Belief, for Aristotle, is about the contingent. It ranks below scientific knowledge, but still
above any cognition animals are capable of: only rational animals believe. Aristotle’s
theory of belief, then, provides data for his broader theory of reasoning and human
rationality. I therefore organize the dissertation around three arguments which distinguish
belief from other forms of mental representation that we share with animals.
(1) Belief requires credence, which depends upon the ability to represent matters as more
or less likely, and therefore the ability to see facts as evidence for other facts. ese two
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abilities require reason and are partially constitutive of rational thought. Animals can be
conditioned to act in certain ways given certain inputs, but this ability diﬀers from the
weighing of evidence.
(2) We cannot form beliefs as we please, while we can do so with other forms of mental
representation, such as imagining. Belief is out of our hands in this way because it has a
normative connection to truth. It is supposed to be true, and must therefore submit to
normative evaluation with respect to truth. is accountability to norms is partially
constitutive of rational thought.
(3) Belief causes aﬀective response in ways that other mental states, such as imagining, do
not. Imagining can cause emotional response, but does not necessitate it in the way belief
does. e ability to entertain mental content without committing to it is peculiar to
rational creatures, and therefore partially constitutive of rational thought. Rationality
confers the ability to question, test and be open to doubt.
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Introduction
In this dissertation I examine two topics in Aristotle’s epistemology and philosophy of
mind: belief (doxa in Greek) and rational cognition. e former is the means to
investigate the latter. is is because, for Aristotle, believing is something only rational
creatures can do. However non-rational animals get around in the world (and humans, for
Aristotle, are the only rational animals), whatever mental states constitute their
representation of that world, they do not have anything Aristotle is willing to call belief.
e sense of “rational” I have in mind is not the normative sense according to
which we evaluate a certain course of action or belief as rational or irrational. Humans do
not contrast with other animals because humans are rational and animals are irrational.
is normative distinction presupposes a further metaphysical distinction between the
rational and the non-rational (as opposed to irrational). Call the !rst phenomenon
“normative rationality” and the second “constitutive rationality,” because it is meant to
capture a diﬀerence in the way that creatures exist, a diﬀerence in what kinds of cognitive
subjects they are. is is the distinction Aristotle means to draw when he says that belief
requires “reason” (logos), so animals cannot form beliefs.1 It is not that animals are too
stupid to form beliefs; they simply lack those kinds of cognitive states. Nor are they for
that reason open to criticism; a subject cannot qualify as irrational in the normative sense
without qualifying as rational in the constitutive sense. Rational cognition, therefore, is a
special brand of cognition that only certain kinds of creatures are able to undertake. It will
turn out, on Aristotle’s view, that to be a constitutively rational subject is in part to be
1. For the details of this argument, see Chapters 1 and 2.
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bound by strictures of normative rationality.2 Being open to that sort of evaluation,
however, requires being a creature of a certain type.
Calling a subject “constitutively rational” says little without an account of what this
special brand of cognition is supposed to look like. e contours of this account will
depend in turn on which type of states are paradigms of rational cognition and which
seem open even to non-rational creatures. e most striking (and largely unremarked)
aspect of Aristotle’s view is that beliefs qualify as rational cognition along with higher
cognitive achievements like demonstrative knowledge (epistêmê), cra knowledge (technê)
and understanding (nous). I call these states “higher achievements” because Aristotle’s
remarks make it clear that they are not states that humans possess and deploy by default;
acquiring them takes much cognitive eﬀort. Having demonstrative knowledge, for
instance, requires that the subject grasp a demonstration of the fact, a valid syllogism that
gives the explanation for the fact and thereby renders it inevitable. Understanding, to take
another example, grasps the !rst principles of demonstrative science, those starting-points
from which scienti!c deduction proceeds.3 To even get to this point, one must at least
have suﬃcient mastery of the science to recognize where the starting-points would be.
is implies substantial systematic grasp of the science. If these states are where rational
cognition starts, then most human cognition does not qualify as rational.4
is seems like the wrong result. If constitutive rationality marks human cognition
oﬀ from what other animals can do, but the majority of human cognition does not qualify
as rational, then the majority of human cognition falls into a strange in-between, neither
rational or non-rational. is is unwelcome because tertium non datur applies: any given
type of cognition is either part of the special brand of cognition or it is not. One might say
that all humans are capable of the higher cognitive achievements, and that this is what sets
them apart, regardless of whatever cognition may in fact make up most of their mental
2. See Chapter 3 for discussion.
3. See especially Posterior Analytics 2.19, 100b7-17. He says therein that there is “understanding of the
principles” (nous…tôn archôn) because “nothing is truer” than demonstrative knowledge except
understanding. e comparative form of “true” expresses that the more true fact is the ground or
explanation for the less true fact. See Chapter 1 at page 31. For Aristotle’s scienti!c epistemology generally,
see Taylor 1990.
4. Frede 1996 bites this bullet. On his view and others like it, see below at page 7.
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lives. is only invites a further objection: if humans, but not other animals, are capable of
the higher cognitive achievements, there must be something about the rest of their
epistemic lives that allows them to progress to those higher achievements. is makes
them part of the special brand of cognition that interests us, and any account of
constitutive rationality that leaves them out fails to deliver the whole picture. A rational
animal shares parts of its cognitive life with non-rational animals: perception is common
to all, and memory is widespread, though not universal.5 Even if those states function
much as they do in non-rational animals, there remains those cognitive states which fall
below the standards of deductive knowledge or understanding of !rst principles but which
are still above any cognition of which the non-rational animals are capable. 
Belief is a much humbler cognitive achievement than knowledge or
understanding. It requires no systematic grasp of explanations and can express deep
confusion and false views. Humble as it is, Aristotle still includes it in the states that
require constitutive rationality. Aristotle’s views about belief therefore help us understand
his notion of rational cognition, in the following sense: characteristics which distinguish
belief from lower-level cognitive states are also characteristics which distinguish non-
rational cognition from rational cognition. We will return to this idea later.
Aristotle’s view about where rational cognition starts (i.e. with belief) presents him
with a problem: denying belief to animals is neither intuitively obvious nor theoretically
innocent. It seems rather to rely on a further theoretical motivation and stands or falls on
the merits of what motivates or entails it.6 Before theory starts, it seems perfectly natural
to ascribe beliefs and desires to animals, as we do to our fellow humans. Animal beliefs
may not have the same logical complexity as human beliefs; verbal behavior is a rich
source of data for belief attribution, and animals do not speak. e question is not,
5. Posterior Analytics 2.19, 99b35-38.
6. In contemporary philosophy of mind, the most prominent argument against animal belief is due to
Davidson (1975). His view is, roughly, that there are no beliefs without language, since belief attribution
requires interpretation of a subject’s verbal behavior, not just observation of non-verbal behavior. For
criticism of this argument, see Bishop 1980, though his main concern is practical reasoning and
intentional action. For defense and expansion of Davidson’s view, see Fellows 2000. For further criticism
see Beisecker 2002, which includes useful references. See also Dreckmann 1999 for a defense of animal
belief that does not depend on linguistic capacity.
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however, one of complexity, but of function. If Aristotle is going to deny beliefs to animals,
he at the very least owes an account of what is supposed to take the place of belief in
determining animal behavior. He thinks it unproblematic to attribute desire (belief ’s
frequent theoretical companion) to non-human animals. A living creature’s being an
animal (as opposed to a plant) even entails that it has desire, since perception makes the
animal, and perception implies awareness of pleasure and pain.7 Desire alone, however,
cannot determine behavior: animals also need a type of state whose function is to
represent the world.8 If animals do not have beliefs, then we want to know what they do
have and what distinguishes it from belief.
What they do have, according to Aristotle, is sense-perception and a state called
representation (phantasia).9 Representation comes about through perception and amounts
(very roughly) to the storage and retrieval of sensory content. Diﬀerent animals have more
or less sophisticated representational capacities,10 and at the upper levels representation
grants memory and a kind of learning from experience that allows for very subtle
diﬀerential response to the environment.11 is makes representation seem, in many ways,
like a sort of belief. At the least, it performs belief ’s role in representing the world and
(along with desire) accounting for behavior, especially movement to and away from
objects in the environment. Despite this similarity, it is not a form of belief. We know this
because Aristotle devotes four separate arguments to establishing that belief and
7. On the Soul 2.3, 414b1-6. 
A complication: Aristotle’s does think that only humans have boulêsis, or will, because will involves
reasoning (it is kata ton logismon): see especially On the Soul 3.10, 433a23-25. Will is open only to
humans because it implicates rational cognition, just like belief does. Will, however, is reckoned a
species of desire, along with appetite (epithumia) and impulse (thumos): see On the Soul 2.3, 414b2; 3.9,
432b4-7 and 3.10, 433a23. Aristotle never says that belief belongs to the same family as representation
(phantasia).
8. For this notion, known as “direction of !t,” see primarily Anscombe 1957.
9. In chapters 1 and 2 I adopt Caston’s (Forthcoming) translation of this term as “representation.” is is
because it makes clear the general function that phantasia plays in animal cognition. In chapters 3 and 4
I adopt the more conventional “imagination.” In the arguments that we deal with in those chapters,
phantasia denotes a faculty similar to the non-committal play of mental images that we would
recognize as imagination.
10. It is not clear how continuous the scale is, but Aristotle does at least recognize a distinction whereby
some animals have representation “indeterminately” (because they “move indeterminately”); see On the
Soul 3.11, 434a4-5. is discussion precedes his distinction between perceptual and deliberative
representation, another divide between rational and non-rational cognition.
11. For representation generally, see Nussbaum 1978, 221-69, Scho!eld 1992, and especially Caston 1998
for the role of phantasia in Aristotle’s theory of representational content. For animals learning from
experience, see Foster 1997, Labarrière 2005, and Gregoric and Grgic 2006.
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representation are distinct as types. is is standard procedure: when Aristotle introduces
a new type of mental state, he frequently distinguishes it from other nearby mental states
which one might (with varying degrees of plausibility) confuse it.12 In On the Soul 3.3, he
distinguishes representation from perception, scienti!c knowledge (epistêmê),
understanding (nous) and belief (doxa). He dispenses quickly with the second and third
options: those states denote successful grasps of the truth, while representation can be
either true or false. Perception receives only slightly more attention.13 Belief receives the
most argumentative eﬀort by far; Aristotle cites three characteristics that distinguish belief
from representation and argues against the idea that representation is any combination of
belief and perception.14 
Aristotle makes a special eﬀort to distinguish belief and representation, I suggest,
because representation plays a role in the mental life of non-rational animals similar to
that which belief plays in the mental life of rational animals. ey are similar enough that
there is a non-trivial risk of confusing them. We might even say that representation is
belief ’s nearest non-rational counterpart. ere is textual support for this. In his
discussion of akrasia in Nicomachean Ethics book 7, Aristotle remarks in passing that
animals are not prone to akrasia because they do not have the necessary cognitive
equipment:
So it happens that people suﬀer akrasia under the in&uence of reason, in a
way, and of belief which is opposite to right reason, not in and of itself, but
incidentally—for the desire is opposite, but not the belief. So it is also due to
this that beasts are not akratic, because they do not have universal
entertaining [huplolêpsis] but rather representation of particulars and
memory.15
12. For other examples of this procedure, see his discussion of choice at Nicomachean Ethics 3.2, excellence
in deliberation at 6.9, and quick-wittedness (eusunesia) at 6.10. ere are no doubt others as well.
13. Aristotle’s argument for why representation is distinct from perception relies, in part, on details of
Aristotle’s doctrine of sense-perception, rehearsal of which would be a distraction.
14. is argument occupies On the Soul 3.3, 428a24-b9. See especially Lycos 1964 and Heil 2003. I do not
address this last argument in the current work.
15. Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1147b1-5: ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι,
οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός – ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ
δόξα – τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου
ὑπόληψιν ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην.
In this context, “judgment” would work just as well as a translation for hupolêpsis.
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Animals cannot suﬀer from akrasia because that predicament requires acting against one’s
better judgment (emphasis on “judgment”), and animals have no better judgment to act
against. None of their cognition represents what we would recognize as general rules or
moral principles, and it is action contrary to the reasoning from those kinds of judgment
(represented in the practical syllogism) that constitutes a case of akrasia. For our
purposes, this text gives us evidence that, for Aristotle, representation (and memory,
which requires representation) is the nearest thing that non-rational animals (“beasts,” as
he calls them) have to the beliefs that shape the action of rational creatures. e
implicature in Aristotle’s last claim is that representation and memory are what animals
have instead of beliefs.16 ey are the states that animals use to navigate and represent the
world and therefore play the same kind of role for non-rational animals that beliefs play
for humans. So when Aristotle carries on his extended comparison of belief and
representation in On the Soul 3.3, he is distinguishing representation from its nearest
rational counterpart.
is is why I organize my discussion around the !rst three arguments about belief
and representation in On the Soul 3.3. Aristotle distinguishes belief and representation in
three ways, each of them a respect in which belief diﬀers from representation as rational
cognition. Put another way, the characteristics that belief has, but that representation does
not, either partially constitute rational cognition or imply a characteristic that partially
constitutes rational cognition. I say “partially constitute” because the three characteristics
Aristotle cites to distinguish belief and representation do not amount to necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for rationality. It is a possibility, which I will not consider in detail,
that there is no set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for what make the various forms
of rational cognition rational. If this picture is correct, constitutive rationality is a cluster
concept pieced together from examination of paradigmatic instances, including (for
Aristotle) belief.
16. Strictly speaking, he only says that animals lack universal beliefs here, not that they lack beliefs outright.
If he meant to preserve the possibility that animals have beliefs about particulars, however, he would
not refer to two further capacities when he mentions the animals’ cognitive powers.
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e three arguments from On the Soul 3.3 organize the work, but for support in
my interpretation I draw from texts across the entire corpus. I adopt this strategy because
Aristotle’s arguments in On the Soul 3.3 are terse and compressed. e immediate context
does not give us enough to reconstruct his thought without undue speculation. I take this
as evidence that Aristotle does not consider his claims to be controversial or in need of
defense in that particular context. ere are many explanations for why he might think
this, the most charitable and productive of which is that those claims express or follow
from views which he is willing to presuppose. If the claims represent or follow from his
committed views, we should !nd him arguing for or relying on them in his other writings.
And indeed we do. ere is no way to know, a priori, which parts of the corpus will
furnish relevant evidence. We can only read closely and !nd out.
Examining Aristotle’s systematic views about belief introduces new data into
discussions about Aristotle’s substantive conception of rationality. I said earlier that our
conception of constitutive rationality will depend in part on which states we take to be
paradigms of rational cognition. If rational cognition starts with belief for Aristotle, it
follows that his conception of constitutive rationality will include quite ordinary thinking
about ordinary aﬀairs, however non-deductive or deeply mistaken. If, on the other hand,
one takes demonstrative knowledge and understanding as paradigm rational cognition, it
follows that only deductive thinking from and about necessary truths express constitutive
rationality. In the scholarly literature on Aristotle’s epistemology and philosophy of mind,
we diagnose a tendency to the latter conclusion and take the work in this book to resist it. 
A representative sampling from the literature will illustrate this tendency. ese
samples do not all express the same view, but they represent an emphasis on high-level
cognitive achievements at the expense of the sort of ordinary thinking that belief
represents, both for Aristotle and for us. Eyjólfur Emilsson, for instance, begins a careful
discussion of the distinction between discursive and non-discursive thought with a
blanket claim that “thinking,” for Aristotle and other Greek philosophers, is inherently a
form of knowledge or understanding:
In the context of this paper I use “thinking” more restrictively. Following the
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practice of the Greek philosophers in such contexts, “thinking” is close to
knowing, understanding or grasping. Both discursive and non-discursive
thought are acts of knowing or understanding.17
If we take Emilsson’s last claim to mean that, for the Greeks (including Aristotle), anything
that comes under the genus “thinking” is a high-level cognitive achievement like knowing,
then the claim is straightforwardly false. Aristotle distinguishes representation from
“thinking” (noêsis) and uses belief as an example.18 He also characterizes discursive
thinking (dianoia) as a kind of search which terminates in an assertoric mental state,
which can be knowledge, but can also be belief.19 Emilsson restricts his attention mostly to
Plotinus and later thinkers, and I am sympathetic to the view that this notion of thinking
as contact or grasping dominates later Greek epistemology. Aristotle, however, does not
commit himself to such a view.
For our second example, we have Michael Frede, who argues that Aristotle
introduces reason “to account for a highly speci!c and rather elevated function … our
ability to grasp the appropriate general features and the necessary connections between
them.”20 e lower-level cognition exhibited by animals and humans who are not
scienti!cally-inclined “does not yet amount to thinking and to reasoning, properly
speaking.”21 Reasoning is not, he emphasizes, “an ordinary ability to think and !gure
things out,” but rather the ability to “grasp general features and to see relations between
them.”22 Frede therefore spells out in more detail Emilsson’s assumption that thinking
amounts to knowledge and understanding. Constitutive rationality appears only at the
highest reaches of cognition. is kind of interpretation is, at best, selective. Part of the
problem is that, when Frede talks about “reason,” he invariably means understanding
(nous). My project relies on the interpretation of a diﬀerent family of terms: pistis, doxa,
17. Emilsson 2003, 48.
18. On the Soul 3.3, 427b16-24. See especially chapter 3 for discussion of this claim.
19. In a brief discussion of Aristotle at the end of the article, Emilsson con!nes his attention to nous, or
understanding (2003, 61-62). Taking this particular mental faculty to stand in for thinking as a whole is,
I think, a mistake; see my remarks on Frede below.
20. Frede 1996, 162, emphasis mine.
21. Frede 1996, 163.
22. Frede 1996, 166. e “general features” he refers to are the universals of a worked-out science, and not
simply attributes that sort objects into groups.
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and logos. is does not make my objection an ignoratio elenchi; I mean in part to
challenge the assumption that Aristotle’s account of rationality falls cleanly from his
account of nous. Frede’s account proceeds from the assumption that Aristotle introduces
constitutive rationality to explain high-level epistemic achievement, so it is no surprise
that what is distinctive of human thinking turns out, on such a reading, to be such high-
level achievements. ere is little independent reason to think that our special brand of
cognition begins only at such a high level.23 Aristotle devotes much careful study to this
high-level cognition (perhaps largely because Plato did), but this does not imply that high-
level epistemic achievement is what sets apart human cognition or, what is more, that
Aristotle has no interesting views about cognition at any lower level. More likely, the high-
level cognition is a modal and methodological re!nement of lower-level but still
distinctively-human cognitive capacities.24
ere are others who assume that Aristotle just does not care about the kind of
lower-level cognition that is the focus of this book. In his admirable attempt to make sense
of Aristotle’s view of the so-called “active intellect,” Myles Burnyeat makes the following
claim about Aristotle:
Aristotle has remarkably little to say about ordinary thinking, either in this
or any of this other works, but nous gets three whole chapters of itself here
and an important discussion at the end of the Posterior Analytics, not to
mention regular asides in the De anima book I plus sustained attention in the
theological context of Metaphysics Λ 7 and 9. I conclude that, while Aristotle
takes ordinary thinking more or less for granted, nous is a distinct topic, and
one on which he means to shine.25
I do not contest Burnyeat’s claim that nous is a distinct topic from ordinary thinking—that
is abundantly clear. My target is rather the claim that Aristotle “takes ordinary thinking
more or less for granted.” is is true, if one takes all and only instances of dianoia or
23. Frede oﬀers Aristotle’s criticism of his predecessors (Plato aside) for ignoring nous as evidence for his
interpretation (1996, 165-66). ere is no need to fully engage with his interpretation here; I can only
remark that the citations are not probative because they signal a far broader critique of pre-Aristotelian
psychology. Democritus, for instance, equated phronêsis with perception, and Aristotle need not have
the views Frede attributes to him in order to have all kinds of problems with that.
24. Frede does grant the possibility that “this highly speci!c function of reason also colours, or even
transforms, our everyday thought and reasoning,” (1996, 163), a remark which I !nd extremely
insightful. It still assumes, however, that what is distinctive of human cognition is simply the highly
speci!c function.
25. Burnyeat 2008, 19.
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logismos (reasoning) to denote instances where Aristotle treats ordinary thinking. He says
frustratingly little about these mental processes, and if we expand the list to include
doxa—which we should—we still encounter no long stretch of continuous text devoted to
the question, such as we see with understanding and scienti!c knowledge. It does not
follow from this, however, that Aristotle either takes ordinary thinking for granted or
leaves it by the wayside. On the contrary: belief is a constant touchstone, compared and
distinguished at length from other mental activities. He holds systematic views about it
which we can and should recover from his explicit statements.26 is alone constitutes an
important contribution on Aristotle’s part to a discussion of ordinary thinking. What is
more, his account of persuasion is, in no small part, an account of thinking itself. Aristotle
considers the Rhetoric a systematic extension of what people do every day:
Everyone participates to some extent in [both rhetoric and dialectic]: for
everyone endeavors, to some extent, to examine and provide reason and
defend and attack in argument. While many do this at random or through an
acquaintance born of habit, since both these ways of doing it are possible, it
also should be possible to do the same things by a method.27 
Giving reasons to each other and trying to !nd out the truth and falsehoods of claims is
just a part of human mental life. Many people do it without any real sense of what they are
doing or why certain moves are correct while others are not. Proceeding by a method is
not, however, a completely diﬀerent type of activity from the pre-theoretic activity on
which it is based. Far from taking ordinary thinking for granted, he thinks it an important
subject in its own right. Add in the Topics—with its extensive use of non-demonstrative
rules and methods—and the less-than-scienti!c methodology defended in the ethical
works (I have in mind Nicomachean Ethics 1.3 and 7.1), and we have a considerable part of
the corpus devoted to analyzing and applying what we could fairly call “ordinary
thinking.”
26. e last systematic attempt to do this happened 75 years ago (see Régis 1935), and even there we see no
attention to the implications of Aristotle’s views of belief for his conception of rationality.
27. Rhetoric 1.1, 1354a3-8: πάντες τρόπον τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν· πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ
ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν
πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἕξεως· ἐπεὶ δ' ἀμφοτέρως
ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον ὅτι εἴη ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁδῷ ποιεῖν
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Susanne Foster aﬀords us our last example. In her discussion of animal
intelligence, she oﬀers a capsule account of what is distinctive about humans that
expresses a form of the consensus view:
Reason receives the universal, the one apart from the many. It
comprehends why the individual impressions collected by experience
belong together. Hence a rational animal experiences its environment
diﬀerently. Rather than having only predicational perception, a non-
linguistic grouping-together of sense perception, the rational animal can
achieve propositional understanding. As Aristotle says at the beginning of
the Metaphysics, human beings, unlike animals, have the capacity to move
beyond rudimentary experience.28
is account seems to confuse having a universal conception (for instance, the thought
that all sweet things are pleasant) with possessing an explanation for its truth (knowing
why sweet things are pleasant). e latter notion seems to be what Foster has in mind; she
calls it “understanding.” e hunt for explanations is a scienti!c impulse, characteristic of
loier cognitive achievement than anything Aristotle deploys in the passages from On the
Soul that we will discuss.29 Her reference to the beginning of the Metaphysics is telling.
ere, Aristotle talks about the progression from empeiria, a kind of pre-theoretic build-
up of structured memories, to demonstrative and cra knowledge, two of the highest
forms of cognition to which humans can aspire. Aristotle’s account of human development
seems to skip over precisely the step (i.e. from the cognition that all animals are capable of
to the formation of beliefs) that we would most like to see for the sake of our own project.
As a result, accounts of Aristotle’s conception of rationality also typically ignore that stage,
and suﬀer from a lack of comprehensiveness as a result. What we are aer is an account of
how exactly human cognition diﬀers from animal cognition, and there is evidence that the
level at which cognition becomes distinctively human is signi!cantly lower than the
achievements Aristotle talks about in Metaphysics 1.1 and Posterior Analytics 2.19, where
he gives a more detailed account of the cognitive development he discusses in the
Metaphysics, but again leaves out the crucial step.
28. Foster 1997, 31.
29. is is not to suggest that Foster is oﬀering an account of those passages in her discussion. Rather, the
passages I discuss provides data which accounts typi!ed by her quote ignore or gloss over.
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Necessity and knowledge matter to Aristotle, but taking seriously his inclusion of
belief in the forms of rational cognition show us aspects of his conception of rationality
that are not apparent if we concentrate on knowledge and understanding. Here, brie&y, is
what we !nd. Constitutive rationality implies an ability to form subtle epistemic
evaluations based on evidence. Rational creatures have credence, which represents
evaluative attitudes that vary between outright denial and complete psychological
certainty. is means that rational agents are capable of a sort of internal accounting about
what to believe and what not to believe. Animals, according to Aristotle, cannot do this.
Related to this, constitutive rationality implies the ability to withhold commitment from
the deliverances of one’s cognitive and representational systems. is in turn implies an
ability to question, test and doubt, and in particular to doubt one’s own sensory
representations. Non-rational animals, on the other hand, invariably commit to their
mental representations. is ability to doubt and evaluate evidence is bound by a kind of
epistemic normativity; we have a rational obligation to believe the truth. is entails that
we cannot believe as we please, while we can use various forms of representation for any
variety of purposes.
If my interpretation, or a good part of it, is correct, we have an exciting exegetical
result: Aristotle’s conception of human rationality is much diﬀerent than we have
assumed. It is another question, however, whether we should !nd his new view credible.
e feeling remains that he underestimates the cognitive capacities of animals, and that
the elaborate ways he accounts for seeming instances of animal reasoning amount to a
violation of parsimony. e trouble stems, I think, from his a priori commitment that only
humans can manifest constitutive rationality. It is a priori in the sense that he holds the
view “come what may.” at is to say, he feels pressure to interpret animal behavior in a
way that does not attribute a rational soul to them. We need not follow him in this
commitment; it is an empirical matter whether any given animal is capable of rational
cognition. Aristotle may be unwilling to admit that they do, but that need not stop us





Our interest in Aristotle’s several arguments in On the Soul 3.3 rests on their potential to
furnish data about his conception of rational cognition. We should, therefore, begin with
the passages where he compares rational to non-rational creatures. In the two arguments
that occupy 428a18-24, Aristotle distinguishes belief from representation (my preferred
translation of phantasia for these two arguments)30 by denying that animals form beliefs,
on two separate grounds. He !rst denies that animals are capable of credence (pistis), a
mental state on which belief depends in some way.31 Aristotle then makes a further
argument that animals lack the ability to reason (logos), and that a creature’s having beliefs
depends on this ability. is is the passage, then, where Aristotle reserves belief (doxa) for
rational creatures, and in doing so evinces his view that belief is a form of rational
cognition.
In the further argument, Aristotle denies beliefs to animals because they do not
possess reason (logos), but he does so via a chain of intermediary dependence
relationships. Belief depends on credence, as it does in the !rst argument, and credence in
turn depends on an ability to be persuaded, which Aristotle calls to pepeisthai. Persuasion,
at the last step, requires reason. e further argument !lls in Aristotle’s reasoning for his
earlier premise that animals do not possess credence. Examining this more involved
argument will have to wait. e present chapter answers the following questions: 
30. I favor this translation of phantasia, in line with with Labarrière 1993 and Caston Forthcoming. Unlike
in On the Soul 3.3, 427b16-24 (which we discuss in chapters 3 and 4), there is little reason here to think
that Aristotle is referring to the human faculty that we would recognize as recreative imagination.
31. It is conventional to translate pistis as “conviction” “acceptance,” or even “belief,” but I think it means
“credence,” and adopt that translation in what follows. For “conviction,” see Hicks 1907. For
“acceptance,” see Hamlyn 1968, 131-32. For “belief,” see Lycos 1964.
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1) How does credence (pistis) work?
2) How does having belief depend on having credence?
Both arguments claim a relationship between belief and credence, so this seems like a
reasonable place to start. Understanding both arguments requires that we answer three
further questions, which I postpone until Chapter 2:
3) How does having credence depend on being persuaded (to pepeisthai)?
4) How should we understand logos?
5) How does having the complex of capacities denoted by pistis and to
pepeisthai depend on having logos, for a given understanding of logos?
is chapter, then, is stage-setting for the main question about Aristotle’s conception of
human rationality. Answering the !rst two questions, however, forces us to reconsider
Aristotle’s doxastic epistemology, which should be of independent interest.
I propose these answers: pistis denotes a mental state that we might reasonably call
“credence.” is much is presupposed in how I formulated the questions. Credence is an
attitude toward a proposition that varies in degree, unlike belief, which is binary. As I
understand the notion, credence has some aﬃnity with what is variously called
“con!dence” or “partial belief ” (as well as “credence”) in contemporary epistemology.32
e term connotes an epistemic evaluation, that is, evaluation of a proposition with
respect to its truth. Aristotle speaks on one occasion of someone with slight credence as
doubting or hesitating, which supports this interpretation.33 Terms like “doubt” and
“hesitation” can refer either to an evidential state or psychological certainty, a feeling of
con!dence which need not track the strength of one’s evidence. Aristotle himself is never
crystal clear about which it is, but our texts favor an evidential reading. is is because
credence is consistently said to respond to epistemic considerations, i.e. evidence and
argument that bear on how likely it is that a proposition is true. e state is “subjective” in
the sense that it expresses the likelihood of a claim by the subject’s own lights, and does
not imply that the claim itself involves any objective “chanciness,” as a roll of the dice does.
32. See Sturgeon 2008 and Joyce 2004 for “con!dence.” See Jeﬀrey 1970 and Price 1986 for “partial belief.” It
is not the case that all of these authors are referring to exactly to the same concept or developing the
same line of thinking. I mention them to give a general &avor of the sort of state I take credence to be.
33. Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1146b24-30; see page 24.
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Based on this, one would not go far wrong to interpret it as subjective probability. It diﬀers
in a signi!cant way, however, from a contemporary notion of partial belief as a measure of
subjective probability. Aristotle oﬀers no analysis in terms of betting behavior or
disposition to presuppose the proposition in one’s reasoning.34 Binary belief and
knowledge remain the only ingredients of practical and theoretical reasoning. is means
that a proposition must be the object of belief or knowledge to play a role in the subject’s
reasoning. e binary states of belief and knowledge result from one’s credence meeting
certain constraints, on which more later. We might say, then, that Aristotle’s notion of
credence is pre-committal. It is not meant to replace binary belief; binary belief instead
emerges from the right level of credence. A subject will, in other words, commit to a
proposition when it seems suﬃciently likely. is commitment, in the case of belief, does
not seem to require evidential certainty; Aristotle speaks of people becoming “even more
convinced” of something that they already believe. Knowledge, on the other hand, does
seem to require evidential certainty of a particularly strict sort.
In understanding pistis as credence, I oppose the bulk of interpretation and
commentary which takes the term in question denote the binary act of taking something
to be true, something like conviction or acceptance. Aristotle claims that having belief
depends on having credence because credence represents a kind of mental bookkeeping
that determines whether a subject commits to a claim. A subject’s commitments, the
claims which guide her actions and aﬀect, are those claims which she believes, i.e. her
doxa. Belief, therefore, is an epistemic investment over and above having a certain amount
of credence in a claim. Believing something therefore depends on having credence in it.
Aristotle’s claim that animals do not have pistis amounts to the denial that animals are
capable of this sort of mental bookkeeping. e reasons for this denial will occupy us in
later chapters.
34. On the !rst interpretation of levels of con!dence, see Blackburn (2011), who traces the view back to
Ramsey. For the second interpretation in terms of disposition to presuppose, see Joyce 2004.
15
2. e Argument
Here are both of the arguments by which Aristotle denies belief to non-rational animals:
It remains, then, to see whether [representation] is belief: for belief also turns
out to be either true or false. But, belief depends on credence (for it is not
possible for someone who forms a belief not to have credence in what seems
to be), but credence belongs to none of the beasts, while many of them have
representation.
Moreover, every belief depends on credence, credence depends on having
been persuaded, and persuasion depends on reason; but while representation
belongs to some of the beasts, none of them have reason.35 36
Aristotle’s aim here is to distinguish representation from belief, and he cannot do that by
appealing to the respective truth-values which those states can take. Unlike exclusive
perception37 and understanding (nous), belief can be either true or false, just as
representation can.38 Exclusive perception and understanding, like scienti!c knowledge
(epistêmê), are states whose content can only be true. In other words, S’s knowing (or
understanding, or exclusively-perceiving) that p entails that p is true.39 To distinguish
representation from such states, Aristotle need only observe that there are some instances
of false representation. He even at one point says that representation is “mostly false,”
whatever that might mean.40 Belief, however, has no guaranteed truth-value: that S
35. On the Soul 3.3, 428a18-24: λείπεται ἄρα ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα· γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ
ψευδής. ἀλλὰ δόξῃ μὲν ἕπεται πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ
πιστεύειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, φαντασία δὲ πολλοῖς. 
ἔτι πάσῃ μὲν δόξῃ ἀκολουθεῖ πίστις, πίστει δὲ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι, πειθοῖ δὲ λόγος· τῶν δὲ
θηρίων ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει, λόγος δ' οὔ.
36. All translations are my own. I follow the text of Jannone’s 1966 Budé edition, and reject the brackets that
Ross 1961 puts around a22-24. Among commentators, only ps-Philoponus thinks the passage bracketed
by Ross adds nothing (Commentary on the Soul, 15.501.5-6). Most modern editions and translations
take the passage to add something new and therefore merit inclusion. See, in addition to the Budé,
Rodier 1900, 2:422, Hicks 1907, 464 and Hamlyn 1968, 132.
37. at is, perception of idia, qualities received by only one of the !ve senses and hence “exclusive” to that
sense. Sight, for instance, is the only sense that perceives color, and hearing, sound. Aristotle contrasts
these (On the Soul 2.6.418a17-20) with “shared” (koina) objects of perception, such as mass, size, shape
and number.
38. Exclusive perception: On the Soul 2.6, 418a11-17, 3.3, 427b12 and 428a11. Understanding: Posterior
Analytics 2.19, 100b8-9, On the Soul 3.3, 428a17-18, and Nicomachean Ethics 6.6, 1141a3-5. 
39. Aristotle never wavers in his view that understanding and scienti!c knowledge always relate the subject
to the truth. His commitment to the claim that exclusive perception always relates the perceiver to the
truth is, however, not quite as secure. See, for instance On the Soul 3.3, 428b18-22, where he says that
exclusive perception makes mistakes “as little as is possible,” which is a weaker than the claim that it can
only be true.
40. On the Soul 3.3, 428a12-13. Hicks (1907, 463) follows ps-Simplicius, who takes this claim to depend on
the lapse in time between the episode of perception (which “stirs up” the representation, as Simplicius
says) and the re-presentation of the appearance. See also Engmann 1976, who sees two incompatible
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believes that p neither entails p nor not-p. e distribution of truth values over token
beliefs, then, is not suﬃcient to distinguish belief and representation as types. Aristotle
must instead argue that representation and belief, as types, do not share some further
characteristic. ese two arguments argument are meant to establish that belief and
representation have diﬀerent distributions across the animal kingdom. Since many
beasts41 share in representation, but do not enjoy reason and credence (upon which
believing depends), belief and representation must be distinct as types.
As I read the text, there are indeed two arguments in this passage. Some editors,
however, bracket the second argument42 (a22-24). ey think the text doubtful because of
an alleged double recension. at is, two diﬀerent versions of the On the Soul 3.3 have
been mixed up in the text as it has come down to us, with a bit of text supposedly
occurring alongside its revision or prospective replacement. Paleography provides no
basis for exclusion, in this case; doubling would need to have occurred further back than
any manuscript evidence can adjudicate.43 Nor is there any sound interpretive ground to
think that a22-24 is mere doubling. On the contrary, removing either half of the passage
turns the argument into a head-scratcher. Remove the !rst half (a20-22) and Aristotle
gives no rationale for why belief might depend on credence, and the claim is not intuitive
enough to stand on its own.44 Without the second half (a22-24), Aristotle gives us no
reason to think that non-human animals cannot have credence. Again, this claim has little
intuitive appeal: my cats, at least, seem to display diﬀerent levels of doubt and certainty,
and it would take further theoretical considerations to disabuse me of that prima facie
notions of truth in Aristotle’s discussion of representation.
41. êrion denotes a “beast of the !eld,” most likely a mammal, i.e. one of the creatures we might
intuitively think of as “animals,” as opposed to !sh and reptiles: see LSJ entry I.A. Aristotle seems to
have this sense in mind when he lumps young children in with beasts and opposes them to rational
adults: see especially Nicomachean Ethics 7.12, 1153a31-32.
42. e most recent editor to do so is Ross 1961, who takes his cue from Biehl 1896 and Torstrik 1862.
43. e earliest manuscripts that contain this section of On the Soul date to the 9th century: cf. Jannone
1966, xxiv-xxxviii. Hicks (1907) points out that every ancient commentator reads both parts of the
passage. at is, their received text includes the second half of the passage, though ps-Philoponus
excludes it on unsound interpretive grounds.
44. Hamlyn in particular (1968, 132) !nds the claim implausible, though he does not share my view about
how to understand the term pistis. 
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attribution. e argument, therefore, requires some background to be the least bit
plausible, and we must retain the entire passage to provide that background.
3. Pistis as Credence: A Mental State that Varies by Degree
How, then, does belief depend on pistis, and what is pistis, anyway? e word has a broad
range of meaning: LSJ lists ten possible translations, from “faith” to “proof ” to “position of
responsibility.” e lexicon, however, will not settle philosophical questions; we must
consult Aristotle’s pattern of use. In this section, I assume that pistis denotes a mental state
in our passage from On the Soul, speci!cally “credence,” a mental state to which there are
numerous other references in the corpus.45 In this section, I examine positive textual
evidence that Aristotle has a concept of credence and uses it in many diﬀerent contexts.
Understanding pistis as “credence” makes the contours of Aristotle’s notion clear to us,
though we should not expect isomorphism with a term in Bayesian epistemology.46 e
most striking aspect of credence is that it varies by degree: a subject can have more or less
of it. is tells against a family of conventional interpretations that take pistis to be some
binary attitude like acceptance or conviction—a taking-to-be-true.47 is conception helps
us explain how belief depends on credence, for Aristotle: there are plausible views on
which binary belief (doxa) constitutively depends on having a suﬃcient amount of
credence.48 We could therefore explain Aristotle’s view that belief depends on credence by
saying that he holds some view of this kind. I take up this discussion until a later section.49
ere are passages, widespread in the corpus, where Aristotle discusses an attitude
toward propositional content that can be stronger or weaker. He discusses how this mental
state is aﬀected by our interactions with the world and with each other, and how changes
45. For argument that it denotes a mental state in our passage from On the Soul, and consideration against
alternative readings, see “Appendix: Other Uses of Pistis,” page 48.
46. In particular, we should not read into Aristotle’s conception of credence a sort of Ramseyan analysis
that they express willingness to buy and sell bets at a certain price. For a concise and readable account
of this view, see especially Blackburn 2011. 
47. For detailed argument against such interpretations, see page 35. 
48. For a survey of views of contemporary this kind, as well as views that deny any such relationship
between binary belief and credence, see Sturgeon 2008.
49. See “How Belief Depends On Credence,” page 34.
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in this mental state interact with belief and knowledge. His terminology is consistent
throughout: he uses pistis and words derived therefrom. Pistis is probably not a technical
term for Aristotle in the same way that “credence” is for us. We should expect this, for
pistis is not embedded in a system of formal epistemology the way “credence” is for us.50
ere is ample evidence, however, that he makes both explicit and implicit use of a notion
of credence, which gives us reason to think that he deploys such a notion in our passage
from On the Soul 3.3.
We start with the !rst chapter of the Rhetoric. Aristotle argues that, when it comes
to rhetoric as a methodical discipline (entechnos methodos), its foremost concern is the
diﬀerent forms of proof (pisteis, an instance of homonymy).51 He claims that these proofs
are a sort of demonstration (apodeixis tis). What matters for our purposes is why he says
this: it is because people put the most credence in what they take to be demonstrated:
Since it is plain that the method [of rhetoric] that relies on cra-knowledge
concerns the ways of proving, and proof is a sort of demonstration (for
whenever we suppose that something has been demonstrated, at that point
do we put the most credence [in it])…52
Aristotle quali!es an instance of pisteuein (to give credence) with an adverb of degree
(malista). His meaning is straightforward: diﬀerent methods of proof convince people to
diﬀerent degrees, and people are convinced to the highest degree when they think that
something has been established through demonstration. is implies that other methods
of proof would convince them to a lesser degree, and the whole scheme presupposes that
being convinced can occur in various degrees and that we can make comparisons between
those degrees. e verb pisteuein is derived from the noun pistis: it literally means “to have
pistis for something.” We are entitled to conclude, therefore, that Aristotle’s notion of pistis
50. Neither, though, should we overstate the term’s informal or intuitive character. Aristotle devotes at least
three arguments to pistis and related mental states in the Topics: 4.5, 125b35-39, 126b12-34, and 4.6,
128a35-37. At 4.5, 126b12-34, the term seems used more as a toy example, and his remarks do not
represent his considered views on the subject. e term’s appearance in a chapbook of academic debate
nonetheless suggests that Aristotle wishes to make it a term in his philosophical vocabulary.
51. is occurrence of pistis, as with all occurrences in the plural, denotes the argument or proof meant to
instill persuasion, not the state of mind itself. See “Appendix: Other Uses of Pistis,” page 48.
52. Rhetoric 1.1, 1355a3-6: ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔντεχνος μέθοδος περὶ τὰς πίστεις
ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις (τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα ὅταν ἀποδεδεῖχθαι
ὑπολάβωμεν)…
19
allows it come in degrees, such that a person can have more or less of it. is means that
we should understand it as credence.
Our next piece of evidence also comes from the Rhetoric, one chapter later.
Aristotle acknowledges that factors other than the argument itself contribute to
persuasion. One of the most important, in his view, is how trustworthy a speaker can
make himself seem to the audience.53 Once again, his argument for this point relies on the
degree to which someone gives credence:
ere is proof through one’s character whenever the speech is spoken in such
a way that the speaker makes himself worthy of credence (axiopiston). For we
give credence more (pisteuomen mallon) and faster to people who are
reasonable (epieikesi)—generally about everything, and even entirely in
matters where there is nothing precise but rather a diﬀerence of opinion.54
We are more inclined to believe what someone says, and give our support faster, if we
think that she is a reasonable person. Aristotle makes the apt observation that this is more
likely to happen, and the speaker holds greater sway, when the subject is a matter of
serious dispute, with diﬀerent people arguing diﬀerent ways. In those circumstances, all
that a listener might have to go on is whether the speakers themselves are worth trusting.
is is another straightforward instance of credence coming in degrees. e adverb
Aristotle uses here is comparative instead of superlative, but that makes no diﬀerence. e
construction still implies a comparison between diﬀerent levels of credence, but does not
make the further claim that one of the degrees is a local maximum.
A third piece of evidence comes from an entirely diﬀerent context, book 13 of the
Metaphysics. Aristotle ends a discussion of the ontology of numbers with some brief
metaphilosophical remarks. Aer criticizing a representative sample of views about what
sorts of things numbers are, he says that he has done all he can to convince someone of his
own view, and that a longer discussion would not bring anyone on board who is not
53. He thinks that one’s character constitutes “the most authoritative proof ” (kuriôtatên pistin), though he
also says that this sort of persuasion “should happen through the speech, not from people believing in
advance what type of person the speaker is.” See Rhetoric 1.2, 1356a9-10.
54. Rhetoric 1.2, 1356a5-8: διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἤθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον
ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, περὶ πάντων μὲν
ἁπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μὴ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς.
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already in agreement. Importantly for us, he also says that someone who is already
persuaded would be persuaded to an even higher degree by more argument:
It is diﬃcult to say something well from elements that are not right, as
Epicharmus says: for right aer it has been said, it immediately seems not to
be right. — But regarding numbers, what has been considered and laid down
is suﬃcient (for someone who has already been persuaded would be
persuaded more by more [considerations], but someone who has not been
persuaded will be convinced to no greater degree).55
is passage plays an important role in explaining how belief depends on credence, and
we will return to it in that section. For now, it is more evidence that there is a mental state
in Aristotle’s cognitive psychology that is capable of responding to considerations by
degrees, rather than in binary terms. e verbs in this passage are instances of peithesthai
(to be persuaded) rather than pisteuein, so we do not have the morphological connection
to pistis that we do in the !rst two passages. ere is, however, no cause for concern: we
cannot say how someone could be persuaded to a greater degree if that does not mean that
he becomes more convinced of the claim. e same applies in the case of someone who is
not persuaded. Someone’s being persuaded to no greater degree (ouden mallon) means, I
assume, that they come no closer to believing the claim. is passage, then, joins the !rst
two in establishing that Aristotle has this notion of a mental state that varies by degrees
and that it behaves in such a way that we should take it to be credence.
ese three passages show that Aristotle’s conceptual scheme includes a mental
state that varies by degree, but say nothing about the connection it bears to binary states
like belief and knowledge. It turns out that Aristotle has sophisticated views about that
connection. is becomes clear in three further passages about credence in which he uses
the notion to do philosophical work about belief and knowledge. ese passages involve
more argument on Aristotle’s part and so require more sustained attention than our !rst
three passages. Together, they show that credence not only varies in degrees, but expresses
an epistemic evaluation of a claim. ey also show that credence establishes necessary
55. Metaphysics 13.9, 1086a16-21: χαλεπὸν δ' ἐκ μὴ καλῶς ἐχόντων λέγειν καλῶς, κατ'
Ἐπίχαρμον· ἀρτίως τε γὰρ λέλεκται, καὶ εὐθέως φαίνεται οὐ καλῶς ἔχον. – ἀλλὰ περὶ
μὲν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἱκανὰ τὰ διηπορημένα καὶ διωρισμένα (μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων ἂν ἔτι
πεισθείη τις πεπεισμένος, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ πεπεισμένος οὐθὲν μᾶλλον).
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preconditions for knowledge and binary belief, which will be important to our discussion
of how belief depends on credence.
e !rst passage that deserves sustained attention comes from early in the
Posterior Analytics, during a discussion of scienti!c knowledge (epistêmê) acquired
through demonstration (apodeixis). It is impossible to understand Aristotle’s train of
thought in this passage without recognizing that credence is an epistemic evaluation that
varies by degree. In his view, someone who knows something through demonstration puts
very high credence in what she knows. We cannot say “the highest credence,” because one
must have higher credence in the premises than in the conclusion of a demonstration. We
can, however, say this: no matter how con!dently one maintains one’s belief in something,
she would put more credence in it if she knew it through demonstration.56 Aristotle uses
this as the premise of a reductio for the view that one can have knowledge through
demonstration without !rst understanding the starting-points (archai) for the
demonstration.57 He goes on to say that anyone who has knowledge through
demonstration cannot !nd more convincing any set of starting-points that entail a
contrary conclusion:
If someone is going to have knowledge by demonstration, he should not only
be better acquainted with the starting-points (archas) and put more credence
in them than in what is demonstrated, but there must also be nothing more
convincing to him or more recognizable among those claims which oppose
the starting points, claims from which there will be a deduction of the
contrary error—if, that is, the man who simply knows is supposed to be
unchangeable in persuasion.58
Aristotle frames the conclusion as a result of the requirement that someone who knows
should be unchangeable in persuasion (ametapeiston). Aristotle does not explicitly aﬃrm
56. is I take to be Aristotle’s claim in the tortuous passage at Posterior Analytics 1.2.72a32-34, two
sentences before the passage I intend to discuss. e phrase “what she is no better disposed toward
[than she would be] if she happened to know” is diﬃcult to parse, but the point seems to be that,
however con!dent one is that a given claim is true, knowing the claim through demonstration
(assuming it is the sort of thing that can be demonstrated) will make one more con!dent still.
57. See Posterior Analytics 1.2.
58. Posterior Analytics 1.2, 72a37-b4: τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα ἕξειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν δι' ἀποδείξεως οὐ
μόνον δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς μᾶλλον γνωρίζειν καὶ μᾶλλον αὐταῖς πιστεύειν ἢ τῷ δεικνυμένῳ,
ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἄλλο αὐτῷ πιστότερον εἶναι μηδὲ γνωριμώτερον τῶν ἀντικειμένων ταῖς ἀρχαῖς
ἐξ ὧν ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ὁ τῆς ἐναντίας ἀπάτης, εἴπερ δεῖ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον ἁπλῶς
ἀμετάπειστον εἶναι. 
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that this is something he wants out of a theory of knowledge. Rather, he states the claim
conditionally: if someone who knows through the demonstration is supposed to be
unchangeable in persuasion, then the stated conditions on credence hold. ere is some
evidence, however that Aristotle presupposes that a satisfactory theory of knowledge will
include this condition.59 Whether he holds the substantive view about knowledge is not,
however, crucial to my interpretation; what matters is the view that he evinces about
credence. If, then, someone is to count as having that sort of knowledge, two things must
be true about her credence. First, she must have more credence in those facts from which
the demonstration proceeds (the so-called “starting points”) than she has in the
conclusion. is is a strange claim to make, especially since the conclusions of ideal
demonstrative science are oen the facts that are more immediately familiar to us than the
principles on which they rest.60 
Aristotle’s second condition concerns us more: someone who knows by
demonstration must not have more credence61 in any starting-point that would entail a
proposition that contradicts what she is supposed to know. at is to say, someone cannot
count as having knowledge through demonstration if she puts more credence in premises
that entail a conclusion contrary to what is demonstrated. Aristotle does not say that such
a person need be aware of this instability in her credence. It is consistent with Aristotle’s
case that such a person have a high credence in the demonstrated conclusion. What
disquali!es her from having knowledge is that there are propositions which (1) she
considers at least as likely as the propositions which entail the demonstrated conclusion,
59. See, for instance, Topics 5.2, 130b15-18 and 5.5, 134a34-38, though he seems less sure when he uses the
example at 5.4, 133b28-31. Aristotle’s statements in the Topics do not always represent his considered
views, but his use in these examples suggests that he takes the point to be so obvious that he can use it
without arousing controversy. On Aristotle’s hesitancy about committing to such a view of knowledge,
see especially Brunschwig 2007, 2:146-47. As I say in the main text, whether Aristotle is in the end
committed to the substantive claim about knowledge matters less for my interpretation than how he
analyzes the claim, which is clearly in terms of credence. 
60. For Aristotle’s distinction between what is familiar and prior “to us” vs. what is familiar and prior “in
nature,” see especially Posterior Analytics 1.2, 71b33-72a2, Physics 1.1, 184a16-21, Topics 6.4, 141b3-5
and 24-28, and Nicomachean Ethics 1.4, 1095b2-3. For what I take to be his explication of the
distinction, see Topics 6.4, 141b8-14.
61. Pistos can also connote !nding a proposition plausible or worthy of belief. If my interpretation of
Aristotle’s views on credence is correct, then credence tracks assignments of plausibility: the more
credence someone has in a proposition, the more plausible they !nd it. We need not press this too hard,
however, since I take it Aristotle means autôi pistoteron to do the same work as mallon pisteuein does in
the previous clause.
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and which (2) entail a conclusion contrary to the demonstrated conclusion. Since the
demonstrated conclusion is true, and deducing the contrary conclusion would be an error
(Aristotle assumes this), such a person fails to have knowledge. She fails to have
knowledge because it should be impossible to change a knower’s mind about what she
knows, given that she has an explanation for why things cannot be otherwise.62 If she
could come to !nd a contrary deduction more credible, however, she fails this test: given
her credence, all someone has to do to change her mind is show her the deduction of the
contrary conclusion from what she considers more credible. Aristotle’s discussion makes
no sense unless pistis represents an epistemic assessment. Someone’s pistis determines
what she considers true and is willing to infer, and through that whether her grasp of a
claim amounts to knowledge or not. 
e other two passages that deserve more in-depth treatment both come from the
Nicomachean Ethics. At Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, Aristotle tries to !gure out what goes
wrong in the thinking of a subject who lacks self-control (the akratês). He brie&y
entertains the view that someone can act against their better judgment because the
judgment amounts to mere true belief (doxa), rather than knowledge (epistêmê).
According to such a view, the conviction one has in the better judgment (e.g. all sweets
should be avoided) is overwhelmed by one’s conviction in another universal belief (e.g. all
sweet things should be tasted). Aristotle rejects this analysis because it claims, implausibly,
that someone who believes is, qua believer, less sure of herself than someone who knows.
is cannot be right, because we all know people whose beliefs do not rise to knowledge,
but nonetheless feel no doubt about their view. Here is how he puts it: 
Regarding [the claim that] it is in spite of true belief and not knowledge that
people act without self-control (akrateuontai): that makes no diﬀerence for
the argument. For some people who believe do not doubt, but think that they
know precisely. So if those who believe are more likely to act against their
judgment than those who know because they give [only] slight credence,
then knowledge will diﬀer nothing from belief; for some people are no less
con!dent of what they believe than others are of what they know. Heraclitus
shows this to be the case.63 64
62. See especially Kosman 1990.
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Call a situation where someone acts against their better judgment “akrasia,” aer the
condition of the soul that gives rise to such occasions. e view oﬀered in the above
passage is that a judgment is liable to akrasia when it expresses a true belief that does not
rise to the level of knowledge, whatever that diﬀerence amounts to (Aristotle’s distinction
between belief and knowledge here does not seem to presuppose the view of scienti!c
knowledge he holds in the Analytics). e view presupposes that someone with only true
belief is thereby in an unstable position, apt to change their mind lightly or on a whim.
Aristotle concludes that this view is confused about the relationship between belief and
credence. It is just not the case that having a belief means also having a weak attachment
to the content of the belief. Because of this, the view does not explain what it sets out to.
Aristotle’s argument against the view proceeds in two stages. First, he rejects a
formulation to the eﬀect that, if someone’s judgment in fact expresses a true belief rather
than knowledge, then that judgment is eo ipso vulnerable to akrasia. Such a view makes a
strong assumption about how believers and knowers view their respective epistemic
situations.65 It presupposes that anyone whose belief does not rise to the level of
knowledge is going to feel some doubts about what they believe. Judging from Aristotle’s
vocabulary, it claims that those who believe necessarily hesitate, or are “of two minds”
(distazousin comes from dis, Greek for “two”).66 Aristotle’s counterexample digs that
presupposition out and refutes it. Some people just feel no doubt about about what they
believe, even when their does not in fact rise to the level of knowledge.
In the second step, he considers a revised version of the view that takes this
objection into account. e new view grants that a judgment expressed by mere opinion is
63. Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1146b24-30: Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι
παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ
διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἠρέμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξάζοντες
μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης·
ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται. δηλοῖ δ'
Ἡράκλειτος.
64. On this passage see also Charles (2009, 43-44) from whom I borrow translation of the !nal sentence.
Aristotle does not mean that Heraclitus already oﬀered a persuasive argument for the point he
(Aristotle) just made, but that Heraclitus is a glaring instance of someone who, despite merely opining,
was very sure of himself.
65. Cooper (2009, 34n55) treats pisteuein (to have credence) as psychological attachment to one’s judgment,
which lacks the &avor of epistemic evaluation at the core of what I take Aristotle’s notion to be.
66. See Chantraine 1968, 287 under δίς.
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vulnerable to akrasia because the believers “have slight credence.” at is, it admits that
the believer is on thin ice not just because her belief fails to constitute knowledge, but also
because her commitment is shaky. Here, then, is where the idea that credence comes in
degrees does philosophical work. All Aristotle needs to refute such a view is a situation
where the credence a person invests in their judgment is independent of whether the
judgment amounts to knowledge or true belief. at is to say, “some people are no less
con!dent of what they believe than others are of what they know.” When he says
“knowledge will diﬀer in no way from belief,” he does not mean that the judgment of
someone who knows is just as liable to akrasia as that of someone who believes.67 Rather,
claiming that the credence is slight because the judgment expresses a belief does no
explanatory work. In cases where the credence is marginal, the view seems to have some
purchase, but there also are cases where someone who believes is totally sure of herself.
ere, the view oﬀers no insight, hence Aristotle’s contention that “it will make no
diﬀerence to the argument” to claim belief is subject to akrasia while knowledge is not.
At Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1146b24-30, Aristotle recognizes a mental state that
accompanies both belief and knowledge, and constitutes a dimension along which it is
possible to compare those two states. He uses the verb pisteuein, the verb derived from
pistis, to talk about this mental state. Adverbs of quantity and strength (mallon, êtton,
êrema) indicate that this ingredient can be present to greater or lesser degrees, and a
distinction between people who “hesitate” and those who “think they know precisely”
suggests that the variation measures one’s credence in a particular judgment, i.e. how
likely the judgment seems by one’s own lights. is new moving part lets Aristotle
demolish a widely-held but confused view about why certain judgments are vulnerable to
akrasia. is is clear evidence that pistis is meant to be credence.
e last passage to consider also comes from book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics,
though much later on, during the discussion of pleasure and pain. In this passage,
Aristotle stumps for a certain way of arguing, on the grounds that it impacts our credence
67. At least, this is true if it is a condition on genuine knowledge that the knower cannot be persuaded
otherwise, a view he entertains at Posterior Analytics 1.2, 72a37-b4, one which see page 22.
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in a desirable way. We should, he says, not only say what is true, but also explain why the
opposing (false) view had the initial appeal that made it a competitor for consideration.
Someone who has an explanation for why some view might be attractive (yet false) will, in
Aristotle’s view, put more credence in the true view because such explanations debunk the
false view and strip away its appeal:68 
We should say, then, not only what is true but also the explanation for what
is false, for this contributes to the credence (pistis): for whenever there comes
to light a reasonable (eulogon) explanation for why something seems true
without actually being so, this makes us invest more credence
(pisteuein…mallon) in the truth. So we must say why bodily pleasures appear
more worthy of choice.69 
According to this line of argument, We should do philosophy not just with a view to
establishing what is true, but also to understand the seduction of false but appealing
views. Aristotle says we ought to do this because it adds to our credence in the true view.
His conclusion that we ought also to give “the explanation of the falsehood,” then, does
not mean that we ought to explain why the false view is false. at is just part and parcel
of arguing for a competing view: if two views compete, and one of them is true, it follows
that the other is false, and considerations that speak for the true conclusion speak against
the false conclusion.70 e explanation of the falsehood is therefore something more
sophisticated. It is what we might call a “debunking explanation:” it accounts for why the
view seems to be true, but is actually false.71 e text demands this reading independent of
68. is type of explanation, which explains the (epistemic) attractiveness of a view without vindicating the
view, is related to the type of debunking explanation which constitutes “error theories” about certain
areas of discourse (e.g. normative ethics or ontology). See Mackie 1977 and Joyce 2001 for error
theories about morality, and Bergmann 2005 for an error theory about internal justi!cation in
epistemology. e characteristic burden of an error theory is to explain why we are disposed to think
that our judgments in the domain are true, when they are in fact false. Aristotle’s point here is distinct
from the one he makes at Topics 8.10, 160b35-38. ere, his advice concerns what sort of objection
actually amounts to an objection to the argument, rather than simply a false premise of the argument. 
69. Nicomachean Ethics 7.14, 1154a22-26: Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον
τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν· ὅταν γὰρ εὔλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί
φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὂν ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον. ὥστε λεκτέον διὰ τί
φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἱρετώτεραι.
My translation reads to aition, by anaphora, as the object of phanêi in the second sentence.
70. Aristotle’s views about the semantics of truth and contrary statements at On Expression 14 commit him
to this conclusion about competing claims. I understand “competing” here in the sense of “contrary,”
meaning that both views cannot be true, but both can be false.
71. is interpretation takes the scope of the explanatory demand to extend over the entire clause. Aristotle
is not, on my view, claiming that we should !nd an explanation for why the view is false (even if it
seems true), but rather an explanation for why the view seems true but is nonetheless false. 
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considerations about the dynamics of disagreement. e explanation demanded is an
answer to the later why-question (dia ti); the main verb phrase concerns the view’s
appearing true (phainetai alêthes), while a circumstantial participle with adversative force
(ouk on alêthes) conveys the view’s not actually being true.72 Moreover, the conclusion
Aristotle draws is that he must explain why the bodily pleasures appear more choice-
worthy, not why they are not in fact more choice-worthy. e argument’s conclusion, then,
demands an explanation for the apparent truth of the competing view (emphasis on
“apparent”).
Aristotle’s use in the above passage shows that credence (pistis) comes in degrees
and represents an evaluation of the claim with respect to truth. We ought to provide
debunking explanations because it “adds to the credence.” Giving an argument for the true
view does a certain amount of probative work, to which the debunking explanation
contributes. e supporting premise con!rms that this is what Aristotle means: we “put
more credence in the truth” when we have a debunking explanation in addition to positive
argument. It also gives us an example of how credence operates, for Aristotle. e item
that makes us “invest more credence in the truth” is an aition, an explanation. Credence,
then, responds to evidence, i.e. considerations that favor the truth of one claim over
another, though do not necessarily demonstrate either one.73 is is reason to think, as we
said before, that credence expresses an epistemic evaluation of a claim, not merely a
psychological attachment to it.74 e passage treats one speci!c example of this dynamic,
where debunking some claim makes a competing claim more epistemically appealing. e
word doxa does not show up in this passage, because Aristotle is not here oﬀering an
argument about the relation between mental states. e passage nonetheless reveals an
aspect of Aristotle’s view about the relation between credence and belief if we make the
following reasonable assumption: in stating the truth, one aims to get others to form true
beliefs. On this assumption, Aristotle’s prescription that “we should say what is true” is
72. See Smyth 1920, 456-57 for how these participles generally behave. It is not, however, unheard of for a
participle to carry the main idea of a clause: see Smyth 1920, 477.
73. For more on this broad notion of evidence, see Chapter 2, page 52.
74. See page 14.
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grounded in a prescription to convince people of the truth. e implicit picture seems to
be this: for someone to embrace a proﬀered view, they must be suﬃciently convinced of it.
It is possible for the positive argument in favor of what is, in fact, the true view to carry
insuﬃcient conviction, perhaps due to undefeated considerations in favor of the
competing view.75 A debunking explanation removes the appeal of the competing view
and thereby raises credence in the true view, perhaps to the point of full endorsement.
More on this further point later.
ese more involved passages con!rm that credence, for Aristotle, is a necessary
precondition for belief and other propositional attitudes. Credence is common to both
belief (doxa) and knowledge (epistêmê), in the sense that both those who believe and
those who know seem to have this other mental relation to the content of their beliefs and
knowledge. If belief and knowledge track what the subject takes to be true (albeit in very
diﬀerent ways), then pistis seems to track how likely she takes a given claim to be true. At
Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, Aristotle counters the claim that judgments are vulnerable to
akrasia if they express belief rather than knowledge with the observation that some who
believe do not doubt (distazousin), but think they know precisely (akbribôs). He then
describes the person who doubts as “having slight credence” (êrema pisteuein). e most
natural way to take these claims is as statements about the subject’s evaluation of the truth.
is language suggests that credence is an epistemic attitude: it represents an
evaluation with respect to truth, not merely how the subject feels. Having little credence in
a claim does not mean that they hate that it is true, or wish it were not true; it means that
they have some doubt. Similarly, a high credence does not represent desire that a claim be
true, or gladness that it is true, but rather an evaluation of whether it is true. Too little
pistis, and there will be no belief. Aristotle’s argument in Nicomachean Ethics 7.14 supports
this picture. Debunking explanations give us more credence in the truth. ey do this by
giving us additional reason to rule out the competing claim. It follows that credence, at
75. Aristotle makes an analogous claim with respect to knowledge (epistêmê), which has stricter standards
than doxa. See Posterior Analytics 1.2, 72b1-4: If someone is to have understanding simply as such, she
must not !nd more plausible any of the “opposite starting-points” from which a “deduction of the
opposite error” might be possible. is is a necessary condition for someone who has knowledge to be
“unchangeable in their conviction” (ametapeiston). I discuss this passage more at page 22.
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least ideally, tracks our assessment of likelihood, not our fervency or “faith” in a non-
epistemic sense. For an example of the latter, consider a high-school student who attends a
pep rally and, by participating in cheers and being moved by the rallying cries, becomes
sure that his school’s football team will win the homecoming game. e pep rally gives
him no real evidence that his team is more likely to win, but it does make him fervently
support his team. is is a very diﬀerent kind of mental state from the one we encounter
in our texts.76 For an example of the state Aristotle has in mind, consider the coach who
watches a rival team play, in preparation for their imminent contest. He sees their
impregnable defensive line, their quarterback throwing pinpoint passes with an
impeccable sense of when to run. He takes all this in and thinks, “they’re going to crush
us,” though he would never admit this to his players. e thought is not merely an
expression of despair, the way that the student’s faith in the team is an expression of his
support. Rather, it is a response to the balance of his evidence. He is not fervently attached
to this claim: he would give it up in a moment, if he could, yet his credence is very high. 
4. Interlude: Credence and Truth
Before we complete our account of Aristotle’s argument with an explanation of how belief
depends on credence, we should note that Aristotle never refers to pistis as true or false,
nor does he ever qualify pisteuein with any adverb to denote its happening truly or
falsely.77 What is more, this is unlikely to be an accident of the data. Since he talks
extensively about the truth and falsehood of most every other cognitive state (belief,
knowledge, practical wisdom, representation, understanding, etc.), and since my
interpretation commits him to the view that credence is an evaluation of the truth of a
claim, it is worth seeing that my account can explain this pattern of use.
76. Aristotle does in fact use pistis to denote this kind of mental state: see Politics 5.5, 1305a22 and 5.11,
1313b2. In those instances, the best translation would be “con!dence” in a non-epistemic sense, where
it is a close cousin of “pride.” ese uses are rare, isolated to a particular context, and do not implicate
the cognate verbs and adjectives, the way that clearly epistemic uses of pistis do. 
77. Results obtained by numerous morphological searches of the TLG through the Diogenes interface. He
does speak, as we have seen, of “investing more credence in the truth,” where to alêthes or some similar
phrase is the dative object of pisteuein, but this, I think, has a diﬀerent sense than saying that someone
has credence truly, in the same way that someone believes truly. 
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It is tempting to explain this pattern of use in the following (false) way: unlike
belief (doxa) and knowledge (epistêmê), credence is not a kind of entertaining
(hupolêpsis). It is therefore (so the story goes) not in the business of making assertions, the
way belief is, and is therefore not truth-apt, i.e. the kind of state that is either true or false.
is explanation falls &at because mental states can be truth-apt while failing to be
assertoric. Consider representation (phantasia): Aristotle says on several occasions that it
is truth-apt, but it does not make assertions.78 Neither is being a form of entertaining
necessary or suﬃcient for a mental state to be assertoric. Aristotle allows the possibility of
entertaining something without giving it credence. is means that the content is not the
object of commitment, and is therefore not asserted. So credence does not fail to be truth-
apt by failing to be assertoric or by falling outside the genus of entertaining. 
On my view of pistis as credence, this issue has nothing to do with whether pistis is
a form of entertaining. Rather, credence is not truth-apt because it comes in degrees, but
truth does not come in degrees. Aristotle seems committed to a correspondence theory of
truth for assertions and assertoric mental states.79 Saying of what is, that it is, is true, and
saying of what is, that it is not, is false.80 One can replace “saying” with “believing” and it
comes to much the same thing.81 Since truth does not come in degrees, there is no way in
which our degrees of credence match up or fail to match up to reality, so as a result the
credence (which is always some degree of credence) is neither true nor false.
is interpretation must answer the objection that Aristotle frequently uses
comparative and superlative forms of alêthês (true).82 I argue that, since Aristotle quali!es
pistis and related words with comparative adverbs and adjectives, it is a state that comes in
78. For a detailed discussion of representation’s being truth-apt, see Chapter 3, at page 82.
79. See Crivelli 2004, 130-32 for details on what kind of correspondence theory it is correct to attribute to
Aristotle. e details of that debate will make little diﬀerence for the substance of my argument.
80. See Metaphysics 4.7, 1011b26-27, on which see Crivelli 2004, 132-34 for close reading and
interpretation. e main text does not list all four possibilities, for the sake of brevity: there is also
saying of what is not, that it is not (which is true) and saying of what is not, that it is (which is false).
Again, none of these four cases adequately describes the relationship between a given level of credence
and the claim that it evaluates.
81. See, for instance, On Expression 14, 23a33-35 and 24b2-4. In both these passages, Aristotle assumes that
the semantics for belief will be isomorphic to the semantics for statement-making sentences.
82. Some examples: Prior Analytics 1.27, 43b9-11, Posterior Analytics 2.19, 100b11-12, Generation of
Animals 2.4, 740b26-27, and Metaphysics 2.1, 993b26-30.
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degrees. If Aristotle follows the same practice with his word for truth, then I must, on pain
of contradiction, admit that truth, for Aristotle, comes in degrees, whatever that might
amount to. is objection sinks because Aristotle tells us explicitly what he means when
he says that something is “more true” or “truest,” and it has nothing to do with truth
coming in degrees the way we think of credence as coming in degrees. In book 2 of the
Metaphysics, he lays out an argument for why the object of philosophy should be
knowledge of those eternal truths which do not depend on anything else for their truth.
His view is that philosophy should grasp what is “most true.” Something is truer which
causes the truth of other things, so those eternal things must be what is most true:
Each thing due to which the quality which follows its name (to sunonumon)
belongs to the others is that thing to the greatest degree (malista)—so for
example !re is the hottest thing, for that thing is the cause of hotness among
the others. And so that is truest (alêthestaton) which is the cause among
posterior things of their being true. For this reason, it is necessary that the
principles of what is always the case are the truest—for they are not true at a
certain time, neither is there anything which is the cause of their being the
case, but rather they are the reason that other things are true—so that as each
matter is about being, so is it also about truth.83, 84
According to this argument, a state of aﬀairs85 is truer than another state of aﬀairs if it is
more fundamental in an explanatory sense. is is a very diﬀerent idea of something
coming in degrees. On my interpretation, credence come in degrees because someone can
have a range of credal responses to some claim, from absolute disbelief through varying
degrees of doubt to complete con!dence. A similar scheme for truth would imply that a
given state of aﬀairs fall along a range of truth-values ranging from completely false to
completely true. ere is no hint of that sort of scheme in this passage from the
Metaphysics. Rather, it sets out a metaphysics of explanation as a relation between two
states of aﬀairs. Some state of aﬀairs explains another if the other depends on it. States
83. Metaphysics 2.1, 993b24-31: ἕκαστον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων καθ' ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
ὑπάρχει τὸ συνώνυμον (οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμότατον· καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ αἴτιον τοῦτο τῆς
θερμότητος)· ὥστε καὶ ἀληθέστατον τὸ τοῖς ὑστέροις αἴτιον τοῦ ἀληθέσιν εἶναι. διὸ τὰς
τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἀρχὰς ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀληθεστάτας (οὐ γάρ ποτε ἀληθεῖς, οὐδ'
ἐκείναις αἴτιόν τί ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖναι τοῖς ἄλλοις), ὥσθ' ἕκαστον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ εἶναι,
οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.
84. Reading the last two genitives as genitives of connection: see Smyth 1920, §326.
85. Aristotle does not seem to be talking about assertions or beliefs in this passage, but rather about those
things in the world that either obtain or do not obtain, e.g. states of aﬀairs. 
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which depend on fewer other states for their truth have a certain primacy, which Aristotle
designates with the locution “more true.” Aristotle is not, therefore, giving us a picture of
degrees of truth which could provide a semantics on which to base the truth of various
degrees of credence, which vindicates my proposed explanation for why pistis is neither
true nor false.
We could not explain comparative talk about credence in the same way that
Aristotle explicates degrees of truth in the Metaphysics for two reasons. First, Aristotle
tends to note degrees of credence with pisteuein plus a comparative adverb, not a
comparative adjective. What he means is that a subject does something—namely give
credence—to a greater, lesser, or highest degree. e claims are about a character of the
subject’s mental state, not the explanatory relationships that it has toward other states of
aﬀairs. Second, Aristotle makes credential comparisons between states of aﬀairs that
cannot bear any causal or explanatory relationships to each other. For instance, in our
passage from the Prior Analytics,86 Aristotle says that someone who knows through a
demonstration must put more credence in the principle from which the demonstration
proceeds than she puts in anything from which she could make a mistaken deduction
contrary to what she is supposed to know through the demonstration. Call the true
starting-point DEM (for demonstrator) and the misleading contrary starting-point ANTI.
ANTI, since it is one of the claims in opposition to (antikeimenôn) a genuine (i.e. true)
starting-point, is false. If we are to understand credential comparisons the same way that
we understand alethic comparisons, Aristotle’s claim is that DEM is the cause or
explanation for why the subject puts credence in ANTI. is is, however, exactly the
opposite of what Aristotle is saying. If anything, DEM is a reason the subject does not put
any credence in ANTI.
It is nonetheless part of my view that credences have propositional content. ey
represent a subject’s evaluation of whether something is true, and that “something” is
going to be a proposition. e proposition itself will be either true or false (unless,
86. See above at page 22.
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perhaps, it is a future contingent), and this gives us some reason to say that the credence
itself will be true or false. Belief and representation, for example, are called true if their
propositional content is true and false if it is false. ere are other mental states that can
have propositional content, but are not called true and false on the basis of whether that
content is true or false. Propositional desire is the most obvious example. Suppose I want
this dissertation to be !nished; that is, I want the proposition expressed by the sentence
“this dissertation is !nished” (along with the appropriate demonstration) to be true. e
proposition is currently false, but my desire is not for that reason false. is leaves some
room to say that credences are not true or false, even though their content will be one or
the other.
5. How Belief Depends On Credence
We can now provide an explanation for how belief depends on credence, thus completing
our account of the argument. Belief depends on credence, for Aristotle, in the following
way: someone forms a binary belief that some claim is true when they invest suﬃcient
credence in the claim.87 Credence is neither true or false because it lies on a continuum
and so cannot bear the sort of semantic relation to states of aﬀairs that would allow it to be
true or false. Aristotle’s syllogistic formalization of reasoning (both theoretical and
practical) requires, however, that the claims represented in the syllogism be claims which
the agent takes to be true, and therefore to which she is committed. It makes no sense to
explain an agent’s action in terms of the execution of a practical syllogism, then turn
around and say that the agent did not take one or more of the premises of the syllogism to
be true. A subject’s pistis, does not unfailingly capture claims to which a person is
committed. One might have a certain amount of credence in a claim, and think it fairly
likely, but still not really believe it. States like belief and knowledge are what encode a
subject’s commitments. 
87. For a modern statement of this view, see Sturgeon 2008, 141-42, especially for the apt turn of phrase
that binary belief “grows out of ” certain levels of credence (which he calls “con!dence”). I do not mean
to suggest that Aristotle had anything approaching a mathematical model of credence and belief
change.
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Aristotle rejects the idea that propositions to which the agent is uncommitted can
have such an in&uence on their practical reasoning. We see this in book 4 of the
Metaphysics, where he argues against a form of global Protagorean relativism. His
argument is ad hominem: to his thinking, even an avowed relativist would shrink from
saying that what is true diﬀers depending on whether the experiencing subject is asleep or
awake.88 Even relativists do not take their dreams as seriously as they take their waking
life. To prove this, Aristotle formulates an example that he takes to be uncontroversial:
at they do not think this is obvious: for no one, at least, if he should
entertain the notion (hupolabêi) some night that he is in Athens when he is
actually in Libya, makes his way toward the Odeon.89
e structure of the case seems to be this: Someone supposes while sleeping90 that he is in
Athens, but he is actually in Libya. is apprehension does not cause him to go to the
Odeon (we are to assume, I think, that he has some desire to go there), because he does
not actually believe that he is in Athens. It is not clear how this is supposed to make any
progress against the relativist, and we need not worry about that for our purposes.91 What
matters is that Aristotle presents a case of entertaining (hupolêpsis) which does not
in&uence how the subject acts, and it lacks that in&uence because the subject does not
commit to it. To play a role in the subject’s reasoning, then, the proposition must receive
commitment, whether that commitment be in the form of doxa, epistêmê or (in certain
special cases phantasia.92
It is here that someone is likely to press a version of the conventional
interpretation of pistis, whereby it denotes just this sort of commitment to a claim.93 Such
88. See Metaphysics 4.5, 1008b3-9. e cited argument is part of a cluster of related claims: are relativists
really, Aristotle asks, committed to saying that something is itself heavier for the weak than for the
strong, and that objects are really themselves smaller for someone who is farther away from them?
89. Metaphysics 4.5, 1008b9-11: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἴονταί γε, φανερόν· οὐθεὶς γοῦν, ἐὰν ὑπολάβῃ
νύκτωρ Ἀθήνῃσιν εἶναι ὢν ἐν Λιβύῃ, πορεύεται εἰς τὸ ᾠδεῖον.
90. Most likely as the result of a dream, but the entertaining itself need not be a part of the dream. See
especially On Dreams 1, 458b24-26 for propositional entertaining in sleep that are distinct from dreams.
91. e relativist can reply like so: ere is no reason for him not to proceed to the Odeon in her dream, for
it is true for him in the dream that she is in Athens. Her failing to proceed to the Odeon when he wakes
up also says nothing against the view; the relativist can say that what is true for him when dreaming
need not remain true upon waking.
92. For discussion of the last option, see Chapter 4. e “special cases” amount to the absence of a critical
faculty that overrides the information that comes from perception and imagination.
93. See earlier at page 18.
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an interpretation suggests translations like “con!dence,” or weaker still, “acceptance.”94 e
believer not only entertains the content of the belief, but takes it to be true. Whether one
takes pistis to be “con!dence” or “acceptance” will further depend on whether the
commitment in question is !rm and fervent or of some lower intensity. Aristotle shows no
interest in settling such details at On the Soul 3.3. What matters is that, on this
interpretation, pistis is the taking-to-be-true, not an epistemic evaluation that comes in
degrees, upon which the commitment supervenes in some way.95 Most commentary and
translation on this passage assumes an interpretation of this sort. 
Any interpretation of this kind, though, is going to get things wrong because it
presupposes that pistis is the entertaining (hupolêpsis) of a propositional content.96
Aristotle, however, explicitly distinguishes entertaining a claim from the further mental
operation of giving it credence. In the Topics, Aristotle argues for why credence and
entertaining come apart in order to illustrate mistaken arguments that crop up about
concepts that are “closely associated” (parakolouthoun) with each other.97 He is quite clear
that credence is not a form of entertaining:
By the same token, neither is credence an entertaining: for it is possible to
have the same entertaining while not giving it credence (pisteuonta), and this
is not possible, if credence is a species (eidos) of entertaining. For it is not
possible for something still to remain the same (to auto) if it should be
transferred entirely out of its species, just as the same animal cannot
sometimes be a man and sometimes not.98
94. For an instance of the weaker reading, see Hamlyn 1968, 132. Some construe pistis itself (rather than
doxa) as “belief,” and take doxa to be “opinion.” See, for instance, Lycos 1964 and Grimaldi 1972, though
Grimaldi does not treat this On the Soul passage. I must admit I do not have a keen sense of the
diﬀerence, or what this move is supposed to accomplish.
95. is tendency is clear even in the ancient commentators, who oen assimilate Aristotle’s notion of
credence to the Stoic notion of assent (sunkatathesis), which is foreign to Aristotle’s own philosophical
vocabulary. See especially Alexander, On the Soul 67.15-18 and ps-Simplicius, Commentary on the Soul
90.17-19.
96. For this picture of hupolêpsis as an essentially propositional form of entertainment, see especially Wedin
1984, 102-07.
97. See Topics 4.5, 125b28: “Sometimes [people in a debate] posit what is related [to a concept] in some way
or other as the genus.” From the context, it is clear that Aristotle thinks this is a mistake.
98. Topics 4.5, 125b35-39: κατὰ ταὐτὰ δ' οὐδ' ἡ πίστις ὑπόληψις· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν
ὑπόληψιν καὶ μὴ πιστεύοντα ἔχειν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δ', εἴπερ εἶδος ἡ πίστις ὑπολήψεως· οὐ
γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἔτι διαμένειν, ἄνπερ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους ὅλως μεταβάλῃ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ
τὸ αὐτὸ ζῷον ὁτὲ μὲν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ὁτὲ δὲ μή.
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Aristotle’s argument seems to go like this: consider a token entertaining, say of the notion
that thunder is a quenching of !re in the clouds. Someone can entertain that content
without giving it credence. is happens quite oen, in cases we would call hypothesis or
idle fancy.99 One can, however, have the same apprehension and also give it credence. is
would be true in the case of a scientist who puts forward some hypothesis in which he is
not inclined to believe, and later con!rms it to his satisfaction.100 is is not possible,
Aristotle says, if credence is a form of entertaining. It would be akin to a particular animal
being a man sometimes and but not other times.101 Credence attaches to instances of
entertaining (it parakolouthei entertaining, to use Aristotle’s term), but it is not a part of
the entertaining family, which includes belief (doxa), practical wisdom and scienti!c
knowledge (On the Soul 3.3, 427b24-26).
Aristotle’s point is not just that one can entertain without committing. at would
show that credence is not coextensive with entertaining as a genus, but it would not follow
that it is not a species of entertaining. In the Topics passage, however, Aristotle makes the
stronger claim that the same particular entertaining can exist with credence and without.
is makes credence an accident of entertaining, not a species of it. So it is not the
entertaining of some content, which seems to rule out “acceptance,” “conviction” and
“belief ” as proper ways to understand the term. is does not imply that credence is non-
propositional; neither representation nor perception are species of entertaining, yet both
can have propositional content. On my view, however, credence is not the entertaining of
a content, but rather a certain attitude toward an entertained content. So pistis should not
be taken as something like acceptance or taking-true. Instead, we should take it to denote
credence, in the sense we have previously discussed.102
99. For an apparent instance of this entertaining without commitment, see Metaphysics 4.5, 1008b9-11,
discussed on page 35.
100. Pure examples of this case are probably quite rare. In my experience, experimental scientists oen put
forward hypotheses in which they are already invested to an extent. How frequently such cases occur in
the real world is, however, irrelevant. What matters is that they are quite conceivable.
101.e argument here seems to be that individual substances have their species essentially, which entails
that a given substance cannot cease to fall under a certain species and remain the same substance. See
Kripke 1980, 123ﬀ. for consideration of a similar thesis regarding natural kinds.
102. See page 14.
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ere is a further reason to think that pistis does not itself denote commitment, in
the sense of a binary taking-to-be-true. Aristotle says that pistis is something that non-
human animals cannot have. He both states the claim on its own and as a consequence of
the claim that non-human animals do not possess reason. It is not the case, however, that
animals are unable to commit to the representational content of their mental states. It is
more accurate to say that animals cannot help but commit to such representational
content. Humans are the ones who are able to doubt, be slightly convinced, and evince a
broad range of stances toward claims.103 Such an interpretation, then, commits Aristotle to
a contradiction with himself, and my interpretation saves him from it. A defender of the
view that pistis just denotes commitment might respond that the commitment Aristotle
has in mind is of a special sort, open only to humans. ere are several ways to !ll in such
a claim: perhaps the sort of commitment is taken toward propositional claims, and only
humans can have any sort of attitude toward propositional claims. at particular way is
not going to work because perception and representation can also propositional content
(though they need not always).104 We can have a representation that the sun is a foot
across, and lions can hear that a goat is nearby.105 Animals can therefore commit to
propositional content, even if that content does not take the form of a belief. 
We might instead say that the kind of commitment pistis denotes is the result of
linguistic consciousness. It represents our ability to talk each other into and out of
believing things, and this is a process in which animals cannot participate.106 I will
postpone discussion of whether speech and language play a relevant part in the argument
Aristotle gives in our passage from On the Soul.107 We need not settle that question to see a
103. See Chapter 4, “Reason and Restraint,” page 157, where I substantiate these claims. See also Sorabji 1993
for a brief discussion (with plenty of citations) of the Stoic position on this question. Commitment, for
the Stoics (which they call “assent”) seems from our sources to be a positive mental act, one of which
animals are incapable, which incapacity partially explains their lack of reason. I take this position to be
very diﬀerent (and markedly less plausible) than Aristotle’s own. Sorabji makes a fair point, however,
that the implausibility might be due to the passages’ !ltering down to us from hostile sources, which no
doubt aﬀected their context and formulation.
104. See Sorabji 1992 and Sorabji 1996, which argue that Aristotle expands the content of perception and
phantasia precisely because he does not allow rational thinking to animals. 
105. In the order mentioned: On Dreams 2, 460b18-19 and Nicomachean Ethics 3.10, 1118a20-21.
106. See especially Heil 2003 and Labarrière 1984, 30-34. 
107. See Chapter 2, “A Radical Alternative?,” page 69.
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strange consequence of the interpretation. If this interpretation is correct, then Aristotle
must say that beliefs only form as a result of those capacities we have due to linguistic
consciousness. He would not, for instance, be able to refer to perceptual beliefs, because
perception is not a linguistic capacity and is moreover something that we share with
animals who do not enjoy linguistic consciousness. e interpretation does not deny that
we commit to our perception, but it must say that this commitment is not pistis, the
special kind of commitment that non-rational animals do not share. If there is no pistis
toward perception, there can be no perceptual belief. is sounds too messy to be right,
and indeed it is dead wrong, because Aristotle grants an important role to belief that
comes through perception. Perception holds sway over the beliefs that we have about
particulars (as opposed to universals). In Aristotle’s formalization of practical reasoning, a
universal belief and a particular belief interact in the manner of a syllogism and force the
practical conclusion:
One belief concerns a universal, the other [belief] a particular, over which
perception is already authoritative. Whenever one claim arises out of them, it
is necessary that the soul aﬃrm the conclusion, and in matters that concern
doing, to act immediately.108
e universal premise of the practical syllogism represents a relevant rule of thumb or
guiding principle of conduct.109 e particular premise represents the relevant aspect of
the situation in which the agent currently !nds herself, and the two result in a
“conclusion” in accordance with which the agent must act, on pain of irrationality or some
other defect.110 It is certainly possible for the agent to hold her particular belief as a result
because she was talked into thinking that things are that way. Aristotle is, however,
certainly right to say that our powers of observation hold sway over how we take the
108. Nicomachean Ethics 7.3.1147a25-28: ἣ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ'
ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ
συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς.
For a thorough discussion of how to translate this passage, with which my translation agrees in all
relevant ways, see Charles 2009.
109. See especially Bäck 2009, 118-20 for a view of how perception gives practical reasoning some of its raw
material. Bäck seems, however, to think that incidental perception, is the product of inference. Against
this, see Cashdollar 1973. If Bäck’s view were correct, then animals would be capable of inference, and
Aristotle says explicitly that they are not. 
110. See, for example, Santas 1969, 169-71, Charles 1984, 114-17, and McKerlie 1991, 307-8.
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world to be. He calls the grasp we have of the particulars of our situation a doxa, and
according to our passage from On the Soul 3.3, doxa depends on pistis. If belief can result
from perception, and belief depends on pistis, then it must be possible for pistis to come
about by perception, which is non-linguistic. Pistis is not, therefore, a special kind of
commitment that we have in virtue of our linguistic consciousness.111
So pistis does not denote commitment itself, even a special kind of commitment
that only humans can have. My suggestion, in line with my translation as “credence,” is
that it is a sort of mental bookkeeping that determines whether we commit to various
claims. We have seen that credence lies on a continuum for Aristotle. On my proposed
account for how belief depends on credence, there is for any given claim a threshold of
credence which represents the point at which a subject commits, thereby forming a belief
about the claim. To put it in more intuitive terms, there is a point at which the subject
becomes sure enough of something to employ it in her practical and theoretical reasoning.
is kind of scheme does not require that the subject be certain. Aristotle’s remarks about
credence, in fact, indicate the opposite. His discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean
Ethics indicates that someone’s believing something is compatible with a measure of doubt
(distazein). All it means is that there is a point beyond which more credence means that
the subject will commit to the claim.
e text we have already surveyed gives us grounds to accept this interpretation.
Foremost, we have Aristotle’s discussion of debunking explanation at Nicomachean Ethics
7.14.112 ere, he claims that debunking explanations add to credence that the positive
argument provides for the true view. e debunking explanation makes us put more
credence in the truth (pisteuein tôi alêthei mallon) than the positive argument alone. is
presupposes that the positive argument furnishes some credence for the true view on its
own. ere must be cases, however, when the credence that comes from positive argument
is not enough. If this were the case, we would not require a debunking explanation that
111. See also Sophistical Refutations 5, 167b4, where Aristotle refers to “mistakes that occur regarding belief
that results from perception (ek tês aisthêseôs).”
112. See quotation at page 27.
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makes us trust the truth even more.113 Yet Aristotle says that we do require such
explanations, and concludes from this, in the manner of a particular truth derived from
general principle, that he owes an explanation for why the bodily pleasures seem to be
choice-worthy but are actually not. ere are, as I see it, two ways to interpret Aristotle’s
thinking here.
e !rst is what we might call the “therapeutic” interpretation. On this
interpretation, Aristotle is obliged to furnish a debunking explanation because the positive
argument will not create suﬃcient psychological attachment to the claim for someone to
adhere to it view in their practical reasoning. e bodily pleasures have an enticement that
the competing, choice-worthy alternatives do not always have, and so agents require a
debunking explanation to armor themselves against the temptation. It serves as a
reminder of the reasons (excessive) bodily pleasure is not actually choice-worthy, even
though it may seem that way sometimes. I call this interpretation “therapeutic” because it
takes the function of a debunking explanation to be helping the agent get by, rather than
aiming at the truth. is is philosophy in something of an Epicurean mode, where the
arguments are meant to set one’s mind at ease, and removing doubts is but a means to that
end.114 e main consideration in favor of this interpretation is Aristotle’s concern, earlier
in book 7, with an agent’s ability to abide by her convictions in the face of temptation. It is
plausible that such a concern might also animate his discussion about the choice-
worthiness of pleasure.
Against this I propose the “epistemic” interpretation. Aristotle’s argument on this
reading concerns whether the subject believes the view, not whether she is willing to “stick
to her guns.” On this view, the debunking explanation rules out considerations that seem
to weigh in favor of the competing view. Insofar as a competing (and so contrary) view
appears to be true, it provides a consideration against thinking that the competing view is
true. In other words, any consideration in favor of the contrary view is a prospective
113. Dei is Aristotle’s general “ought” verb. It connotes a normative requirement, but carries no overt moral
connotation. at is, it does not denote speci!cally moral obligation, but obligation of any sort. See
especially Kraut 2006 and note 250 on page 96 of this dissertation.
114. See especially Nussbaum 1994, 102ﬀ.
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defeater for what is in fact the true view. Without a debunking explanation, the competing
view still appears to be true, which means that it continues to provide a consideration
against the true view. A debunking explanation shows that the defeater is in this case
merely apparent: it is not actually reasons to doubt the true view. is is debunking
explanations they “add to the credence,” as Aristotle puts it. 
is interpretation is more plausible than the therapeutic interpretation for two
reasons. First, Aristotle couches this passage in a debate between advocates of diﬀerent
views on pleasure: he has le the discussion of akrasia behind, as of Nicomachean Ethics
7.11. e opening lines of 7.14 establish an argumentative burden:
It is necessary to investigate bodily pleasures, necessary for those who say
that some pleasures are very worthy of choice, i.e. the noble ones, but not
those which are bodily and regarding which someone is unbridled
(akolastos).115
He then lays out several questions that await someone who advocates such a view of
pleasure, and oﬀers the hypothesis that someone is a fool by virtue of pursuing an excess of
pleasure, not the pleasure simply as such.116 He follows this up with the statement that one
should oﬀer debunking explanations as well as positive argument. From this general
principle he takes it to follow (hôste at 1154a25) that he ought to explain why bodily
pleasures seem more worthy of choice than they actually are. e context of the passage
about debunking explanation does not, therefore, suggest an attempt to shore up
someone’s conviction in the face of temptation, but rather an attempt to convince
interlocutors that something is true, partly by means of debunking explanation. 
e second reason to favor the epistemic interpretation is Aristotle’s language in
the passage itself. Debunking explanations “contribute to the pistis,” and someone who
favors the therapeutic interpretation might take that as evidence that such explanations
are meant to shore up one’s conviction in the face of temptation. e image of one’s faith
providing “strength” in trying times is common, but it is not plausible to attribute such an
115. Nicomachean Ethics 7.14, 1154a8-10: Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον τοῖς
λέγουσιν ὅτι ἔνιαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταὶ σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ καλαί, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ
περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος.
116. Nicomachean Ethics 7.4, 1154a16-22.
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image to Aristotle. First of all, the Christian worldview from which this image draws its
power is entirely alien to him. Second, among the instances where pistis denotes a mental
state, there are only three where it clearly denotes some non-epistemic kind of
“con!dence.”117 By this, I mean the sort of con!dence that the student has in his team aer
attending the pep rally, where the attitude does not bear on the truth or falsehood of some
claim, but rather a sense of allegiance or faith in a person or institution.118 Aristotle’s
argument for the claim that debunking explanation “adds to the pistis” shows that he does
not have in mind the kind of “strengthening” on which the therapeutic interpretation
relies. Instead, he argues that a reasonable explanation (eulogon) makes us put more
credence in the truth (tôi alêthei). e vocabulary describes someone weighing reasons in
favor of believing something, not someone casting about for reassurance. e epistemic
interpretation seems the way to go. Furthermore, we do not in our passage from 7.14 see
the one word we would expect Aristotle to use if he meant that we needed help standing
!rm against temptation: emmenein, “to abide by” something. In the preceding discussion
of agents who lack self-control, Aristotle uses emmenein to describe people who stand by
their convictions, and holds up the akratics as paradigm cases of those who fail to do so.119
If Aristotle were worried that considerations of pleasure might overwhelm the appeal of
his positive argument, we would expect him to use his characteristic language for
describing such scenarios. Instead, we see only the argument that debunking explanations
give us more credence in the truth. is favors the epistemic interpretation.
How, then, does this passage (read epistemically) support my hypothesis about
how belief depends on credence? Consider two claims A and B, such that A entails not-B
and B entails not-A. Suppose that B has a certain intuitive pull: it “appears to be true,”
regardless of whether it is actually true. Since B entails not-A, any reason to think that B is
true is a reason to think that A is false. Consider the sets of claims which express putative
reasons to think that A and B are true: call them R(A) and R(B), respectively. A
117. Eudemian Ethics 7.2, 1237b13, Politics 5.5, 1305a22, and 5.11, 1313b2. For this sense of “con!dence” he
usually uses the word thrasos, on which see Garver 1982.
118. For the pep rally example see page 30.
119. See Nicomachean Ethics 7.2, 1146a19-21, 7.7, 1150b20, 7.8, 1151a2, 7.9, 1151b19-23, and 7.10,
1152a28-30. See also Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110a29-31 for another example. 
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debunking explanation (call it D) explains why the putative reasons expressed in R(B) are
not genuine reasons to think that B is true. It undermines the intuitive appeal of B,
granting that B appears to be true but is nevertheless false. Consider now a subject S,
before she thinks about D. She has some reasons to think that A is true—expressed in
R(A)—and some reasons to think that A is false, expressed in R(B). Her credence in A
gets dragged down by the putative reasons expressed in R(B). When she considers D,
however, she learns that R(B) is no longer relevant to whether A is true. e net eﬀect is
that she puts more credence in A, just as Aristotle says. 
If we adopt an epistemic interpretation of Aristotle’s argument, his reasoning
commits him to a threshold view about about how belief depends on credence. His talk
about debunking explanations comes couched in prescription, something that he should
do if he is going to defend his view that some pleasures are worth choosing. He feels an
obligation to do so because debunking explanations make us put more credence in the
true claim. Aristotle’s remarks in other philosophical contexts, however, indicate that he
does not think that one must introduce a consideration simply on the grounds that it will
increase someone’s credence in a true proposition. at is, there is not a general obligation
to bring every possible consideration to bear during a discussion. What matters, and what
limits the obligation, is whether additional considerations would add up to convince
someone who is not already convinced. Aristotle says as much as he !nishes his
discussion about the ontology of numbers in the Metaphysics. It is not worth arguing
further for a view if it will not bring people on board who were not already convinced:
But about numbers, what has been discussed and laid down is enough (for
someone who has already been persuaded would be persuaded yet further
by more [sc. arguments], while someone who has not already been
convinced would get no closer to being convinced).120
Aristotle grants that, were he to bring forward more arguments, the people who already
believe him would give even more credence to what he says.121 He stops, however, because
120. Metaphysics 13.9, 1086a18-21: ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἱκανὰ τὰ διηπορημένα καὶ
διωρισμένα (μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων ἂν ἔτι πεισθείη τις πεπεισμένος, πρὸς δὲ τὸ
πεισθῆναι μὴ πεπεισμένος οὐθὲν μᾶλλον).
See also page 20 for more on this passage.
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he thinks that, if someone is not on board by this point, more argument is not going to
bring him around. is shows that the mere potential to increase someone’s credence in a
claim (to “make them even more convinced,” as Aristotle puts it here) does not generate
an obligation to continue the argument. e obligation comes up if the argument has the
potential to push someone over the threshold from not believing the claim to believing it.
Our passage about debunking explanation is a context where he does feel the need to
provide further considerations. His point is not simply that there is a debunking
explanation at hand, though, since that alone is not enough to ground the obligation. He
must instead think that the debunking explanation could make the diﬀerence between
someone accepting the view and falling short of accepting the view. He presupposes that
the positive argument already makes us “put credence in the truth” to some extent (since
he claims that debunking makes us do so to a greater degree), so his need for further
argument shows that he thinks positive argument alone will not be enough to carry full
conviction. e intuitive pull of the undefeated competing view might be suﬃcient to
prevent people from believing the true view. is is exactly the scenario that the epistemic
interpretation of the passage puts forward. 
It is reasonable, then, to think that a threshold account expresses Aristotle’s view
about the relation between credence and belief. e exegetic move is one of charitable
parsimony: it accounts for Aristotle’s explicit views by assuming that those views are
consistent and attributing to him no more conceptual apparatus than is necessary to
deliver a plausible view about the issue in question. In this case, we attribute a threshold
type of dependence view to Aristotle because a) he stakes an important argument on the
claim that belief requires credence in some way, b) he thinks that credence varies by
degree, and c) he thinks that someone can give a certain amount of credence to a claim
but still need some convincing before they believe it. e therapeutic interpretation of
Aristotle’s discussion does capture a certain aspect of Aristotle’s view, but for the wrong
reason. On the therapeutic interpretation, the need for debunking explanation stems from
121.e Greek does not have forms of doxazein, but rather perfect forms of peithesthai, “to be persuaded.”
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the need to resist the temptation to pursue pleasure despite one’s “better judgment.” e
worry is that the agent’s commitment will not stand up to the temptation of bodily
pleasures, which will lead the agent astray. is means that the agent’s considered
judgment will not play the role in her action and reasoning that it is supposed to. On the
epistemic interpretation, we can agree that one of Aristotle’s concerns is that the true view
will not play the role that it should in the agent’s reasoning and action. On the epistemic
interpretation, however, it does not do so because the agent does not believe it, i.e. she
does not form the relevant doxa.
6. Conclusion
We now have an account of Aristotle’s claim that belief depends on credence.
Someone will not believe a claim without suﬃcient credence in the claim. is does not
require Aristotle to say that there is some single threshold that must be met in every
context. Aristotle makes no such claim, in part because his view of credence is not
suﬃciently formalized to formulate state a claim succinctly, the way we might say “S
believes that p just in case S’s credence in p is at least .85.” Such thresholds are no doubt,
for Aristotle, beholden to elements of the particular case.122 It matters to him how exact
the arguments are supposed to be, how many and how pressing the puzzles are, and
whether the competing views have any intuitive pull of their own.123 It also matters how
trustworthy the speaker is, and even non-epistemic factors (such as how stubborn the
believer is) can have an eﬀect. Emotional manipulation, to take another example, is a part
of rhetoric because someone who is, for example, angry at another person will be more
easily convinced that the person has done wrong.124 Whether this means that they give any
piece of evidence that he has done wrong more weight than they otherwise would, or that
they form their belief at a lower threshold of credence, is diﬃcult to decide, but Aristotle’s
122. Sturgeon 2008 notes that many and varied elements of context will determine what the threshold is in
various cases.
123. See especially Nicomachean Ethics 1.3, 1094b24-27, where Aristotle argues that it is foolish to demand
more precision than a certain subject matter will admit of.
124. See especially Rhetoric 2.1, 1378a1-3. See also my discussion of emotion-arousal in Chapter 2, page 58.
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explicit remarks leave both possibilities open. e point is that Aristotle need not think
that every subject must meet some !xed point of credence in order to form a belief.
It remains, however, that Aristotle does not pack these considerations into his
argument at On the Soul 3.3, 428a20-2. He says only that we must put credence in those
things that seem to be the case. One might object, then, that there is little reason to apply
this involved discussion about credence, persuasion and thresholds to those two short
lines. My response is that we should bring such considerations to bear because those
considerations represent the rules which govern credence and its relation to belief. Pistis,
when it denotes a mental state, denotes a mental state that comes in degrees. To invest
one’s credence in something (pisteuein) is to put some degree of credence or other in it.
Aristotle has sophisticated views about how credence relates to other states of committed
judgment (persuasion, belief, and knowledge), which he makes evident in the passages we
discuss in this chapter. If he does not rehearse those views in On the Soul 3.3, it does not
follow that they are not meant to apply, especially if they are the views to which he is
committed across a wide swath of the corpus, and which he deploys to do serious
philosophical work. In any event, Aristotle need not explicitly evoke his entire view to
make his point. It is true, as he says, that one cannot form a belief without investing
credence in the claim. He need not clarify with “enough credence” or “more credence than
one puts into competing views” to support his contention that belief constitutively
depends on credence. Nonetheless, that is his view.
A question to take us into the next chapter: why would Aristotle think that
animals cannot put credence in things? Credence, we saw, is a kind of mental accounting
which tracks how likely she takes the claim to be. When Aristotle denies that credence
belongs to beasts, he is denying that any non-human animals have any of this structure as
part of their mental life. is is, if anything, a more controversial claim than denying that
animals have beliefs. To see why he might make this claim, we need to understand how he
connects this mental accounting to reason itself, a subject we will discuss in the next
chapter.
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7. Appendix: Other Uses of Pistis
I have assumed that pistis in our passage from On the Soul denotes a mental state,
speci!cally one that varies by degrees. is is not the only way that Aristotle uses the
word. As we noted before, the word can mean many things in Greek, but Aristotle for the
most part uses it in two broad senses: to denote a mental state, in the way I assume above,
and to denote a proof, argument or piece of evidence, i.e. something that instils said
mental state. We oen do not have enough data from a given context of use to determine
with any certainty which broad category Aristotle intends to denote. Many of Aristotle’s
uses occur in contexts that !t the following (mostly translated) schema: 
e pistis for p comes from/through δ
Where p is some claim and δ denotes some method of proof or argument.125 Aristotle’s
favorite values for δ are logical inference (sullogismos) and induction (epagôgê).126 One
also sees for δ “similar things” (tôn homoiôn) and “observation” (aisthêsis).127 It is diﬃcult
to tell in these instances whether Aristotle is referring to the mental state that δ instills in
us, or to the very act of proving, the way we might say that a mathematical proof is “by
induction.” I lean toward the former, but making a case is diﬃcult. e word appears
without any comparison to other items in Aristotle’s philosophy (unlike our passage from
On the Soul), which makes it impossible to triangulate and determine what sense of pistis
Aristotle has in mind. I therefore ignore these contexts; they provide no dispositive
evidence toward one reading or another.
Another prominent family of uses which should not impact our reading of On the
Soul 3.3 comes from the Rhetoric, where Aristotle discusses the pisteis that rhetoric
deploys. ese uses have received considerable attention.128 e consensus seems to be
125. A sampling of where instances of this schema occur: Prior Analytics 2.24, 69a4; Posterior Analytics 2.3,
90b14; Sophistical Refutations 4, 165b27; Physics 3.4, 203b14; 5.1, 224b30; 8.8, 262a18; Meteorology 4.1,
378b14; Metaphysics 11.11, 1067b14. Instances that do not exactly !t the schema, but say basically the
same thing: On the Heavens 1.3, 270b32-33; 2.4, 287a31; Meteorology 3.2, 372a31-32; Politics 7.4,
1326a29.
126. For Aristotle’s notion of epagogê and how it diﬀers from the process we call “induction,” see especially
Hamlyn 1976, 168-70 and also McKirahan 1983 and LaBarge 2004, 202-12, who takes himself to
supplement the account found in Lesher 1973.
127. Similar things: Prior Analytics 2.24, 69a5, 11-13. Observation: Physics 8.8, 262a18.
128. See, for instance, the competing views of Grimaldi 1957 and Wikramanayake 1961, as well as Lienhard
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that when Aristotle uses the term pistis in the Rhetoric, especially in the plural, he
generally is talking about proofs or arguments, rather than the mental state engendered in
the audience by rhetorical demonstration.129 We can immediately rule this meaning out as
the right one to apply to our On the Soul passage. It would imply, !rst of all, that one can
only hold a belief when one also has in hand a proof or argument. Some weaker form of
this view might be plausible. One might, for instance, take someone’s beliefs to be
determined by their evidence, where “evidence” is taken to mean what, by their own
lights, indicates whether a claim is true or false. Aristotle, however, is willing to ascribe
doxa to people who do not know what their belief amounts to, as he does with Heraclitus
in Book 11 of the Metaphysics.130 Second, Aristotle argues that belief cannot happen
without investing credence (the verb is pisteuein), and he takes this to establish his claim
that belief depends on pistis. Aristotle uses the verb pisteuein, which is derived from pistis
and can only mean that the subject trusts or relies on something; it has no meaning which
parallels pistis as proof or argument. is does not entail that Aristotle’s premise could not
be used to argue that belief depends on having, by one’s own lights, an argument or proof
for the content of the belief. Such an argument would, however, be much more involved,
and Aristotle gives no indication that he needs anything further to establish his claim. In
our On the Soul passage, then, pistis denotes a mental state. It is the sort of mental state on
which belief depends in order to be belief (as opposed to idle fancy).
1966, who supports Grimaldi. Grimaldi 1972 contains an exhaustive catalogue of where pistis is used in
the Rhetoric, and what he takes them to mean in each instance. 
129. So Lienhard 1966, 454: “the meaning [of the term] varies enough to allow separate de!nitions, but not
enough to lose the note of ‘proof ’ in any of the occasions.” e remark is meant to exclude three
instances where pistis obviously denotes some kind of mental state: Rhetoric 1.9, 1367b30, 2.1, 1377b25,
and 2.20, 1394a10. On this, see Lienhard 1966, 450 and Grimaldi 1957, 189-90. Whether Grimaldi and
Lienhard are right to distinguish pistis as form of proof vs. pistis as subject-matter of proof is irrelevant
for the distinction that matters to me, between the pistis as proof and pistis as mental state.





To understand the second argument in the pair at 428a18-24, we must answer the
questions I deferred in Chapter 1:
1) How should we understand logos? Like many important pieces of
Aristotle’s vocabulary, the term has several meanings. Sometimes it denotes
reason itself. Sometimes it denotes a verbal or propositional item (a speech
or account of something); sometimes it denotes language, or the ability to
speak.
2) How do credence and persuasion depend on logos (for a given
understanding of the term) such that one can infer the absence of the former
from the absence of latter, as Aristotle does with respect to non-human
animals?
My hypothesis is that, when Aristotle denies reason to animals at On the Soul 3.3,
428a18-24, he denies them !ne-grained evaluative responses to their environment. My
answer to question (1) is therefore that logos denotes reason itself, that which makes a
creature capable of the special brand of cognition that, on Aristotle’s view, separates the
rational creatures from all the other animals. is opposes an interpretation on which
logos means something like “speech” or “language.” If such an interpretation is correct,
then no substantive conclusion about reason or rationality follows from Aristotle’s
argument or its presuppositions.131
My answer to question (2) is that the non-rational animals, in virtue of lacking
reason, are incapable of responding to their environment in such a way as to have !ne-
grained evaluative responses to it. Fine-grained credence is the cognitive response to
evidential relationships. e ability to discriminate these relationships in the world is
131. For extended consideration of this rival proposal, see below at “A Radical Alternative?,” page 69.
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partially constitutive of rational cognition, in the sense that no creature who lacks such a
capability can be “rational” in the constitutive sense.132 In other words, part of what makes
a creature rational is its ability to discriminate evidential relationships.
In the !rst chapter, we discussed Aristotle’s conception of pistis as credence. Based
on Aristotle’s use of the term and its cognates, credence in p (for some proposition p)
represents the subject’s evaluation of the likelihood that p is true. It admits of degrees,
meaning that a subject can put more or less credence in a proposition. e notion
therefore roughly corresponds to our modern notion of subjective probability.
“Subjective,” because evaluating the likelihood of an outcome does not imply that the
outcome itself is “chancy” or probabilistic, e.g. the value of a die roll.133 We might also call
it “epistemic,” because the attitude is evaluative with respect to truth. It is diﬃcult to
describe this in more basic terms, but comparisons are possible. Credence is not, for
instance, a measure of how much someone hopes it is the case the p, or wants it to be the
case that p. It is rather of measure of how the world currently looks to the person whose
credence we are describing. is description makes clear that the state has
phenomenological aspects; it is easy to talk both in terms of how likely someone !nds it
that p and how it “looks to her” regarding p, and even how “sure she feels” that p. It is a
separate question, however, whether pistis itself reduces to these felt experiences. Aristotle
says nothing to commit himself to such a claim, but as we have seen, he is willing to
characterize a subject’s credence in terms of felt doubt or certainty.
Credence is, therefore, a kind of epistemic evaluation that is gradational: one can
think of something as more or less likely, and compare the likelihood of diﬀerent
propositions. e majority of contexts where Aristotle makes clear that credence is
gradational are these sorts of comparative contexts.134 We might wonder what, for
132. For my use of this term, and its distinction from a normative sense of “rational,” see the Introduction at
page 1. In brief, constitutive rationality is a descriptive way of sorting certain kinds of cognitive
capabilities from others, and normative rationality is a way of sorting the correct from incorrect uses of
such capabilities.
133.is notion of “objective” chanciness itself is not meant to imply that the event lacks a determining
cause. e roll of a die, for instance, is determined completely by the forces which act on it, but it is the
sort of event we would call “objectively” chancy. 
134. See Chapter 1, “Pistis as Credence: A Mental State that Varies by Degree,” page 18, for a survey of the
positive textual evidence.
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Aristotle, might cause these sorts of gradational response. Credence is a subjective state:
unlike knowledge (epistêmê) and understanding (nous), it does not necessarily mirror
logical relationships in the world. e demonstrations of scienti!c knowledge perfectly
capture relationships between what syllogistic terms represent. is means that it is
impossible that the following happen all at once:
1) One has a demonstration that p via some explanation E135
2) at demonstration captures some bit of scienti!c knowledge
3) Either it is not the case that p, or p obtains through some other
explanation E*
Knowledge is what we might call an objective state: in virtue of how it comes about (via
demonstration), it answers perfectly to how things are in the world.136 Credence does not
enjoy this kind of security. Just as it is possible for someone to believe that p even while p
is false, so is it possible for someone to have a very high credence that p when it is
incredibly unlikely that p, or have her doubts about whether p when there is almost no
chance that not-p. Consider, for example, an arrogant student who, having neglected to
study for an exam, is the !rst to !nish it (she thinks exams are a race) and leave the class.
Her arrogance leads her to think, “I !nished long before anyone else. at’s a sign that I
understood the material better than anyone else in the class!” She thereby comes to !nd it
more likely that she understood the material than she did when she was sweating her way
through a thicket of baﬄing questions. It is highly unlikely that she understood the
material better than anyone else in the class (including her more diligent peers), still less
so that she !nished !rst for that reason.137 Her con!dence is misplaced, but it does not for
that reason fail to express her credence.
is example illustrates a natural next step, which is that our credences re&ect
something about the world, even if that re&ection is distorted. ey do not re&ect truth or
135. True scienti!c demonstrations do not just prove some fact of the matter, but also give the reason why,
expressed in the middle term of the syllogism.
136. For a concise explication of the diﬀerence between knowledge—with the strict requirements Aristotle
puts on it—and reasoning from signs and evidence (which will concern us shortly), see especially Allen
2001, 72-78.
137. We can all probably remember doing well on a test that we did not study for. I cannot speak for
everyone, but I never took my good performance in such instances as a sign that I really understood the
material, despite my lack of preparation.
52
falsehood: credences are not truth-apt, so they cannot represent states of aﬀairs as true or
false. at is what our beliefs are for, in any event.138 Instead, they seem to re&ect our
evidence. A state of aﬀairs p is evidence for another state of aﬀairs q in the minimal sense I
have in mind just in case it is more likely that q, given that p. Our lazy student’s credence
that she understood the material did not go up all by itself. Rather, it went up when she
observed that she had !nished !rst. She took her !nishing !rst as evidence that she
understood the material better than anyone else in the class (she even called it a “sign,” on
which more later). is shows also that what constitutes evidence by someone’s own lights
is not necessarily evidence.
Our lazy student takes her putative understanding of the material to explain why
she !nished !rst, but evidential relationships need not follow aer causal or explanatory
relationships. To see this, suppose our student returns home and is browsing Facebook in
her room when she hears the front door creak open, followed by unfamiliar footsteps.
Amidst incipient panic, her credence that she le the front door unlocked rises
dramatically. ere was no sound of forced entry, so the unfamiliar footsteps do provide
good evidence that she forgot to lock the door. e unlocked door, however, seems neither
the cause nor the explanation for the unfamiliar footsteps, except in a roundabout way.
ese evidential relationships are what credence attempts to capture, and our lazy student
shows that it can fail or succeed. We can put this more succinctly and say that credence is
an evaluative response to evidence. Agents need not be completely aware of what they are
responding to, and the response need not take the form of a conscious inference, of the
kind our lazy student carried out regarding her performance on the exam.
is sketch helps us see how Aristotle’s two arguments !t together. In the
argument we examined in Chapter 1, Aristotle denies to animals the ability to have
credence. is amounts to saying that non-rational animals are unable to !nd things more
or less likely. A striking claim, for which we were at the time unable to provide much of a
rationale. In Aristotle’s further argument, which many editors bracket as a double
138. For the relation between belief and truth, see Chapter 3.
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recension, he does provide a rationale. I regard this as a strong reason to doubt that the
passage is a double recension: it belongs in the text. at non-rational animals lack
credence is no longer a bald assertion, but follows from two further claims:
1) Having credence in something requires being persuaded
2) Being persuaded requires reason (logos)
Non-rational animals, then, cannot !nd things more or less likely because they lack some
capacity or other that makes for constitutive rationality. e term by which we proceed
from lacking reason to lacking credence is “persuasion.” In fact, it is the perfect articular
in!nitive of the verb “to persuade,” which we might translate as “having been persuaded.”
is suggests the result of a process !nished at the present time. For Aristotle, then,
rational cognition is not about being able to entertain a kind of content that other, non-
rational creatures cannot. His argument does not suggest that beliefs latch onto a species
of content to which animals are blind. Rather, rational cognition depends on the ability to
process information in a way that non-rational animals cannot. It requires the ability not
just to react to the world in ways determined by one’s psychological states (perception,
representation, desire, etc.), but to be open to persuasion. Persuasion is the process by
which subjects gain and lose credence in a proposition, and this is the basis for obtaining
various results, such as a favorable vote or commitment to some course of action. Seen in
this light, Aristotle’s claim that credence requires the ability to be persuaded is
uncontroversial. Subjects change their credence in response to what they see as evidence.
Persuasion, therefore, involves the evaluation of evidence. Non-animal’s lacking reason,
then, entails their lacking the ability to recognize states of aﬀairs as evidence for other
states of aﬀairs.
e result: part of what makes for constitutive rationality is the ability to respond
to evidence. is is not to say that a constitutively rational subject must respond correctly
to evidence. Deciding whether a creature is constitutively rational is a matter of
descriptive metaphysics: the categorization itself makes no normative demands, though it
might entail that the creature so characterized is vulnerable to certain normative
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demands.139 Still, this is a striking claim for Aristotle to make, and if my interpretation is
correct, it tells a diﬀerent story about Aristotle’s conception of rationality than the family
of interpretations on which scholarly consensus has settled.
2. Persuasion and Distortion
We need to understand the connection between persuasion and rationality. In addition to
our passage from On the Soul, there is a passage in the Rhetoric140 where Aristotle commits
himself to the view that persuasion determines whether a mental state is non-rational or
rational. When we can say that a mental state is due to persuasion, according to Aristotle,
we can also say that it participates in reason (meta logou). In the following passage from
the Rhetoric, Aristotle applies this scheme to desires:
But among desires, some are non-rational and some rational (meta logou). I
call non-rational those desires which men do not have as a result of
entertaining something (hupolambanein) (these are, by the way, the kinds of
desires which are referred to as “natural” …), while rational desires are the
ones people have from being persuaded (peisthênai); for they want to see and
acquire many things because they listened and were persuaded.141
Rational desires just are those desires which we acquire as a result of being persuaded. To
justify this classi!cation, Aristotle argues that people desire to see and acquire things aer
just hearing about them and “being persuaded.” He characterizes non-rational desires as
those desires which do not come about as a result of entertaining some content (ek tou
hupolambanein). Since “rational” and “non-rational” are mutually exclusive
characterizations, we can conclude that rational desires are those that do result from
entertaining some content. Entertaining something does not necessarily mean believing it,
139. For discussion of this claim, see Chapter 3.
140.is passage is not oen noted in the literature. See also Labarrière 1984, 30-34 for consideration of
both the passages from On the Soul and the Rhetoric, though his analysis diﬀers from my own; he seems
committed to a view whereby the conventional symbol system of language is what makes for rational
thought. For more on this, see below at “A Radical Alternative?,” page 69.
141. Rhetoric 1.11, 1370a19-25: τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν ἄλογοί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. λέγω δὲ
ἀλόγους ὅσας μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν (εἰσὶν δὲ τοιαῦται ὅσαι εἶναι
λέγονται φύσει […] μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσας ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ
θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες.
I elide in this passage a list of paradigmatic “natural” desires, which includes the desire for food, drink
and sex.
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but in this context it is likely Aristotle means “entertaining” to stand in for belief or some
other kind of conviction (such as knowledge). Aer his list (elided in my quote) of the
sorts of things that count as “natural” desires—which all seem to involve either the
satisfaction of a basic bodily need or a need for pleasant sensory stimulus—Aristotle calls
those desires rational which “result from being persuaded” (ek tou peisthênai). One cannot
be persuaded of something and yet fail to believe that it is the case. Such a scenario has the
&avor of contradiction. 
So the entertaining that results in rational desire is the kind that comes with
commitment to the entertained content. What is the content, then? Aristotle does not say
explicitly; it would need to involve a characterization of the object of desire, though it
involves more, as well. Representation alone (phantasia) would be suﬃcient for that
purpose, and representation prepares all sorts of desires, not just the rational ones.142 e
entertaining is the cause of the desire, which is brought about by “listening and being
persuaded.” People oen want things because they hear them described, sometimes things
they did not even know they wanted. In my own experience, this happens oen with food,
especially if the description is lavish. Hearing a string of words causes a representational
state, which then causes desire for the represented object. is cannot be all that the
process amounts to, however, because Aristotle says it is an instance of persuasion, but
non-rational animals can form desires through words in the same way. If I say, “Would
you like some food?” to my cats, their ears perk up and they wander over to their dish,
calling for me. If they had not wanted food before, they sure did aer I mentioned it. Since
animals cannot be persuaded, Aristotle would deny that this exchange amounts to
persuasion, and I think he is right in this case. at the desire was caused by a string of
words is not suﬃcient for its being persuasion, nor is it necessary. If my cats were not
persuaded by my mention of food, then neither am I persuaded (in the proper sense of the
142. See Movement of Animals 8, 702a17-19, where representation “prepares desire,” and in turn comes from
either perception or thought (which is not the same as entertaining). On this passage see especially
Lorenz 2006, 124-28 and Nussbaum 1978, essay 5.
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term) by a lavish description. e mental content involved in the latter case seems more
sophisticated than what my cats have, but the cases do not diﬀer in kind.
Compare a situation where someone forms a desire because they come to believe
that the object in question is something that they should have. is is more obviously an
instance of persuasion, and I would say it is the missing ingredient in the lavish-
description case. Such persuasion can proceed in two diﬀerent ways. One might, !rst, be
persuaded that the object has characteristics which one already thinks makes something
desirable. For example, members of the Athenian assembly preferred to keep Athens the
dominant force in the Aegean, so persuading them that course of action C would
maintain Athens’ power more than course of action C* would lead them to prefer C to C*.
One might also, however, be persuaded to desire the object even if it does not !t any
antecedently-held scheme for desirability. A good deal of modern advertising seems to
work in this fashion. I do not, for instance, want an iPhone because of some antecedent
conception of the Good Phone, which the iPhone exempli!es to a greater degree than its
competitors. Rather, advertising and word of mouth have convinced me the iPhone’s
characteristics are something I should want in a phone.143 Our answer to the question
“what is the content?” will therefore have no neat answer. Sometimes it will be a thought
to the eﬀect that something has such-and-such desirable characteristics, and sometimes it
will be a thought to the eﬀect that such-and-such characteristics (which this object
happens to exemplify) are desirable. What distinguishes both scenarios from the lavish-
description scenario, however, is that instead of merely prompting certain thoughts which
cause certain desires, the entertaining results from an evaluation, and so the desire does as
well, insofar as it is caused by the entertaining.
Evaluation of what, though? I will want eventually to say “evaluation of evidence,”
but this passage alone does not allow that. An important part of the view I wish to
attribute to Aristotle is that evaluation of evidence is not an all-or-nothing aﬀair, but
143.is, of course, only applies to cases where the advertisement eﬀects genuine persuasion, and does not
simply amount to a lavish description. A huge, backlit image of a hamburger might make me want one,
but not by persuading me that I should want to eat one. Which instances of advertisement work
through which avenue is a tricky empirical question.
57
admits of degrees just like the credences which represent the results of such evaluation.
Our current passage from the Rhetoric does not mention degrees. We might say that it
discusses successful persuasion, where the subject is convinced beyond the threshold
necessary to entertain and commit to the propositions for which the persuader furnishes
putative evidence.
We need, therefore, to examine passages where Aristotle deploys a graded notion
of evidence. Aristotle does not have a single word for “evidence:” the closest candidate is
sêmeion, which means “sign,” but can also mean “evidence” in many contexts.144 From
Aristotle’s lack of a uni!ed vocabulary, however, it does not follow that he lacks a coherent
conceptual framework to discuss these sorts of evidential relationships.145 On the contrary,
he adopts such a framework to do philosophical work about emotions, persuasion and
judgment. We seem him apply the framework most oen to cases where various factors
distort the subject’s judgment and evidential reasoning. is is reason to think that
Aristotle’s notion of evidence accords with the sketch we gave earlier. Credence responds
to evidence, but we can be mistaken as to what is actually evidence and how strong the
evidence really is. Aristotle not only allows for such cases, but uses them to do
philosophical work. His treatment of emotion in the Rhetoric, for instance, amounts to a
systematic examination of the ways that emotions aﬀect people’s judgment, and how to
cause such emotions through argument.146 For the purpose of his study, he even de!nes
emotions (pathê) in terms of their eﬀect on a listener’s judgment:
e emotions are those things through which people, when they change,
diﬀer with regard to their judgments, and on which follow pleasure and pain,
e.g. anger, pity, fear and other things like that as well as their opposites.147
144. See Burnyeat 1982, 193-94, where Burnyeat says also that in many contexts “evidence” is as good a
translation as “sign” for instances of sêmeion, but rightly insists that it does not always denote
something we would recognize as empirical evidence.
145. See Caston 1992, 10-13 for argument against tracing the history of a word and taking that to stand in for
the history of a concept.
146. For the thorough discussion I do not provide here, see Leighton 1996, Striker 1996 and Fortenbaugh
2006.
147. Rhetoric 2.1, 1378a19-22: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς
κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ
τούτοις ἐναντία.
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Emotions just are those things change in which brings about change in judgment. More
accurately, they are a subset of those things that are followed by pleasure or pain. is
restriction rules out things like belief or credence being considered emotions. Such a
classi!cation would not sound as absurd to Aristotle as it does to us: he at one point calls
representation (phantasia) a pathos.148 Nonetheless, there is an intuitive distinction
between logical and emotional sources of persuasion, which Aristotle wants to preserve
even as he recognizes that all the elements work together to get an audience to make a
certain judgment. Most important for our purposes is the following remark, which
Aristotle makes to motivate his study of emotions in a rhetorical context:
For these things [i.e. the facts that are the concern of public deliberation or
trials] do not seem the same to those who have aﬀection and those who hate,
neither to those who are angry and who are calm, but rather [they seem]
either entirely diﬀerent or diﬀerent in a matter of degree (kata megethos).149
is apt observation shows some psychological acumen. It also makes two points in
support of my interpretation. First, aﬀecting the listeners’ emotions (“disposing them a
certain way” is how Aristotle puts it) aﬀects their judgment because it makes them
evaluate the facts diﬀerently than they would otherwise. Aristotle does not give any
indication that this is a bad thing or something to avoid.150 Appeals to emotion are a part
of rhetoric not because they make the listeners do something that they would not do
otherwise. is would make emotion-arousal analogous to tweaking someone until they
lose their cool. It is, of course, possible to do this, and to do it with words. It is, however,
no more an instance of persuasion than causing desire through lavish description is an
instance of persuasion. is is not to say that emotion-arousal does not amount to
clouding the listener’s judgment. Aristotle is neutral on this point; he addresses emotion
because they can be aﬀected by argument, and so come under the heading of rhetoric
proper. Whether the method can be misused or not (i.e. used to cloud the listener’s
148. On the Soul 3.3, 427b16-21, on which see Chapter 3.
149. Rhetoric 2.1, 1377b31-33: οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσιν, οὐδ' ὀργιζομένοις καὶ
πράως ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα ἢ κατὰ μέγεθος ἕτερα.
150. I do not think his remarks against previous theoreticians of rhetoric (1.1, 1354a11-18) does not amount
to a condemnation of emotional appeal as such: see especially Dow 2007. Book 2 of the Rhetoric is
premised on the view that it is possible to “domesticate” appeals to emotion and make them a part of
rhetoric proper, which is about fashioning arguments.
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judgment and make worse at weighing the evidence) is a normative question, irrelevant to
the science of persuasion itself. Aristotle is concerned with all factors that can aﬀect a
listener’s evaluation, so emotion-arousal is fair game. Important for our purpose is that
emotional change makes things seem diﬀerent, rather than simply making the listeners act
diﬀerently, though that may be the orator’s goal. 
e second point helpful to our interpretation: emotion-arousal can aﬀect a
listener’s evaluation in two diﬀerent ways, either completely or as a matter of degree.
Changing one’s evaluation completely is straightforward: one’s considered judgment
comes to be the opposite of what it would have been without emotional manipulation. If a
juror is angry enough at a defendant, he will seem guilty to her when he would previously
have not seemed guilty. Changing how things seem to the listener as a matter of degree is
harder to parse, but I suggest that it refers to the sort of credal evaluation we discussed in
the last chapter. A listener who is aﬀected emotionally will feel a little less or a little more
sure. Consider, for example, a speaker bringing suit against a man, claiming that he stole
from him. Among the evidence he oﬀers is the fact that the accused disappeared for
several minutes during a drinking-party at the speaker’s house. is is circumstantial
evidence, hardly probative by itself. Someone in a calm state of mind would likely see it
this way, but if the listener were angry at the accused (and so inclined to believe the worst
about him), it would carry far more weight. Why would he disappear and tell no one
where he was going, the angry juror might think, unless he were up to no good? Aristotle’s
rhetorical treatment of emotion therefore includes attention to the sort of gradational
evaluation that we say makes for rational cognition.
We will return shortly to the Rhetoric and Aristotle’s positive views about evidence.
We need !rst, however, to address the objection that my interpretation is overly
speculative and begs the question as to whether graded evaluation of evidence is
something that Aristotle cares about. We need a more explicit text to answer this
objection, and we !nd it in the minor treatise On Dreams. Aristotle is discussing a fact
about perception that makes dreaming and other forms of representation (phantasia)
possible, namely that the result of the perceptual experience (the aisthêma) remains even
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aer the perceptible is gone, and subjects can have the experience again absent further
external stimuli. He then makes a tangential argument that we can be deceived about our
perceptions when in the grip of some emotion or other:
We are easily deceived about our perceptions when we are enthralled,
diﬀerent people by diﬀerent emotions, for instance the coward is easily
deceived in his fear, the lover in his erotic passion, so that the former
supposes that he sees, from very slight resemblance, his enemies, and the
second the object of his love. What’s more, those things will appear from ever
slighter resemblance, in proportion to how enthralled they are.151
e passage starts oﬀ talking about how we can be deceived about our perceptions, which
gives the impression that it will not be relevant to Aristotle’s theory of evidence, which we
have considered so far in terms of judgment and (if I am right) credal evaluations which
underly but do not themselves constitute judgments. e passage is relevant, however;
credence can come from perception as well as argument.152 is allows that persuasion is
not merely a verbal process, but an evaluative process open to a wide range of phenomena.
Furthermore, Aristotle goes on to say that the deception does not occur with respect to
what we perceive, but rather with the beliefs we form on the basis of our perception. e
lover is wrong about what he takes himself (dokein) to see, as is the coward. e
mechanisms in question therefore pertain to epistemic evaluation and the forces that
hinder it, not to the mechanics of perception as such.153
Here as in the Rhetoric passage, Aristotle assumes a scheme whereby emotion
aﬀects a subject’s judgment by degrees, but here the gradation is more explicit, as is the
kernel of a general view about the relationship between the distorting factor and the
character of the distortion. e view is intuitive and hard to deny: the degree of distortion
varies in direct proportion to the strength of the distorting emotion. at is to say, we
151. On Dreams 2, 460b3-9: ῥᾳδίως ἀπατώμεθα περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, ἄλλοι
δὲ ἐν ἄλλοις, οἷον ὁ δειλὸς ἐν φόβῳ, ὁ δ' ἐρωτικὸς ἐν ἔρωτι, ὥστε δοκεῖν ἀπὸ μικρᾶς
ὁμοιότητος τὸν μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους ὁρᾶν, τὸν δὲ τὸν ἐρώμενον· καὶ ταῦτα ὅσῳ ἂν
ἐμπαθέστερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ ἀπ' ἐλάσσονος ὁμοιότητος φαίνεται.
152. See also Physics 8.8, 262a12-19. ere the word aisthêsis is better translated “observation,” but the
distinction from argument or thinking remains clear.
153.ese cases are therefore distinct from cases of incidental perception, the mechanism by which
perceivers recognize individual objects based on their sense data: see On the Soul 2.6. Pace Bäck 2009,
who treats incidental perception as a kind of inference that is vulnerable to “fallacies” (particularly the
fallacy of accident), Aristotle never gives uses any logical or inference-involving vocabulary in his
discussions of incidental perception. See especially Cashdollar 1973 for references and discussion.
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become worse at properly evaluating the evidence on which we base our judgments as we
experience stronger emotions. Aristotle talks about the eﬀects of the emotions on certain
character types, e.g. people in love and cowards, but it is hard to see why his observations
would not generalize to people who do not share these character traits. 
is passage, unlike our passage from the Rhetoric, talks about evidence itself, not
just the subject’s (distorted) evaluation of it. e cases in question concern judging that
one has seen a certain person, on the basis of a resemblance (homoiotês). e resemblance
is in fact slight, and we are led to believe that someone in a similar epistemic position, but
unaﬀected by the relevant emotion, would not be taken in. is scenario lends itself easily
to characterization in terms of evidence. e resemblance provides a certain amount of
evidence that the person seen is one’s lover (or enemy). e resemblance varies by degree:
Aristotle says that it is slight and also refers to the possibility of a “lesser resemblance” that
could trick someone even more enamored or terri!ed. Since the resemblance is small, it
does not make it likely that the enemy or lover has been spotted. e observer, since he is
in the grip of a distorting emotion, wrongly takes the scant evidence to make it highly
likely that his enemy or lover is standing right over there, hence the mistaken judgment.
3. Evidence and Epistemic Evaluation
Note that Aristotle does not treat these sorts of mistakes as mere non-sequiturs. at is, he
does not treat them as conclusions which do not follow from supplied premises. ese
mistakes are instead a matter of taking evidence too seriously (i.e. thinking that it makes
likely what it does not). He goes back and forth about whether this kind of reasoning from
evidence counts as a form of inference, and it does not !t comfortably into the syllogistic
by which he formalizes the steps of reasoning.154 at is to say, a large swath of this
reasoning is deductively invalid, because the sign does not necessitate what it is supposed
to be evidence for, even if it is genuine evidence. Aristotle nonetheless recognizes such
154. See Allen 2001, 26-33 for useful discussion of Aristotle’s diﬀering attitudes toward diﬀerent kinds of
sign inferences, including inferences that proceed from premises true “for the most part.” On the
second point, regarding the formal character of sign inference, see Burnyeat 1982, 195-97.
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relationships as legitimate subjects for reasoning even though evidential relationships fall
short of deductive validity and do not guarantee a grasp of the truth.
He considers them legitimate because they make up much of our epistemic lives.
Most everyday reasoning concerns contingent matters: things could have been diﬀerent
than they in fact are, and may change without our knowing. Rhetoric, which Aristotle
conceives as a systematic understanding of everyday reasoning,155 must accommodate this
fact by providing guidance in how to reason about contingent matters:
Since few of the matters due to which rhetorical syllogisms exist are
necessary…it is clear some of the things from which enthymemes156 are said
will be matters of necessity, but most will be true for the most part. And it is
clear that enthymemes [come about] from likelihoods (eikota) and from
signs (sêmeia), so that it is necessary for each [of these enthymemes] to be
the same as each [of these things, i.e. signs and likelihoods].157
A conclusion is only as sure as the premises from which one draws it. If the premise
expresses what Aristotle calls a “likelihood,” then the conclusion will not be necessary, but
likely.158 With likelihoods, the generalization from which one proceeds (represented
formally by the major premise) does not establish a necessary or universal connection. If
the major premise does not assert that all As are Bs, but rather asserts that any given A is
pretty likely to be a B (or something to that eﬀect), then the conclusion for any Cs that are
A cannot be that C is B, but rather that C is pretty likely to be a B. One might, for example,
assert that most thieves are liars and that Vince is a thief, concluding that Vince is also a
liar. What is interesting about this sort of argument is that, unlike demonstration and
other forms of deduction, it does not transmit truth. e premises need to be true for the
155. See especially Rhetoric 1.1, 1354a3-8: “Everyone participates to some extent in [both rhetoric and
dialectic]: for everyone up to a point endeavors to examine and provide reason and defend and attack in
argument. While many do this at random or through an understanding born of habit, since both these
ways of doing it are possible, it also should be possible to do the same things by a method.”
156.e meaning of this word, which seems to represent the kind of reasoning native to rhetorical contexts,
is controversial and not germane to my present concern: see Burnyeat 1994 for an excellent survey, as
well as Rapp’s commentary on the Rhetoric (Rapp 2002, 2:223-43).
157. Rhetoric 1.2, 1357a22-23, 30-34: ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὀλίγα μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξ ὧν οἱ ῥητορικοὶ
συλλογισμοί εἰσι…φανερὸν ὅτι ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται, τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἔσται, τὰ
δὲ πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὰ δ'ἐνθυμήματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ ἐκ σημείων, ὥστε ἀνάγκη
τούτων ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρῳ ταὐτὸ εἶναι.
158. Accepting Allen’s argument (2001, 31) that the “for-the-most-part character” of an argument from
likelihood derives from the premise, rather than the relationship between the premise and the
conclusion, though as we see in this paragraph, that relationship is not one of entailment or implication.
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argument to be credible, but such argument can be correctly deployed even if the
conclusion turns out to be false. Instead of truth, the argument bestows likelihood. is
means that it in&uences a person’s credence, and only derivatively their beliefs (if the
conclusion is likely enough to be believed). 
is makes arguments from likelihood a formal reconstruction of evidential
reasoning. ey seem to work diﬀerently, however, from the evidential reasoning I
discussed earlier, whereby someone concludes that some proposition is more likely to be
the case upon observing, hearing, or otherwise being persuaded that something else is the
case. In our paradigm case, the evidence is not a general truth, but some particular state of
aﬀairs. is paradigm case more closely matches Aristotle’s discussion of signs (sêmeia).
For example, we might say that Vince is a thief (suppose we caught him on camera), and
this is a sign that he is a liar. e eﬀect of this, given that we accept Vince’s thieving as
evidence that he is a liar, is that we think it more likely that he is a liar (though we may not
yet be ready to believe it, especially if we are friends of his). In the end, though, these
paradigm cases and argument from likelihood are not diﬀerent in kind. e argument
from likelihood instead represents reasoning from a certain strong kind of evidence.
Strong, because the generalization through which we derive the likelihood of the
conclusion assumes that there is a close (though not necessary or universally applicable)
connection between the terms in question. Not all evidential reasoning has such a strong
basis; we will soon see some examples where the connection is more tenuous.
Nevertheless, these arguments formalize evidential reasoning because the connection
between the premises and the conclusion is not one of truth, but rather likelihood.
e majority of Aristotle’s systematic views about evidential reasoning lies in his
treatment of signs, to which we now turn. He de!nes a sign (sêmeion) in the Prior
Analytics159 as follows: “anything which, when it obtains, then the matter (pragma) [in
question] obtains, or which, when it has come to be either before or aer, then [the matter
159. Referring to the Analytics is appropriate in our discussion of the Rhetoric, for Aristotle does so himself
at the start of his discussion of signs and likelihood (Rhetoric 1.2, 1357a30). is indicates that his
discussion in the Rhetoric post-dates and relies on Aristotle’s considered view in the Prior Analytics. For
this reason, Allen (2001, 23, 30, and 32) calls the passage “Analytics-oriented.”
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in question] has come to be—that is a sign of [the matter’s] coming to be or being” (Prior
Analytics 2.27, 70a7-9).160 He oﬀers this to justify his remark that a sign is a
“demonstrative proposition, either necessary or reputable (endoxon)” (2.27, 70a6-7). e
latter quote makes it seem as though signs do not represent evidence at all, especially since
he calls them “demonstrative,” which brings to mind the sort of deduction I contrast with
evidential reasoning. is tension is only apparent; Aristotle does not have in mind the
standards of demonstrative knowledge, as his examples go on to make clear.161 ere
remains something of a mismatch between his technical and non-technical de!nitions,
however; characterization in terms of pragmata suggests that signs are token events, not
premises. Aristotle is trying, however, to distinguish the forms of evidential reasoning. It is
natural, then, that he would speak in terms of propositions leading to other
propositions.162 
Aristotle’s talk of a “necessary” sign is further cause for confusion. If a sign is a
proposition (or the matter of fact thereby expressed), it is natural to think that a necessary
sign is a necessary proposition, or a state of aﬀairs that obtains of necessity. is goes
against, however, Aristotle’s insistence that rhetorical argument proceeds through signs
precisely because rhetorical argument deals with what can be otherwise. is problem
does not arise if the necessity applies to the relationship between the sign and what it
provides evidence for, rather than the modal status of the sign itself.163 is in turn
suggests that we should take “proposition” not in the sense of some truth-evaluable
content, but in the looser sense of “something oﬀered or put forward.” What is “put
forward” is the evidential connection itself: to say that p is a sign that q is to say that such
a connection holds between p and q. In order to refer to the connection between the
proﬀered evidence and what it provides evidence for, Aristotle must use the word “sign” to
160.οὗ γὰρ ὄντος ἔστιν ἢ οὗ γενομένου πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον γέγονε τὸ πρᾶγμα, τοῦτο σημεῖόν
ἐστι τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ εἶναι.
161.at is, knowledge which meets the conditions given at Posterior Analytics 1.2, 71b9-16. See Burnyeat
1982, 198n13.
162. Hence Burnyeat (1982, 197-98) calls the propositional characterization a “logician’s technical
de!nition,” as opposed to the non-technical de!nition that supports it.
163.is tells against Burnyeat’s view (1982, 198) that this passage refers to the sign as a premise, while the
rest of passage uses the term in an extended sense, referring to the inference based on the sign.
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refer to the entire piece of evidential reasoning (oen called a “sign-inference”). A
“necessary sign” therefore denotes a relationship wherein the evidence guarantees what it
evinces. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle calls these signs “tokens” (tekmêria).164 
Leave necessary signs to one side for the moment: their value is well-understood,
because deploying a necessary sign makes for logically-valid inference. e rest of the
signs are not logically valid; they fail to constitute a syllogism (Aristotle’s term for them is
asullogiston).165 He does not, I think, mean to say that these sorts of signs fail even to be
inferences (i.e. that they are not sullogismos in a looser, non-technical sense). at they are
inferences is in part why non-rational animals cannot recognize them.166 ey are not,
however, logical inferences, reasoning which one could reconstruct as a valid syllogism,
and this is what Aristotle means when he says that they are asullogiston. What kind of
reasoning, then, are they supposed to represent? ey represent evidential reasoning.
Here are two examples of such reasoning, one from each discussion of evidence:
e [inference] through the middle !gure is always and in each case open to
refutation (lusimos), for a syllogism never happens when the terms are put
this way. For it is not the case that, if a women who has given birth is pale,
and this woman is pale, that she has necessarily given birth.167
And there is among signs one which is the way that a particular is toward a
universal,168 for example if someone were to say that there is a sign that the
wise are just, for Socrates was both wise and just. is is a sign, but it is open
to refutation, though what was said be true (for it fails to form a syllogism).169
164. Rhetoric 1.2, 1357b4-9. We need not examine the peculiar folk etymology by which Aristotle justi!es
his terminology.
165. See Rhetoric 1.2, 1357b14-15; 2.24, 1401b9 and 2.25, 1403a4.
166. See On Memory 2, 453a9-14 and On the Soul 3.10, 434a5-11, where Aristotle denies certain capacities to
non-human animals on the basis of their inability to perform inferences.
167. Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a34-37: ὁ δὲ διὰ τοῦ μέσου σχήματος ἀεὶ καὶ πάντως λύσιμος·
οὐδέποτε γὰρ γίνεται συλλογισμὸς οὕτως ἐχόντων τῶν ὅρων· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἡ κύουσα ὠχρά,
ὠχρὰ δὲ καὶ ἥδε, κύειν ἀνάγκη ταύτην.
168. Aristotle divides signs into those which are oriented as a universal is toward a particular and vice versa
(1357b1-3). His meaning is obscure: the example cited in the main text makes some sense, since it
adduces a statement about Socrates to support a general claim about wisdom and goodness. His
example of a sign oriented the other way, however, is that someone’s breathing heavily is a sign that he
has a fever, which relates two particular statements. is issue seems worth exploring (I am aware of no
literature on it), but we need not settle it here.
169. Rhetoric 1.2.1357b10-14: ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σημείων τὸ μὲν ὡς τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ καθόλου
ὧδε, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν σημεῖον εἶναι ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ δίκαιοι, Σωκράτης γὰρ σοφὸς ἦν καὶ
δίκαιος. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν σημεῖον, λυτὸν δέ, κἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ τὸ εἰρημένον (ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ).
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As attempts at logical inference, these signs are clearly invalid. e !rst argument aﬃrms
the consequent, while the second amounts to a hasty generalization. We are not, however,
supposed to take them this way: Aristotle says that the fact that Socrates is both wise and
just is a sign that the wise are just, even though the corresponding formalization of the
argument is logically invalid. e same applies to the !rst passage quoted: Aristotle is
discussing signs, not fallacies. Neither example presents a problem if we understand them
as instances of evidential reasoning. On this understanding, Socrates’ being wise and just
is evidence that wise men are just. It is by no means decisive, but it is reason to believe the
conclusion, if only as part of an inductive base. In the other example, a woman’s being pale
is evidence that she has given birth. Aristotle under-describes the case, so it is diﬃcult to
tell whether this is actually an instance of good evidential reasoning. Given that women
who have given birth are pale (grant Aristotle this), observing that a women is pale would
make it slightly more likely that she had just given birth, though in a real world case there
would likely be many other considerations that could furnish better evidence.
On my proposal, Aristotle’s discussions of signs and likelihood amount to
discussions of evidence, and presuppose a method of reasoning with evidence that diﬀers
from that of demonstrative science. One might object that Aristotle seems only to care
that many signs are invalid, not that they represent a diﬀerent character of reasoning. He
never misses an opportunity to mention their invalidity, aer all. On this basis, one might
question whether Aristotle really means to be oﬀering an account of a diﬀerent kind of
reasoning. Aristotle’s introductory remark to his discussion in Rhetoric 1.2, however,
indicates that he is in fact concerned with relationships between facts diﬀerent from those
we might capture in a scheme of demonstrative deduction. He introduces signs and
likelihood to characterize arguments about this realm of contingent connections.
Evidence turns out, then, to be Aristotle’s way of modeling ordinary rational thinking
within the con!nes of an extended syllogistic. My proposal was never that Aristotle cares
only about evidential reasoning: the modes of deductive validity clearly matter to him.
e best kind of evidence, in fact, guarantees what it evinces. It does not follow, however,
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that he sees value in forms of reasoning only insofar as they !t into the scheme of
deductive validity characteristic of scienti!c knowledge and demonstration. 
Furthermore, Aristotle recognizes proper ways to respond to this kind of
reasoning that are distinct from the ways in which one would respond to reasoning that
aspires to logical validity. To refute that kind of reasoning, you oﬀer counterexamples.
Someone who thinks that counterexamples work against evidential reasoning, on the
other hand, is mistaken. In his discussion of how to demolish an opponent’s argument
(Rhetoric 2.25), Aristotle observes that many objections to signs and likelihood take the
form of counterexamples, and explicitly disapproves.170 at kind of fallacious objection
can mislead those who are deciding the case:
And the judge supposes, if an objection is brought in that way, either that
the statements are not likely or that it is not for him to decide, but he
reasons incorrectly in doing so, as we said (for one should judge not only
based on what is necessary, but also based on likelihoods, for that is to
judge by the best comprehension).171 
If Aristotle cared only that arguments from signs and likelihood did not have the same
type of logical validity as his favored brand of argument, he would not bestow such
arguments with their own standards of evaluation and accuse people of making a mistake
if they do not observe them. He mentions only likelihood in this passage, but the principle
applies just as well to signs, and the context makes clear that Aristotle means to include
them in his defense. is is because the contrast Aristotle makes is between reasoning
from necessities and reasoning from likelihoods. Aristotle introduces signs as a package
deal with likelihoods, so his defense applies to them as well. He says that it is not only
fallacious, but epistemically irresponsible for judges to dismiss evidence that lacks
deductive validity, and insists that making use of it is simply best practice.
What, then, does this have to do with the cognitive capacities of animals? If my
interpretation is correct, we have the following picture: credence changes in response to
170. On this mistake, and the correct way, by Aristotle’s lights, to object to a likelihood, see Madden 1957,
167-68.
171. Rhetoric 2.25, 1402b30-33: ὁ δὲ κριτὴς οἴεται, ἂν οὕτω λυθῇ, ἢ οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἢ οὐχ αὑτῷ
κριτέον, παραλογιζόμενος, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων δεῖ αὐτὸν μόνον
κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν).
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evaluations of likelihood, not assessments of truth. Such changes in credence come about
through a process of persuasion, which involves responses to evidence, including evidence
that enjoys a necessary connection to what it evinces. Animals cannot participate in this
process because they lack reason. Reason, then, is partially constituted by the ability to
engage in the sorts of evidential reasoning that bring about persuasion. is is also why
they do not have credence: they are incapable of evaluating the likelihood of a proposition
or state of aﬀairs. is is just to say that they cannot respond to evidence.
4. A Radical Alternative?
My account claims that, when Aristotle says that a creature needs logos in order to have
doxa, he means that believing, among other mental activities, expresses a special kind of
cognition that only certain creatures, i.e. constitutively rational creatures, possess. In other
words, Aristotle oﬀers cognitive criteria to distinguish the animals that have beliefs from
the animals that rely on perception and the non-rational representation (phantasia) that
result from it. On this account, logos means “reason,” but that is not the only way Aristotle
uses the word, even when he uses it to distinguish humans from other animals. 
ere is a plausible rival account which goes like so: Aristotle is not talking about
any sort of cognitive capacity when he denies that animals enjoy logos. Instead, he is
talking about a linguistic capacity and only derivatively about that capacity’s role in
shaping human thought. Humans in&uence each other through speech; they persuade
each other to hold certain beliefs, desire certain things and take certain actions.172
Humans can also, of course, use words and signi!cant gestures to interact with properly-
trained non-human animals. For instance, one can shout and crack a whip to urge a horse
or mule onward. An interaction of this kind would not, however, amount to persuasion,
for reasons discussed previously.173 e mere presence of words or commanding gestures
172. See especially Rhetoric 1.11, 1370a19-27, where Aristotle distinguishes desires which are “non-rational”
(aloga) from desires which are “rational” (meta logou). Rational desires, he says, are those we have as a
result of being persuaded (a25), and supports this by saying that we come to desire many things by
“hearing about them and being persuaded” that we should want them (a27).
173.e author of the commentary on On the Soul 3.1-8, commonly attributed to John Philoponus, observes
such a distinction in his discussion of this passage. e horse example is his.
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in the cause of a creature’s motion is not what makes for persuasion. Persuasion requires
that the subject evaluate what is being said and act in accordance with that evaluation.
One might say that the persuaded subject is not responding merely to the utterance (as a
commanded animal does). ose who hear about something and come to desire it on that
basis do not form their desires simply because certain sounds struck their eardrums. What
they respond to is rather what gets said, the content of the assertions and exhortations.174 
Creatures with the power of speech therefore have what we might call “linguistic
consciousness.” To non-linguistic animals, the sound of speech is mere noise. It can cause
them to respond just as any other event in the natural world, but it does not mean
anything to them. Creatures with the power of speech, on the other hand, are party to a
range of activities and concerns to which non-linguistic animals are blind. Aristotle seems
to say as much in the Politics, when he asks how human society diﬀers from that of other
social animals, such as ants and bees. His answer is that humans have language, and the
expressive power of human language far outstrips the expressive power of other animal
vocalizations:
at the human is a political animal more than any bee or gregarious animal
is clear. For nature, as we say, does nothing in vain, and man alone among
the animals possesses speech (logos). Voice, then, is a sign of the pleasant and
painful, and for this reason it belongs to other animals (for their nature has
proceeded as far as having awareness [aisthêsin] of what is pleasant and
painful and signifying these to each other), but speech is up to the task of
communicating (dêloun) the helpful and harmful, and so also the just and
the unjust: for it is peculiar to humans, as opposed to other animals, that
they have an awareness of good and bad and just and unjust and other
[notions]: and the common sharing of those makes for a household and a
city.175
174. Labarrière so argues (1984) when he says that persuasion involves a “mediated” representation, while
the kind of representation open to animals is not mediated. It is this mediation, he says, that creates a
space for belief, persuasion and other forms of rational cognition. He goes on to advocate an
understanding of logos in our target passage as speech, rather than rationality. His elaboration , that
what makes humans special is the ability to “put into play the multiplicity of [one’s] experiences” does
not, however, seem to explain (as he takes it to) why human mental representations are genuine beliefs
and those of animals are not. His claim that beliefs result from “a certain contact with reasoning and
calculation” just assumes the diﬀerence I hope to explain.
175. Politics 1.2, 1253a7-18: διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς
ἀγελαίου ζῴου μᾶλλον, δῆλον. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον δὲ μόνον
ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων· ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ
τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζῴοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν
λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ
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ere can be little question that, in this passage, logos refers to the capacity for speech and
language, rather than the faculty of reason. is is plain from his comparison with voice
(phônê), the non-linguistic vocalization of which animals are capable. His argument is that
humans are uniquely suited to forming cities and other political units because their
linguistic capacity opens up a broad array of concerns which other animals do not share.
Human linguistic consciousness allows us to communicate information about goodness
and justice, thereby allowing us to share the pursuit of these things with each other.176 is
in turn makes us suited to forming cities, because cities are constituted by the shared
pursuit of justice and the good.177 Aristotle even puts the point in terms of a diﬀerence in
awareness (aisthêsis). Linguistic creatures are literally conscious of things that non-
linguistic creatures are not. is is not, however, because non-linguistic animals cannot
produce signi!cant sounds. Aristotle, both here and elsewhere, holds that animals
communicate with each other.178 Certain birds even teach their young to sing, as humans
teach their children to talk.179 e passage from the Politics tells us that there is more to
linguistic consciousness than the ability to produce and recognize signi!cant sounds.180
συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα
ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.
176. For a contemporary parallel, see Korsgaard 1997, 398-400, who argues that the source of our moral
obligation to one another is, quite literally, our ability to intrude into one another’s linguistic
consciousness. Two crucial diﬀerences, however: (1) Korsgaard’s view depends on her theory that our
self-consciousness is the source of our obligation to ourselves, a claim which has no parallel in Aristotle;
and (2) Korsgaard is explicit that the social structure of our linguistic consciousness is what gives rise to
our interpersonal obligations. Aristotle stops short of making that claim; see below.
177. For con!rmation, see the end of Politics 1.2, at 1253a39-40: “and justice is something political, for it is
the arrangement of the association pertaining to society.”
178. See especially On the Soul 2.8, 420b30-34, where Aristotle insists that voice is meaningful (sêmantikos)
sound produced by an ensouled creature, accompanied by a representation (meta phantasias). is
implies that animal vocalization means something. Also see On the Soul 3.13, 435b24-26, where he says
that animals have hearing so that “something can mean something to it,” and a tongue so that “it can
mean something to another [animal],” though Ross 1961 brackets that last phrase.
179. History of Animals 4.9, 536b15-19. Birds sing diﬀerently from their parents if not raised around them,
and mother nightingales “have been seen teaching their young,” which suggests to Aristotle that
“discourse (dialektos) is not by nature similar to voice, but is able to be molded.” at observation is
applied, in the next sentence, to humans, implying that birds and humans are relevantly similar. On this
passage see Ax 1978, and Wedin (1984, 153-55) in response.
180. See also Labarrière 1993, though what he takes the extra human ingredient to be is not clear. He says,
for instance (1993, 248, 256) that human speech is “composed” and “articulated,” and perhaps by this he
means that human speech !ts together in a grammatical way, while animal speech does not. Relevant
here is Caston’s observation (1998, 284) that phantasia, which animal vocalization signi!es, does not
have linguistic structure. 
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Non-human animals can do as much, though they remain out of touch with the broad
range of other concerns that circumscribe human social life.
is passage from the Politics shows that Aristotle sees some correlation between
the human capacity for language and whatever cognitive capabilities set us apart from
non-rational animals. Someone inclined to defend the view that logos means “speech” in
our passage from On the Soul 3.3 could therefore point to it as evidence that, since
Aristotle is doing the same thing there as he is in the Politics passage—namely,
distinguishing humans and other creatures on the basis of whether they possess logos—he
is employing the same tactic in our passage from the On the Soul. is move is hasty,
though, because the Politics passage never claims any sort of dependence between
linguistic consciousness and rational cognitive capability. Aristotle’s argument in the
Politics runs like this: humans alone have awareness of goodness and justice. Speech
(unlike other animal vocalization) is up to the task of communicating (epi to dêloun) these
notions to conspeci!cs. Nature does nothing in vain, so humans must have the ability to
communicate about justice for a reason. Administration of shared justice is what makes
for political society. It is likely, then, that humans are most apt to form political societies,
in light of how nature has equipped them. Nowhere does he claim that the awareness of
justice is caused, constituted or in any other way dependent on linguistic capacity.181 So the
context of the Politics passage seems quite diﬀerent from that of our passage from On the
Soul, where Aristotle does claim that belief (a cognitive phenomenon) depends in some
way on logos. It is a mistake, therefore, to say that Aristotle explains human political
aptitude with linguistic consciousness, because Aristotle does not claim that possession of
political notions (such as goodness and justice) depends on possessing the language to
express them. Human political aptitude rather depends on language because language
allows for communication and therefore a shared conception and administration of
181. Wedin 1984, 147-56 defends at length the claim that language is a necessary condition for thought,
using this passage among others as evidence. My discussion, if right, undercuts a piece of his evidence,
and one piece of his data concerns the word dialektos and not logos. is suggests that his conclusion
should have limited impact on how we read logos in our passage from On the Soul. e thesis he
defends, that language is a necessary condition for rational thought, is weaker than the thesis under
discussion in the main text, that linguistic capacity somehow explains or underlies rational cognition.
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justice. His view does not, however, involve anything like a notion of “linguistic
consciousness” because he does not ground human awareness of justice and goodness in
the possession of the appropriate language.182
His considered view, in fact, is that the explanation runs in the opposite direction.
Humans do not think because they employ language, but rather employ language because
of the sort of cognition they enjoy. In the introduction to his semantic treatise On
Expression, he states that written marks symbolize spoken sounds, which in turn
symbolize “things that happen in the soul” (On Expression 1, 16a4-5). e latter phrase
refers most likely to the beliefs, concepts and other mental items which words are
supposed to express. His claim that language symbolizes things in the soul does not itself
imply that language does not have a hand in molding, shaping, or serving as a necessary
condition for those things in the soul. He goes on, however, to say that even though
spoken sounds are not the same for all humans, what they symbolize is the same:
And just as written marks are not the same for everyone, neither are vocal
sounds the same. What happens in the soul, however—those primary things
of which these [vocal sounds] are signs—those are the same for everyone,
and so are the real things (pragmata) of which those [happenings] are
resemblances (homoiômata).183
ere is quite a bit going on in this passage that would distract us to unpack. For instance,
Aristotle uses diﬀerent terms to express the relationship between the diﬀerent terms in his
theory. Written marks are symbols (sumbola) of vocal sounds, while the sounds are signs
(sêmeia) of happenings in the soul, which in turn are resemblances (homoiômata) of
things in the world.184 Crucial for our purpose is Aristotle’s claim that, although language
is molded by convention—and therefore diﬀers person to person—the mental
182. Wedin (1984, 155) aptly notes Sophistical Refutations 1.1, 165a6-8, where Aristotle says that we employ
words in the place of the things themselves, when the things themselves are not present. He seems,
however, to take this view as evidence that it is a “mark of reason” itself to employ conventional symbol-
strings in expression. For reasons not to accept this view, see below at page 76.
183. On Expression 1, 16a5-8: καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὧν
μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτων, ταὐτὰ πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα
πράγματα ἤδη ταὐτά.
184. For a thorough discussion of Aristotle’s semantic model, with copious reference to other secondary
sources, see Wheeler 1999. A de!ning characteristic of symbols seems to be that they signify by
convention: see also On Expression 2, 16a26-28, as well as Politics 3.9, 1280a36-39 for a more literal
example, of which Aristotle’s semantic usage is probably a metaphorical extension. On this, see
especially Labarrière 1984, 34-40, who rightly observes that sêmeion is likely synonymous with
sumbolon in On Expression, though in general the two are not synonymous.
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representations that language symbolizes are not. Aristotle does not, therefore, hold the
view that language molds or constructs the mental representations that it symbolizes.185 If
that were the case, then the representations would not be invariant under changes in
vocalization. Aristotle does claim in On Sense and Sensibles that speech (logos, again) is
the cause of learning (aitios mathêseôs), which seems to contradict my interpretation.186
He goes on, however, to say that it is the cause of learning not in and of itself, but rather
incidentally, because language is made up of names (onomata), which again serve as
symbols. e thought seems to be that language serves to instruct when it connects in the
right way to what goes on in the hearer’s soul. Aristotle does not say that language
contributes to the growth of wisdom or instruction because of any holistic eﬀect that
language use or acquisition has on thinking. He instead explains the role of language in
terms of its basic signi!cant ingredients187 and the role those ingredients have as symbols
for thought. In other words, language is the cause of learning not because it allows for
thought, but because it allows for the closest possible thing to a sharing of thoughts with
other individuals. is function, however, does not rely on or even hint at any relation of
constitution or dependence between the capacity for speech and the capacity for rational
cognition.
All this is reason to doubt that logos in our passage from On the Soul means
anything like “speech” or “language,” and that Aristotle is therefore making a claim that
certain types of cognition (in this case, belief) depend on the capacity for speech. One
might object, however, that the passages I have discussed do not tell against such a reading
to a greater extent than his many uses of logos as “speech” tell in favor of it. Nor does
Aristotle’s view that “what happens in the soul” is the same for everyone imply that
185. See also On Expression 13, 23a32-35 and 14, 24b1-3, where Aristotle deduces facts about the logic of
aﬃrmation and negation from facts about the respective beliefs that they symbolize. In the former
passage, Aristotle uses the word akolouthei, which appears in our main passage from On the Soul 3.3
and which I translate there as “depend on,” with the dependent thing as the subject of the verb. In On
Expression, however, the word has its more basic meaning of “following aer” in a causal sense. is is
clear because Aristotle supports his claim by citing how the structure of things in the soul determines
the structure of the spoken language, not the other way around. 
186. On Sense and Sensibles 1, 437a12-15.
187. I add “signi!cant” because words are made up of sounds which do not signify in and of themselves but
which are still part of language (i.e. they are not meaningless the way that a cough is meaningless). 
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language does not somehow underlie or constitute a sine qua non for beliefs and other
rational cognitive capacities. All languages possess certain common traits, which Aristotle
elaborates in On Expression: they consist of names and verbs, which are symbols for what
happens in the soul and combine with each other to express complex thoughts. Perhaps it
is access to this sort of symbol system, whatever form it takes in spoken language, that
allows for rational thought.188 Rational cognition does, then, depend on the capacity for
speech, though the exact mechanism and nature of the dependence would take more work
to spell out. e basic thesis is enough, however, to make sense of Aristotle’s brief
argument in our passage from On the Soul.
I grant that the human capacity for language allows us to formulate more complex
thoughts than what non-linguistic animals are able to entertain and express. Non-human
animals can !nd something pleasant or painful, and think that something should be
sought aer or avoided, but as Aristotle says in our passage from the Politics, it is unlikely
that they can !nd something just or unjust, less likely still that they could form a shared
conception and administration of justice. If access to a conventional symbol system allows
for a greater range in the contents of one’s thoughts, however, it is a further step to the
claim that employing this conventional symbol system is what constitutes or underlies
rational cognition. In our passage from On the Soul—even if logos does mean “speech”
there—Aristotle is not simply pointing out that humans can talk and animals cannot. at
fact alone would not serve to distinguish between belief and representation. His argument
denies beliefs to animals on the grounds that they do not have logos. If Aristotle means to
argue that employment of the conventional symbol system of language is what makes for
rational cognition, and it is for this reason that animals cannot form beliefs, then he is
committed to the thesis that all rational cognition is symbolically mediated. at is,
nothing that counts as the special brand of cognition occurs without linguistic mediation.
By “linguistic mediation,” I mean that the content of thoughts which count as rational
cognition are formulated in terms of elements in the conventional symbol system. is is
188. See Wedin 1984, 149-50.
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still somewhat vague, but the overall thrust is that we think in terms of the words in our
language: thought is internalized talk. 
It is enough to refute this interpretation, then, to show that Aristotle is not
committed to the thesis that our thinking is linguistically mediated. at is, he does not
hold the view that reasoning always takes the form of manipulating a conventional symbol
system, though of course it can and oen does take that form. He makes his view clear in
the Sophistical Refutations, when he discusses fallacies that stem from equivocation, i.e.
mixing up the diﬀerent senses of words. It is diﬃcult, Aristotle says, to keep track of all the
diﬀerent possible meanings of words, and mistakes occur easily. is is because we have a
tendency to assume that, when something gets predicated of something else, the
predicated thing is an individual (tode ti) and we understand it as a unity.189 Because of
this assumption, equivocation and ambiguity tend to catch us by surprise, and lead to
errors in speaking and reasoning. He says, therefore, that equivocation and ambiguity
belong among the errors that stem from language, and the further reason he provides
commits him against the idea that all thinking is linguistically mediated. He says that the
error stems from language because we are especially prone to it when we carry on our
inquiries with other people:
For this reason, this way (of going wrong) should be put among those
stemming from language (para tên lexin), chie&y because the error happens
more to those inquiring with others than on their own (for with another the
inquiry is through words (logôn), while with oneself it is no less through the
matter itself), and when someone happens to err (in this way) on their own,
it is when he fashions the inquiry based on the word. Furthermore, the
mistake is due to similarity, and similarity is due to language.190
Using language in argument and inquiry introduces a complication that is absent when
one does not use language. Aristotle allows that a signi!cant amount of rational cognition
189.is is my reading of Aristotle’s remark at Sophistical Refutations 7, 169a31-35. It is hard to see exactly
what he is getting at, but a precise understanding is not necessary to grasp the import of the remark that
follows.
190. Sophistical Refutations, 7, 169a36-40: διὸ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν οὗτος ὁ τρόπος θετέος,
πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι μᾶλλον ἡ ἀπάτη γίνεται μετ' ἄλλων σκοπουμένοις ἢ καθ' αὑτούς (ἡ μὲν
γὰρ μετ' ἄλλου σκέψις διὰ λόγων, ἡ δὲ καθ' αὑτὸν οὐχ ἧττον δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος)·
εἶτα καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν ἀπατᾶσθαι συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου ποιῆται τὴν σκέψιν. ἔτι ἡ
μὲν ἀπάτη ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἡ δ' ὁμοιότης ἐκ τῆς λέξεως.
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is mediated by language, even when one is not carrying on a discussion but rather
thinking on one’s own. A signi!cant amount of thinking, however, happens “through the
thing itself.” It is not immediately clear what Aristotle means by this, but he explicitly
contrasts whatever this kind of thinking is with thinking that occurs through language.191 
is is enough to conclude, I think, that such thinking is not formulated using
linguistic symbols, and is therefore not linguistically mediated. If we take Aristotle’s “no
less” literally, he is saying that human thinking consists of about equal parts thinking
which is mediated by the conventional symbol system of human language and thinking
which is not so mediated. Nor is the thinking which is not linguistically mediated a kind
of thinking on a level below that of rational cognition. One might imagine a system where
rational cognition consists of linguistically mediated thinking, and the non-linguistic
thinking is exclusively the kind of cognition which animals also have: representation,
memory, certain limited kinds of expectation. On this picture, linguistic capacity would
still be a sine qua non for rational cognition, even though not all cognition undertaken by
rational creatures was in fact linguistically-mediated. 
Our passage from Sophistical Refutations, however, speaks against such a picture.
Aristotle seems to believe that thinking which proceeds through the matter itself, without
linguistic mediation, is equally !t to carry out inquiries about abstract concepts. It is a
robust alternative to linguistically-mediated thinking, not a lower-level remnant of our
animal nature. e !nal remark, aer “furthermore,” provides another piece of evidence
that linguistic formulation is a separate, non-constitutive operation that introduces
complications into what already quali!es as the special brand of cognition that separates
rational from non-rational creatures. He says that “similarity” is the cause of ambiguity
and equivocation, a similarity which is speci!cally “due to language.” When we carry on
our inquiry through language, we are in part hostage to the contingent development of
our language. Meaning is conventional, so there is no natural connection between words
191.e thinking occurs through language, but is not necessarily about language. at is, the distinction is
not between thinking about real things and thinking about the meanings of words. Rather, the
distinction is in the means by which the reasoning occurs.
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and the “real matter” (pragma) they ultimately (through their role in symbolizing mental
entities) stand in for. In a given language, an identical mark may signify two very diﬀerent
things, and the homonymy need not signal any kind of similarity or connection between
the things signi!ed. 
Due, however, to our tendency to think that predicates signify an individual thing,
we are liable to overlook the homonymy that results from the contingent development of
language and so stumble in our reasoning about the actual things. An example from
English would be the word “bank.” Here is some mistaken reasoning about banks: I have
some savings, and want to earn interest on it. Well, money earns interest inside a bank,
banks are located next to rivers, therefore I should bury my money by the side of a river.
My concepts of river banks and monetary banks are radically diﬀerent. Were I just
thinking about the relevant objects, thinking that proceeded “through the things
themselves,” there would be no chance to make such a mistake. Nor would a speaker of
French, Arabic or Inuit (whose words for river banks and monetary banks diﬀer from one
another) be vulnerable to the mistaken reasoning given above. 
If the non-mediated kind of thinking is open to us, and linguistically-mediated
thinking is prey to these sorts of errors, one might ask why we bother with linguistically-
mediated thinking in the !rst place. Answering this question is not crucial here, but such
an answer would likely involve the social character of language, which allows us to share
conclusions and carry on joint inquiry. It would also likely involve the fact which I granted
earlier, that linguistic mediation allows us to formulate highly complex thoughts about a
wide range of content with relative ease. If the mistakes due to language can be avoided,
then language is a powerful reasoning tool. Aristotle says as much immediately prior to
the passage we quoted above:
For it is diﬃcult to determine which [expressions] say the same thing, and
which say diﬀerent things (for the man who is able to do this is basically next
door to an understanding of the truth, and knows best how to join in
assenting [to a claim]).192
192. Sophistical Refutations 7, 169a31-34: χαλεπὸν γὰρ διελεῖν ποῖα ὡσαύτως καὶ ποῖα ὡς ἑτέρως
λέγεται (σχεδὸν γὰρ ὁ τοῦτο δυνάμενος ποιεῖν ἐγγύς ἐστι τοῦ θεωρεῖν τἀληθές, μάλιστα
δ' ἐπίσταται συνεπινεύειν).
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Facility in linguistically-mediated thinking gives one an advantage in thinking about the
matters themselves, in part because someone with such a familiarity does not make the
mistakes that more careless people make, but also because he knows how to reason
quickly and eﬀectively with the tool of language. 
Whatever the details of Aristotle’s view about those matters, these passages from
the Sophistical Refutations makes this clear: there is more to rational cognition than
thinking mediated by a conventional symbol system. It is possible to carry out reasoning
without linguistic mediation, and such mediation is not constitutive of rational cognition
because Aristotle sees linguistic thinking as prey to certain fallacies and mistakes which
thinking “through the matter itself ” is not prey to. Aristotle is therefore committed against
the view that language is necessary for constitutively rational cognition. Since taking logos
for “speech” in our passage from On the Soul would commit him to such a view, this is
reason to reject the interpretation. It is correct, then, to think that logos denotes a
cognitive or mental capacity (reason in particular), rather than some other capacity, such
as the ability to speak or be linguistically conscious.
79
Chapter 3
e Normativity of Belief
1. Introduction
We come now to the side-by-side arguments that occupy On the Soul 3.3, 427b16-24.
Unlike the arguments discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, Aristotle seems concerned here
primarily with cognition open only to humans. His does not mention animals and how
they diﬀer from humans, and his examples depend on forms of representation (phantasia)
which we would not attribute to animals, such as building a mnemonic system and
appreciating a work of art. e arguments nonetheless remain relevant to his conception
of constitutive rationality. Believing is still something that only rational creatures can do,
and the properties that he attributes to belief in order to distinguish it from representation
are properties which make it a form of rational cognition.
In the argument at On the Soul 3.3, 427b16-21, Aristotle distinguishes believing
and imagining193 by saying that believing is not up to us, while imagining is. My
understanding of what Aristotle means by this diﬀers radically from previous
commentary on the passage. He does not mean that we lack causal or conative control
over the formation of our beliefs, but rather that we have a positive obligation to believe
the truth, and so cannot believe as we please. Belief ’s normative connection to truth takes
two forms: !rst, truth governs belief as a standard of procedural correctness that belief has
in virtue of its role as a guide to rational agents in advancing their concerns. Aristotle goes
further than that, however, and says that truth has a value all its own which can come into
felt con&ict with the agent’s other values and concerns. Our beliefs are therefore subject to
193. For discussion of these passages, I prefer the conventional “imagination,” because here Aristotle seems
to be referring to a mode of representation to oneself that we can more or less use as we please. at is,
he seems to be talking about what we would recognize as the recreative imagination, pace Freudenthal
1863.
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normative evaluation with respect to truth, and we go wrong to the extent that we believe
falsehoods. Being subject to these normative constraints is part of what makes for
constitutive rationality, on Aristotle’s view. In order to be a rational creature, one must be
subject to the norms which govern rational creatures, and one violates them on pain of
irrationality. In order to establish anything close to this, I must cut through a thicket of
mistaken interpretation. First, I set out and dismantle two guiding assumptions of the
conventional interpretation: that belief ’s connection to truth lies merely in its having a
truth-value, and that something is up to us just in case it is under our causal or conative
control. I replace each of these in turn with my own interpretation. e conclusion tells a
story about what Aristotle’s normative views about belief and truth amount to.194
2. e Argument, and Two Crucial Assumptions
To start, here is Aristotle’s argument in full:
It’s clear as well that it [i.e. imagination] is not thinking, or rather
entertaining. For that state is up to us, whenever we want (for it is possible to
put something in front of our eyes, like those who fashion images and put
them into mnemonics), but believing is not up to us. For when forming
beliefs we must either be in error or hit on the truth.195, 196
Imagining is up to us because we can conjure images for various purposes, whenever we
want. Aristotle’s speci!c example is a person who is putting together a mnemonic system,
but nothing in his remark indicates that this is the full range of the ability. e
conventional interpretation of this argument makes two assumptions, both of which I
reject. e !rst is that, when Aristotle says that imagining is “up to us” and believing is
not, he means that we have some sort of causal control over the former and not the latter.
at is, we can make ourselves imagine something but we cannot make ourselves believe
194.is passage is notoriously diﬃcult to interpret, in part because the text itself is the subject of editorial
controversy. Translation throughout re&ects my own choices; for discussion of why I read the text and
translate it as I do, see “Appendix: Text and Translation of 427b16-21,” page 123.
195. Reading hautê with the Budé edition (Jannone 1966, 75), against Rodier 1900, 2:405-6 and Hicks 1907,
457-58, and retaining noêsis against Ross 1961 and Wedin 1984, 73.
196. On the Soul 3.3, 427b16-21: ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν αὕτὴ νόησις καὶ ὑπόληψις, φανερόν. τοῦτο μὲν
γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι,
ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες), δοξάζειν δ' οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν·
ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν.
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something.197 e second assumption is that the connection between belief and truth goes
no deeper than the fact that beliefs have truth-values. Call mental states that share this
feature TRUTH-APT. is assumption requires a diﬀerent translation from my own: where I
have “we must either be in error or hit on the truth,” substitute something like “we must
believe either truly or falsely.”198 I examine the second assumption !rst; it is more
straightforwardly false, and correcting it will motivate us to question the !rst assumption.
3. Dismantling the Second Assumption: TRUTH-APT
Grant for now the assumption that Aristotle is talking about causal control when he says
that belief is not “up to us.” It is nonetheless diﬃcult to see why belief ’s being TRUTH-APT
would entail that believing is not up to us. e problem gets worse when we observe that
imagination is TRUTH-APT as well. Several of the distinctions Aristotle makes between
imagination and other states throughout On the Soul 3.3 depend on imagination being
either true or false. For instance:
Also, [perceptions of intrinsic objects] are always true,199 while instances of
imagination are by and large false. Furthermore we don’t say, when our
senses are operating accurately with regard to something [incidentally]
perceived, that it seems to us that it’s a man, but we do that more when we
are not clearly perceiving whether it’s true or false.200
197. Among ancient commentators see Ps-Philoponus Commentary on the Soul 488.16-21, ps-Simplicius
Commentary on the Soul 206.8-11, emistius On the Soul Paraphrase 88.37-40. Among modern
scholars see especially Freudenthal 1863, 8-11, Hicks 1907, 458, Hamlyn 1968, 130, Wedin 1984, 74-75,
and Polansky 2007, 411-13. Rodier 1900 presupposes that this is Aristotle’s view, but says nothing
explicit. I know of no one in the literature who rejects the assumption; Barnes (2006, 195-97) recognizes
that the argument does not work on this interpretation, but nonetheless takes it to be the correct
interpretation of Aristotle’s argument. I, on the other hand, think this is reason to seek an alternative
interpretation.
198.is conventional reading (as in Rodier 1900, Hicks 1907 and Hamlyn 1968) is possible, but not
necessary. My translation, however, makes better sense of the argument. Aristotle’s point is not about
the distribution of truth-values, but rather about how truth regulates the process of belief-formation.
He explains his claims about whether states are up to us with examples of human activity, such as
forming mnemonic systems. Humans cannot be true or false (except metaphorically), but they can be
in error or hit on the truth in their beliefs.
199.e notion that certain perceptions are “always true” sounds strange to us, but exclusive (idia) objects of
perception are the perceptual qualities which de!ne or constitute the sense in question (e.g. color for
vision, sound for hearing). ese perceptions are “always true” because our senses are never mistaken
about whether some stimulus is taking place, though they can be mistaken about what object they are
perceiving via that sensation: see especially On the Soul 2.6, 418a15-19 and 3.3, 428b18-30. See also
Turnbull 1978,  Everson 1997 and Modrak 1987.
200. On the Soul 3.3, 428a11-15: εἶτα αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς ἀεί, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἱ πλείους
ψευδεῖς. ἔπειτα οὐδὲ λέγομεν, ὅταν ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὅτι φαίνεται
τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν μὴ ἐναργῶς αἰσθανώμεθα πότερον ἀληθὴς ἢ
ψευδής.
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Aristotle also argues for a distinction between imagining and understanding (nous) or
knowledge (epistêmê), on the grounds that they are always true, and imagination is
sometimes false:
Neither will imagination turn out to be any of those states which are always
true, for example knowledge or understanding; for imagination is also
false.201
If imagination is not TRUTH-APT, these comparisons make no sense. Furthermore,
Aristotle needs imagination, and introduces it in the !rst place, to account for the
possibility of cognitive error. Past theorists, he says, tend to say that thinking is just a form
of perception, on the grounds that the soul uses both to discriminate and become familiar
with what is the case.202 Empedocles and others, however, have no story for how we can
think that p when it is not the case that p. e sort of representation that we here call
“imagining” allows Aristotle to account for the phenomenon. It cannot play the role he
needs it to, however, if it can be neither true nor false.203 A !nal bit of evidence comes at
the end of this chapter, when Aristotle gives a condensed characterization of imagining, its
causes and consequences. e “motion” he refers to in the following quote is an
imagining:204 
is motion would not be possible without perception, nor would it belong
to things which do not perceive; and the thing that has it will be able to do
and experience many things because of it, and it can be both true and false.205
Imagination, as far as Aristotle is concerned, is TRUTH-APT. If being TRUTH-APT were
suﬃcient to make a mental state not up to us, then imagining would not be up to us,
201. On the Soul 3.3, 428a17-19: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀεὶ ἀληθευουσῶν οὐδεμία ἔσται, οἷον
ἐπιστήμη ἢ νοῦς· ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής.
202. On the Soul 3.3, 427a17-22: “…it seems like both theoretical and practical thought (to noein kai to
phronein) are a certain perception: for in both of these the soul discriminates and recognizes some of
what is. And the older thinkers, at least, say that thinking and perception are the same thing…”
203. One might argue that phantasia simply supplies the content of one’s judgment, and that the truth or
falsehood is determined by other aspects of the mental state. e plausibility of this objection will
depend on how one !lls in the details, but my response would be that it is diﬃcult to see where the
truth or falsehood of a judgment would come from, if not from its representational content.
204. Wedin (1984, 75ﬀ) calls this the “canonical theory of imagination,” and spends a great deal of time
reconciling Aristotle’s other remarks on phantasia with what he takes to be the core doctrine expressed
in this section.
205. On the Soul 3.3, 428b15-17: εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ
αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι
καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ.
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contrary to Aristotle’s claim. Any reconstruction of the argument, then, will have to appeal
to some property of beliefs other than their merely having truth-values.206 
We can deal brie&y with the radical suggestion that imagination does not, in
general, even have a truth value. Aristotle says that belief is not up to us because it “must
be true or false,” so one might conclude that imagination need be neither true nor false,
i.e. it need not be TRUTH-APT.207 Some instances of imagining are TRUTH-APT, which
accounts for the several pieces of text we have already seen, but others are not. One might
say that in order for imagining to have a truth-value, one must take a certain stance
toward the representation (phantasma). If one does not take it to represent anything in the
world—if it amounts to an idle fancy or a daydream—then it has no truth value. If this
stance is something that is up to us, it would follow that imagining is up to us.
is proposal falters on both exegetical and philosophical grounds. It is
implausible that a thinking subject must take some stance toward a representation for it to
have any sort of truth value. A mental state still has content, even when that content is not
taken to represent the world.208 Whether the representation is isomorphic with some part
of the world does not depend on any attitude that any subject takes toward it. Since the
isomorphism is what determines the truth value of the representation, and the
isomorphism holds independent of the subject’s attitude toward the representation, it
follows that the attitude of the subject does not determine the truth-value of the
representation (and, a fortiori, whether the state is TRUTH-APT at all).209 e subject’s ability,
therefore, to hold diﬀerent attitudes toward the representation does not imply anything
about whether the representational state is TRUTH-APT. Nor have we any good reason to
206. Freudenthal (1863, 9-11) seems to notice this, calls the argument “obviously invalid” and concludes that
Aristotle did not write it or did not mean for it to be where we read it. Rodier (1900, 2:408-13) tries to
make due only with truth-aptness by suggesting that belief must (anankê) be true or false, while
imagination only might be. His arguments are based on a &awed interpretation of On Memory 1,
450b21-451a3. See immediately below in the main text.
207.is argument is due to Rodier (1900, 2:408-13), in response to Freudenthal.
208. On this point see especially Lorenz 2006, 159 and Caston 1998, 257n21. Caston also points out that it is
implausible to think that taking a certain stance toward a content is necessary for a state to be
representational (and that Aristotle never makes such a claim). 
209.is argument takes as a premise some sort of correspondence theory of truth, which seems to be
Aristotle’s own view. For discussion, see Crivelli 2004, 130-32, Modrak 2001, Irwin 1988 (5, 95), and
Nussbaum 1978, esp. ch. 7.
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think that Aristotle held a view like this: textual evidence is wanting. e closest we can
get is a passage from On Memory, where Aristotle says that we “must consider” (dei
hupolabein) the representation in us both “on its own terms and as a likeness of something
else,” in the same way that we can contemplate a painting both on its own terms and as a
reference to something else out in the world.210 Aristotle is only there concerned, however,
with representations as the medium of memory and recollection; he espouses no general
view about imagining there.211 Furthermore, he says that we “must consider” any given
representation in both the ways he gives. ere is no impression of dichotomy, or that our
stance one way or the other is “up to us” in the sense required by our main passage from
On the Soul.
e situation, then, is as it appeared to be: imagination is TRUTH-APT, so belief ’s not
being up to us must have some other explanation. ere are other interpretations,
however, that rely on no stronger connection between belief and truth than the fact that
beliefs have truth-values. Such proposals still fail, however, because they commit Aristotle
to claims which contradict his express views about which states are up to us and which are
not. We can see this if we examine a representative sample of such interpretations. e
most straightforward proposal is semantic. at is, it attempts to derive that believing is
not up to us from considerations about what determines the truth-value of beliefs. We
might argue as follows: beliefs get to be true or false by corresponding or failing to
correspond to the facts. How the facts fall out are not up to us. We cannot, therefore,
control which of our beliefs are true and which false. erefore, believing is not under our
210. On Memory 1, 450b21-27: οἷον γὰρ τὸ ἐν πίνακι γεγραμμένον ζῷον καὶ ζῷόν ἐστι καὶ εἰκών,
καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἄμφω, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἔστι θεωρεῖν
καὶ ὡς ζῷον καὶ ὡς εἰκόνα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν φάντασμα δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ αὐτό τι καθ'
αὑτὸ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλου [φάντασμα]. ᾗ μὲν οὖν καθ' αὑτό, θεώρημα ἢ φάντασμά ἐστιν, ᾗ δ'
ἄλλου, οἷον εἰκὼν καὶ μνημόνευμα.
211. In accordance with Caston 1998, 257-59. Aristotle’s point in the quoted passage is that we can a) regard
as a likeness what is in fact a likeness (genuine memory), b) regard as a likeness what is not a likeness
(seeming to remember) and c) fail to regard as a likeness what is a likeness (doubting one’s memory).
None of this implies that the representation in question would ever lack a truth-value. Aristotle himself
provides an example of case (b) at 451a9-11, when he speaks of lunatics who “spoke of their
representations as if they remembered them,” when in fact they were mere delusions. See also Caston
1998, 281-84.
85
control. We !nd this idea foremost in the commentary for On the Soul attributed to
Simplicius:212
Endorsement is not simply due to the comprehension of how things fall out,
but rather is due to the discrimination of truth and falsehood. Truth and
falsehood lies in agreement and disagreement with the facts of the matter
(pragmata), and the facts of the matter are not up to us.213
e truth-value of our beliefs is set by how the facts fall out. Facts, however, are beyond
our control. Imagination is unfettered by this connection to facts, so we can do what we
want with it.214 Belief, therefore, does not depend on us but rather on the outside world,
which does not depend on us either.215
We need to qualify the premise that facts are not up to us; numerous facts seem to
be under our control.216 I can control whether or not a light switch is on in my room,
whether or not my students understand the material, whether or not my door is locked.
Simplicius seems right, however, that dependence on the actions of an agent is not
characteristic of facts as a kind. e facts that are up to us seem limited to a subset of
particular facts (kath’ hekasta, literally “with regard to each individual”). Aristotle also
takes this to be the realm of human control.217 Our in&uence ends there: we have no
control over universal facts (katholou, literally “with regard to the whole”), which oen
represent moral principles or facts of nature. No one controls what is true about !re and
lightning, for example. We can have beliefs about both kinds of facts, so Simplicius is right
to say that facts are not, in general, up to us.218 e rest of his argument relies on the
following reasonable assumption: anything which depends on a state of aﬀairs that is not
212. It is probably not the work of Simplicius, however; see Blumenthal 2000, 1-7.
213. Commentary On the Soul 206.32-35: ἡ δὲ συγκατάθεσις οὐ κατὰ μόνην τὴν τῶν
προσπιπτόντων σύνεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἢ ψεύδους διάκρισιν. ἐν δὲ τῇ
πρὸς τὰ πράγματα συμφωνίᾳ καὶ διαφωνίᾳ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος· τὰ πράγματα δὲ
οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.
214. Ps-Simplicius says as much before the cited passage, at 206.13-15.
215. Heil (2003, 324n) seems to assume something like this argument in his own reconstruction. See also
Barnes 2006, 195-97 for a more thorough reconstruction, though he realizes it does not make any sense
of our target passage.
216. In fact, standard modal logics of ability require this by presupposing in their semantics that the actions
of agents can make propositions true or false. See for example Brown 1988, 3-5.
217. See, for instance, Metaphysics 1.1, 981a15-17, Nicomachean Ethics 2.7, 1107a29-32, 3.1, 1110b6-7, 6.7,
1141b14-16, and Politics 2.8, 1269a9-12.
218. For the comparison between universal and particular beliefs, see On the Soul 3.11, 434a16-21 and
Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1147b1-5. For particular beliefs, see also On Dreams 2, 461a31-b2 and
Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1147a25-28.
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up to us is also not up to us. If the truth-value of every belief consists in whether it agrees
or disagrees with the facts, and the facts are not up to us, then it is not up to us whether
that given belief is true or false. Belief, therefore, is not up to us. is account, however,
faces a fatal diﬃculty. If truth is agreement with the facts, and imagination can also be
true or false, then the truth of imagination also consists in agreement with the facts.219
Simplicius’ argument works for belief, it also works for imagination, so imagination is not
up to us either, contrary to Aristotle’s express view.220 So Simplicius’ semantic argument
does not explain why belief is not up to us.
Perhaps the pragmatics of belief has a better chance. Beliefs have a diﬀerent kind
of force than imaginings, so maybe the diﬀerence lies there.221 is kind of proposal goes
like so: when we form a belief, we do not simply represent a state of aﬀairs, but also assert
the content of that representation.222 What we believe is, therefore, restricted by how we
take the world to be; we cannot believe what we do not take to be true, since beliefs
encode our commitments about what is true.223 Imagining is up to us because it faces no
such constraint. e appeal to assertoric force yields a clear distinction between belief and
imagination, while requiring no deeper a connection between truth and belief than
belief ’s being TRUTH-APT. 
e proposal, however, is unsatisfying for two reasons. First, it makes no headway
in answering our initial question: why does belief ’s being TRUTH-APT entail that we have no
causal control over it? Our beliefs constitute what we take to be true,224 so the claim that
we cannot believe what we do not take to be true amounts to the claim that we cannot
219.is is true even if the operative notion of truth for imagination is truth-of, rather than propositional
truth. See Wedin 1984, 77-79 for the distinction. e basic notion of matching-up is, I think, present in
both propositional truth and truth-of, so the latter requires no importantly diﬀerent account. See also
Moreau 1961, 23-26 for a discussion of truth which does not involve predication (and therefore does
not involve propositions), though Moreau’s subject is perception and not imagination proper.
220. It also implies that actively exercising our knowledge is not up to us, even though it is: see page 89.
221. Ademollo (2010, 97n2) is skeptical that Aristotle cared much about the theory of speech-acts and force
(what I loosely call “pragmatics”). It would certainly be anachronistic to import too much of our
modern theoretical framework into our readings, but I think regimenting Aristotle’s intuitions using
this kind of language does little harm.
222. Aristotle holds this view explicitly: see especially Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142b13-14 and On
Expression 14, 24b2-4.
223.is proposal, or something like it, is widespread in the literature. It seems to lie behind Wedin’s view of
the passage (1984, 75-77), though it is hard to be certain, since he says that Aristotle is making a
“logical point.” See also Hicks 1907, 459, Hamlyn 1968, 130-31, and Polansky 2007, 410-12.
224. Or, as Hamlyn puts it, our “view of the facts.”
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believe what we do not believe. is is either obviously false (since our beliefs change), or
a tautology, and applies as much any other mental state, imagining included. To make the
proposal at all convincing, we would need to supplement it with an account of why the
commitments involved in making an assertion put the assertoric mental state outside our
control.225 
More damning from an exegetic standpoint, however, is that this proposal
commits Aristotle to contradicting his own express view. If a mental state’s making an
assertion entails that the state is not under our control, then Aristotle should agree that no
assertoric mental state is under our control. Knowledge, however, is assertoric in the same
sense: it encodes our commitments about what is true, just as our beliefs do. In On the
Soul 2.5, Aristotle draws a threefold distinction among capabilities, and his example
throughout is knowledge.226 Humans start with the ability to acquire knowledge, then
through study acquire a disposition which we would call “knowledge” in contemporary
philosophical discourse. Knowing in this sense does not imply that the knowing subject is
at any given moment aware of or making use of their knowledge. When someone knows
in this dispositional sense, they can, according to Aristotle, enter a further occurrent
mental state that amounts to an active exercise of her knowledge.227 Aristotle says that this
active exercise is up to us: 
But there is a diﬀerence [between perception and knowledge], namely that
those things which produce sensation are external: what is seen, what is
heard, and so on for the other senses. e reason for this is that sensation,
as an activity, concerns particulars, while knowledge is of universals, and
these are in the very soul, in a way. For this reason thinking is up to
someone, whenever he wishes, but perceiving is not up to him, for the
225. My own proposal, that the connection between belief and truth is normative, provides such a bridge. If
beliefs are supposed to be true, then as a matter of course people (if they are good believers) will want
their beliefs to be true, and so feel constrained by the truth. is does not validate the current proposal,
however, because it is still not the reason why believing is not up to us.
226. For extended discussion of this passage see especially Burnyeat 2002. e present discussion,
fortunately, does not require a detailed understanding of the many intricacies of On the Soul 2.5.
227. See On the Soul 2.5, 417a25-30. Aristotle says that the man who actively exercises his knowledge is a
knower in the principal (kuriôs) sense, which suggests that he ascribes the disposition to know on the
basis of the ability to engage in this more active form of contemplation.
Since Aristotle draws a direct analogy between active perception and active knowing (On the Soul 2.5,
417b18-19), it is tempting to say that what characterizes active knowing is a conscious awareness or
contemplation of what one knows. As far as I can tell, however, nothing in Aristotle’s remarks at On the
Soul 2.5 commit him to this.
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perceptible must be present.228
Aristotle says that “thinking” (noêsai) is up to us, rather than knowing (epistamai), but
this passage occurs right aer the discussion I summarize above, and so the term
“thinking” is meant to include the active exercise of our knowledge, even if it extends
more widely. When one exercises one’s knowledge, one enters an assertoric mental state.
is state is, for Aristotle, distinct from dispositional knowledge. In fact, he refers to active
awareness of one’s knowledge as “the principle sense” in which we know something. at
is, we ascribe dispositional knowledge to a subject on the basis of their ability to actively
contemplate some truth. A subject can do this whenever she wants to (provided nothing
interferes), which makes exercising her knowledge up to her. Yet it is also assertoric,
because it makes a claim about the world (which always happens to be a true claim).
Believing cannot therefore be outside our control because it is assertoric. Proposals based
on the pragmatics of belief dead-end just as did proposals based on its semantics.
e last type of proposal I will consider appeals to the psychological dynamics of
belief. Perhaps, as a matter of psychological fact, humans are incapable of forming certain
beliefs at certain times. e ancient commentator emistius defends such a proposal at
length in his paraphrase of On the Soul.229 We can, he says, imagine anything we please at
any given time. When it comes to belief, however, we are compelled by what seems
obvious (to dokoun enarges). We must give our assent to what seems obvious, deny what
seems obviously not the case, and suspend our judgment when nothing is clear. In
general, what is obvious to someone at a certain time determines what they believe at that
time.230 Again, such a proposal draws a clear distinction between belief and imagination,
and appeals to no greater a connection between belief and truth than belief ’s being TRUTH-
228. On the Soul 2.5, 417b19-25: διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι τοῦ μὲν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔξωθεν, τὸ
ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. αἴτιον δ'ὅτι τῶν καθ'
ἕκαστον ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου· ταῦτα δ' ἐν αὐτῇ πώς
ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ. διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται, αἰσθάνεσθαι δ' οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ·
ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τὸ αἰσθητόν.
229. On the Soul Paraphrase 88.38-89.10. Ps-Philoponus (Commentary on the Soul 15, 488.16-31,
492.24-493.4) also asserts that it is psychologically impossible to believe anything we please at any given
time, but he provides no argument for his claim. I engage with emistius in particular because I am
aware of no contemporary interpretation which provides such a cogent defense of the proposal.
230. See especially Barnes 2006, 199-201, who traces of this sort of argument to the Stoic tradition as well.
89
APT. What is more, it tells a psychologically plausible story about why we do not have
control over our beliefs. 
e proposal fails, however, because belief ’s not being up to us does not follow
from emistius’ argument. According to emistius, we must, at any given time, believe
in accordance with what is obvious to us. He seems to consider this suﬃcient to rule out
belief ’s being under our causal control; he calls belief an “unwilling aﬀection of the soul.”
If we are so constrained, then belief is not under our immediate conative control. at is,
we cannot make ourselves believe something straightaway by willing ourselves to believe
it.231 Belief is not like raising our hand or directing our attention somewhere.232 If
something is obvious to us, we must believe it, whether we want to or not. Immediate
conative control, however, is not a necessary condition for a mental state to be “up to us,”
according to Aristotle. He argues in his discussion of responsibility in Nicomachean Ethics
book 3 that being virtuous is up to us, even though we cannot become virtuous and
vicious at will:
But if someone knowingly performs those acts due to which he will become
a wicked man, then he will be willingly wicked, even though of course he will
not, upon wishing for it, cease to be wicked and become just. For neither will
a sick man become healthy like that. […] Just as it is not possible for
someone who has thrown a rock to make it return, but nonetheless less it was
up to him to throw it, for the source was in him.233
We do not become virtuous simply through wanting or intending to. Rather, we acquire
these states of character through habitually performing the appropriate actions and
learning to take the right attitude toward performing them.234 Aristotle does not, however,
231. Williams’ argument against this kind of believing at will (1973) has attracted enough attention and
criticism (see, for instance, Winters 1979, Walker 2001, Funkhouser 2003 and Setiya 2008) that it is
worth noting the diﬀerence between his argument and that of emistius. For Williams, what makes
belief at will impossible is the conceptual impossibility of forming a belief while being indiﬀerent to
whether the belief is true or false. Believing at will presupposes this sort of disregard for the truth, so it
is conceptually impossible. For emistius, beliefs result directly from certain evidential states, oen
against our will (he calls belief an “unwilling aﬀection of the soul”). We need not be aware of these
evidential states or have any thoughts about whether our beliefs are true or false, as we must in Williams
account.
232. Our control over these actions can also, of course, be wrenched from us, by paralysis or surprise. e
point is that we can, in general, perform such actions at will.
233. Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1114a12-19: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἑκὼν
ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ
νοσῶν ὑγιής. καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἑκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς
ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον
ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ.
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shrink from saying that they are up to us. We make ourselves virtuous or vicious, even
though acquiring virtue is not the immediate result of any action that we take. Similarly, it
might be possible, through our own actions, to change what is obvious to us. Say someone
wants to get themselves to believe that p, for some propositional claim p. She might
carefully avoid anyone who wishes to argue that not-p and only associate with those who
agree that p. Over time, it will start to seem obvious to her that p, because she is no longer
aware of any evidence to the contrary. Nothing in emistius’ argument rules this out. If
Aristotle thinks that this kind of control is enough to put virtue under our control, then it
should also put belief under our control. If we assume that Aristotle does not fall prey to
this confusion, then the psychological proposal cannot represent his reasoning.
A broad survey of the ways one might defend the assumption that there is no
deeper connection between belief and truth than belief ’s being TRUTH-APT shows us that
there is likely no good defense of the assumption. Semantic, pragmatic and psychological
defenses of the assumption all lead the argument into direct con&ict with Aristotle’s
express views and so likely fail to capture the contours of Aristotle’s reasoning. My
suggestion is that we abandon the assumption and look for evidence that Aristotle sees a
more substantial connection between belief and truth which he might plausibly deploy in
this argument.
4. Replacing the Second Assumption: Truth Matters
Here is my suggestion: the connection between belief and truth is not semantic, pragmatic
or psychological, but normative. Truth is the standard of correctness for belief, not simply
one of two values it can take.235 In other words, belief is not just TRUTH-APT. In addition,
believing is what we might call TRUTH-NORMED. Call a cognitive activity (such as believing,
imagining and knowing) TRUTH-NORMED just in case it should hit on the truth (that is, there
is some normative constraint that requires it to be true), but it can also be false. Put
234. See also Nicomachean Ethics 10.9, 1179b20-24, Eudemian Ethics 2.6, 1223a7-15; 2.11, 1228a5-11.
235.e thesis that belief “aims at truth” has received much recent attention, though the connection to
doxastic voluntarism is not always explicit. See especially Velleman 2000, Walker 2001, Shah 2003, Shah
and Velleman 2005, Steglich-Petersen 2006b, Gibbard 2007 and Swanson 2007.
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slightly diﬀerently, an activity is TRUTH-NORMED if it makes sense to say that it is operating
correctly when it hits on the truth and makes a mistake when it seizes on a falsehood.
Imagining is not TRUTH-NORMED, because our imagining truly or falsely does not determine
whether we are imagining as we should. Neither is knowing TRUTH-NORMED, because there
is no way to know something false. Knowledge is true as a conceptual matter: part of what
it is for a judgment to express knowledge just is for it to be true. Believing falls between
these two extremes: it can deviate from the truth and still be belief, but it is not
freewheeling the way we think of imagination as freewheeling. 
My de!nition applies to activities (such a believing) rather than states (such as
beliefs) because the norm, however we spell it out, applies to believers and governs what
beliefs they form, rather than states and which truth-values they possess. e second
option sounds bizarre; it implies both that a belief that p and a belief that not-p “should be
true,” which is a strange thing to say.236 e !rst option also better !ts the way Aristotle
presents his argument; he says not that doxa is not up to us, but to doxazein, “forming
beliefs.” If believing is TRUTH-NORMED, then in some sense (to be spelled out), one ought to
believe truths and reject falsehoods.237 For Aristotle, this “should” is a rational compulsion
(i.e we violate it on pain of irrationality), and for this reason we cannot believe “as we
please,” the way we can imagine as we please.238 
Several texts make it clear that Aristotle takes believing to be TRUTH-NORMED. He
argues, for instance, that truth is the right condition of theoretical thinking, because
hitting on the truth is what every kind of thinking is supposed to do:
e right and wrong conditions (to eu kai kakôs) of discursive thinking
(dianoia) which is theoretical, and neither practical nor productive, are the
true and the false, for this is the function (ergon) of everything concerned
with thinking. Of what is concerned with practical thinking239 [the right
236.anks to Rich omason for making me think about this.
237. As Gibbard would say (borrowing from Sellars), believing is “fraught with ought” (2003, 21, 191). We
will see in a moment how the oughts join the fray.
238.is formulation presupposes my replacement of traditional commentary’s !rst assumption about how
to understand Aristotle’s argument. See below at “Dismantling the First Assumption: Causal Control,”
page 100.
239. Practical thinking proceeds under a certain conception of the good, which implies a certain
desiderative structure on the part of the agent. In order for this kind of thinking to proceed correctly,
the desiderative structure must be correct as well as judgments of factual matters, hence Aristotle’s
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condition] is truth in union with correct desire.240
Aristotle talks about thinking (dianoia) in this passage rather than belief (doxa), but the
two are intimately connected; evidence for this is scattered throughout the corpus. At On
Expression 14, 23a27-35, Aristotle tries to puzzle out whether an assertion is contrary to
its corresponding denial—as “all men are just” is contrary to “no man is just”—or to
another incompatible assertion, say “all men are unjust.” He argues that, since spoken
sounds follow “matters in discursive thought” (tois en têi dianoiai), we can answer the
question by considering which beliefs are contrary to which other beliefs. is
presupposes that discursive thought either consists in part of beliefs or is responsible for
forming beliefs. 
Two further passages suggest that it is the latter. Late in the Posterior Analytics
(100b5-10), Aristotle lists the states “by which we hit on the truth (alêtheuomen)” and
which “concern discursive thinking” (peri tên dianoian). He divides them into those
which are always true and those which can also be false. Belief and reasoning (logismos)
are his examples of the latter kind, while scienti!c knowledge and understanding (nous)
are his go-to examples for states which can never be false, just as they are in On the Soul
3.3. By saying that these states “concern discursive thinking,” Aristotle does not mean to
say that these states are all species of a common genus, dianoia. is would be a mistake
because discursive thought is not a state, the way belief and knowledge are. Rather, it is the
cognitive process which produces those states. Aristotle draws this distinction by saying
that discursive thinking is not assertoric, while belief is (presumably the same goes for
knowledge and intuitive understanding).241 During his discussion of excellence in
deliberation (euboulia), Aristotle rejects the idea that it is correctness of belief or
knowledge, and then reaches for a nearby alternative, discursive thinking:
But neither does excellence in deliberation exist without reason (aneu logou).
at leaves its being [a correctness] of discursive thinking (dianoias), for (1)
second condition; see especially Anscombe 1965, 147-48, 156-58. 
240. Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139a27-30: τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ
ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ
ἔργον)· τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ.
241.is leaves logismos (reasoning, inference) which also seems to be a process and yet Aristotle describes
in the text under discussion as a “state” (hexis) like belief and knowledge.
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that thing is not yet an assertion (phasis), and (2) belief is not a search but
already some sort of assertion, while one who deliberates, whether well or ill,
seeks something out and reasons.242
If someone is deliberating about something, Aristotle argues, that presupposes that the
person has not yet formulated a conclusion and therefore has no state which might
represent an assertion on the matter. It is a pragmatic contradiction for someone to say
“I’m still thinking about whether to φ” while φ-ing, or to say “I’m still wondering whether
p” right aer asserting that p.243 Since discursive thinking is not assertoric, it is a better
candidate for the cognition of which euboulia is the correctness. Aristotle does not say
outright in the above passage that discursive thinking is the process which results in belief
and knowledge. It is, however, the closest thing to belief and knowledge that can play the
role he is trying to !ll in his account, and stands to belief as an inquiry does to an
assertion, or an inference does to a conclusion. Combine this with the claim in the
Posterior Analytics that belief is one of the states that “pertains to discursive thinking,” and
we can conclude that, for Aristotle, dianoia denotes the cognitive process that results in
belief and other states.
With this context, we can see that Aristotle’s argument at Nicomachean Ethics 6.2
(quoted !rst in this section) implies that belief is TRUTH-NORMED. Aristotle’s conclusion is
that the right state of discursive thinking is the truth.244 e best way to state this, I think,
is that discursive thinking is in its right state when it issues in true states, whether
knowledge or true beliefs. If the result in question is knowledge, then truth is guaranteed,
242. Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142b12-15: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα
λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ
βουλευόμενος, ἐάν τε εὖ ἐάν τε καὶ κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται.
My numbering in the quote represents the structure Aristotle gives to the premises with his gar…kai
gar. e particle gar indicates the premise of an argument, and the conjunction kai gives the impression
that he is ticking oﬀ the premises from which he concludes that euboulia is a correctness of discursive
thinking.
243. A pragmatic contradiction occurs when a set of statements do not contradict themselves with respect to
propositional content, but rather contradict some implicature or presupposition that goes along with
their assertion or performance. See especially Dayton 1977 and Kupfer 1987. A notable schema for
generating pragmatic contradictions is “Moore’s paradox,” expressed in statements of the form “p, but I
don’t believe that p.” See Gillies 2001, however, for a solution to the paradox that makes it a semantic
contradiction, rather than a pragmatic one. 
244. I ignore here Aristotle’s distinction between theoretical and practical thought. e distinction in
Nicomachean Ethics 6.2 is that practical thinking has a conative aspect with which the cognitive aspect
must agree and resonate. is extra requirement, however, is irrelevant to the fact that the good state of
such thinking is truth, just as it is for non-practical thought.
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because one can never have knowledge of a falsehood. Aristotle also, however, refers to the
bad state of discursive thought, which is when one’s thinking produces false beliefs and
faulty inferences.245 e claim therefore emphasizes the results of discursive thinking
which can go either wrong or right, and belief is among these. True belief is what happens
when discursive thinking is in its right state, and something is going wrong when one
forms false beliefs. is means that it is not a matter of indiﬀerence whether one’s beliefs
are true or false, just as it is not a matter of indiﬀerence whether one acts rightly or
wrongly. To eu routinely denotes the right way for something to be, with to kakôs its
opposite.246 Beliefs can be false; this is why he can say that they should be true. is
amounts to the claim that belief is TRUTH-NORMED, as I de!ned it: beliefs are under a
normative constraint to be true because true belief is the result of discursive thinking in its
right state.
One might wonder how Aristotle’s argument about the good state of theoretical
and practical thinking implies a normative connection between belief and truth. How, in
other words, does the claim that truth is the right condition of the belief-producing
activity entail that beliefs should be true? We can draw the connection because Aristotle’s
argument has exactly the same structure, and betrays the same assumptions, as the so-
called “function argument” from Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.247 In this argument, Aristotle
attempts to derive what the good life is for humans from considerations about a human
being’s characteristic activity. e details and foibles of that argument need not detain
us.248 We need only note the metanormative principle which motivates it, that we can
derive normative conclusions about something by examining its characteristic activity
(ergon):
For just as in the case of &autists and sculptors and every artisan, and in
general those activities which have some function and activity—just as in
245.e second is my best guess for what might constitute a false logismos for Aristotle: an inference that the
subject is not entitled to, whether the conclusion happens to be true or not.
246. See for instance Eudemian Ethics 1.5, 1216a9-10, b25; 7.12, 1245b18-19 (where the language applies also
to divine beings); Nicomachean Ethics 1.10, 1100b7-10; 6.7, 1141a25-26; Generation and Corruption 2.6,
33b17-19 (where all natural objects have a “right state”).
247. Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1097b27-98a17.
248. It has received much attention in the scholarly literature. See, for a sampling, Barney 2008, Lawrence
2001, Whiting 1988, Korsgaard 1986, Kraut 1979 and Suits 1974.
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those cases it seems that the good, i.e. the good state (to eu) is in the
function, so might it seem also in the case of the human as such, if indeed
there is a human function.249
e reasoning goes that, if one can identify the function of an activity or cra, then one
can derive what it is to perform that function well, i.e. perform the function as one ought
to.250 In our quote about dianoia, Aristotle claims truth is the “good state” of theoretical
thought, and his argument is based on the fact that “this” (reference unclear, but
presumably it means something like “hitting on the truth”) is the function of everything
connected with thinking. It is, in short, an application of the same principle that drives the
ethical “function argument.” His view on the relation between belief and truth are
therefore as normative as what he has to say about the good life. e ethical function
argument purports to derive what the good state is for human life, and he oﬀers it as a
clari!cation of the claim that happiness is the chief good, i.e. that it is always chosen for its
own sake, and needs nothing else to make life complete.251 e argument, if sound, has
implications about what humans should do, what sorts of things they should value, what
sorts of goals they should have. If the ethical function argument states a normative thesis,
then so does the argument for the connection between belief and truth.
In book 6, immediately before the passage we previously quoted, we !nd another
argument which presupposes that believing is TRUTH-NORMED. Aristotle wonders what kind
of “correctness” goes into good deliberation. Is it a correctness of knowledge? A
correctness of belief? In the end, it is neither:
But since one who deliberates poorly makes a mistake, and one who does it
well gives correct advice, it is clear that excellence in deliberation is a kind of
correctness (orthotês), but a correctness neither of knowledge nor belief; for
there is no correctness of knowledge (for there is no error for it), while the
correctness of belief is truth.252
249. Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1097b25-28: ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ,
καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω
δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ.
250.is does not imply that beliefs are a matter of moral concern, because Aristotle does not distinguish
“morality” as a separate sphere of normativity: see especially Kraut 2006. He does, however, have views
on normative and meta-normative issues. It is worth noting that, even though one’s beliefs do not in
general redound on our moral character, true belief is an object of praise: see Nicomachean Ethics 3.2,
1112a5-10.
251. Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1097b22-25: “but maybe the claim that happiness is the best thing appears to be
something easily granted, and what it is needs to be said more precisely.”
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ere is more to being a good deliberator than knowing things or having true beliefs. e
premises Aristotle deploys to that end show that he thinks believing is TRUTH-NORMED. e
more obvious piece of support is his explicit assertion that truth is the “correctness” of
belief. More interesting, however, is the claim that there is no “correctness” for knowledge
(epistêmê) because “there is no error” for it. Knowledge is TRUTH-APT; at 3.3, 428a17-19253
he contrasts knowing with imagining and rules out identifying the two because we can
have true or false imagination, but only true instances of knowing. As we said above,
knowledge is tied to truth as a conceptual matter: a judgment cannot express knowledge
while also being false, but this does not mean that truth regulates knowledge in the way it
does belief. He does not think it makes sense to speak of a “correct” state if there is no
chance that the system in question will end up in any other state.254 is is the case when
we know something, but when forming beliefs we can go wrong, so it makes sense to
describe truth as the “right state” of belief.
e !nal piece of evidence does not use the same terminology as our other two
quotes. It is valuable, however, because it represents Aristotle’s eﬀort to spell out what it
means for believing to have a “right state.” As Allan Gibbard points out, beliefs do not aim
for things; people do.255 Aristotle would agree. Beliefs are not objects in the natural world
which suﬀer changes of state and so aim for a particular state that constitutes well-being,
the way that animals do. Rather, beliefs are themselves states,256 so any talk of their
“aiming” or “being correct” should ultimately reduce to talk about the actions and states of
their subjects. In Metaphysics book 4, we !nd Aristotle talking in this more literal way.
Against those who deny the principle of non-contradiction, he pushes the intuition that
no one behaves as if everything is both F and not-F, especially when whether the object is
252. Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142b7-11: ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἁμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ
ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρθότης τις ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὔτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης·
ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία), δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια.
253. See above at page 83.
254. In other words, there is a tight safety requirement on knowledge. For this requirement on knowledge,
see primarily Williamson 2000, esp. ch. 4. Aristotle also seems to think that there is a fallibility
constraint on normativity: see Lavin 2004 and especially Dick 2009. 
255. Gibbard 2007, 143. For discussion of how Aristotle’s view seems to diﬀer with Gibbard’s, see below.
256. See Régis 1935, 63-71 for extensive discussion of the metaphysics of belief in Aristotle. His !nal verdict
is that it is a diathesis, a disposition of the person which is less !rm than a hexis like virtue and more
long-standing than a pathos like imagining.
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F aﬀects our interests and projects.257 People by nature try to get at the unquali!ed truth. If
their judgments do not rise to the level of knowledge, that is no argument against caring
about the truth. Quite the opposite, in fact:  
If people do not know but rather believe, they must pay much more attention
to the truth, just as someone who is sickly must pay more attention to health
than a healthy person; for someone who has a belief, compared to someone
who knows, does not have a healthy disposition regarding the truth.258
Aristotle’s analogy is strained. If knowledge is to truth what healthiness is to health, then
those who are healthy have literally no chance of becoming ill.259 We need not defend
every aspect of the analogy, however, to see Aristotle’s point. Truth matters more to
someone who just believes, because he is not entitled to be sure of himself. In this way, he
is like someone who is sickly and must guide their practice in light of what is healthy, in
hopes of achieving it. Someone who is robust need not pay the same amount of attention.
Aristotle is not, I think, comparing a person who has a cold with someone who is in good
health at the moment. at would be a bizarrely implausible claim: someone who is in
good health at the moment also needs to pay attention to the dictates of healthy living, lest
they fall ill themselves. Only a fool takes his present good health as a guarantee that he
will never get sick. e analogy is not to present good health, but to a healthy disposition
(hugieinôs diakeitai). Some people are robust, so that they rarely become ill and shake it
oﬀ easily when they do. Others are sickly (nosôdês), so they become ill more oen and for
lesser causes.260 Seen in this light, the claim that sickly people “should may more attention
to health” makes perfect sense. A healthy person can stray from the dictates of healthy
living and be none the worse for it. She can skip meals to meet a deadline, for instance, or
257. Metaphysics 4.4, 1008b18-27. In other words, when the belief in question has GUIDANCE VALUE. See below
at Concluding Remarks: How Belief is Normative, page 116.
258. Metaphysics 4.4, 1008b27-31: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἀλλὰ δοξάζοντες, πολὺ μᾶλλον
ἐπιμελητέον ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀληθείας, ὥσπερ καὶ νοσώδει ὄντι ἢ ὑγιεινῷ τῆς ὑγιείας· καὶ γὰρ
ὁ δοξάζων πρὸς τὸν ἐπιστάμενον οὐχ ὑγιεινῶς διάκειται πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
259.is is because knowledge is of what cannot be otherwise, and in order to count as knowing something
we have to be aware that it can’t be otherwise. See Posterior Analytics 1.2, 71b9-16.
260. See Categories 8, 9a16-25, where he discusses qualities that apply in virtue of a certain disposition
(diakeisthai pôs). Someone is called healthy “in virtue of having a natural ability to in no way aﬀected
easily by what befalls them” (ὑγιεινοὶ δὲ λέγονται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν
πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ῥᾳδίως), while sickly people are the opposite.
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go running in the cold without a jacket. e more robust she is, the further she can stray.
A sickly person cannot aﬀord to do so, since he is more likely to become ill. 
What does it mean, then, that we should “pay attention to truth?” “Truth” cannot
simply mean the fact of the matter, which is manifest to the person forming her beliefs. If
one could simply compare one’s belief to the truth, as one compares a copy to the original,
the believer would not lack a healthy disposition regarding the truth. Here the analogy is
illuminating: when we tell someone “pay attention to your health!” we mean that we want
them to act in such a way that they remain healthy, or at least to let considerations of
health guide their behavior to some extent. Sickly people have to be more diligent, because
more things will make them sick. For believers to “pay attention to the truth,” then, they
must guide and shape their behavior in such a way that they form true beliefs instead of
false ones. People with beliefs need to be more careful than people with knowledge
because believers do not have the deductive structure of science and necessity of scienti!c
principles to guarantee that their knowledge is a grasp of something true. Believers are in
a delicate epistemic position: some fact changes without their knowing, they fail to check
their work, and suddenly they are in error. is is what it means to say that some who
believes does not “have a healthy disposition regarding the truth.” Here, then, is a concrete
rendition of Aristotle’s view that truth is the “right condition” for belief. Subjects who
form beliefs must be careful in order to form true beliefs; they do not have demonstration
and understanding to provide !rm grounding. e Metaphysics passage contains no
advice about how to form true beliefs, so the edict is not especially helpful to the believer
on the ground. It does, however, illustrate Aristotle’s view that truth guides belief
formation as some kind of end or !nal cause.
Our collection of passages show Aristotle’s consistent commitment to the view that
believing is TRUTH-NORMED. He furthermore considers the claim obvious enough to deploy
it as a premise without further explanation. It is, therefore, a plausible candidate for the
principle on which he relies to make his terse argument in On the Soul 3.3. It is for this
reason that I am comfortable translating the clause in question as “we must either make a
mistake or arrive at truth,” rather than the plainer “we must believe either truly or falsely.”
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Imagining, on the other hand, is not TRUTH-NORMED. Aristotle nowhere gives any
indication that we are supposed to imagine truths instead of falsehoods. In fact, he says
that imagination is “mostly false” as a matter of course, but this does not imply that we
should not avoid imagining.261
5. Dismantling the First Assumption: Causal Control
We must now ask why being TRUTH-NORMED entails that believing is not “up to us.” Time to
reject the assumption we granted earlier. Conventional interpretations assume that, when
Aristotle denies that believing is up to us, he is denying that belief is under our causal
control. In what follows, I will refer to this particular assumption simply as “the
assumption.” Someone has causal control over something if she can make it happen
through her own eﬀorts, whether immediately or by bringing about an event that in turn
brings about the event in question. We must set some limit on how far downstream the
consequences can be before we withhold causal control of its occurrence. In book 3 of the
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle’s main interest are the conditions of moral responsibility.
Consequences can be unintended and still be “up to us” in a sense that makes us
responsible for it, but there comes a point where the consequences of our action in a
strictly causal sense are no longer under “causal control.” ere comes a point, in other
words, where we cannot fairly say that the subject could have “seen it coming,” and so
cannot be held responsible for said unintended consequences.
Causal control seems, at !rst, to be a natural way to understand the text from On
the Soul 3.3: in other contexts where Aristotle says that an action, event or state is up to us,
he tends to argue for this by claiming that the origin (archê) of the event lies inside us,
which is his way of talking about how humans have causal control (though not necessarily
conative control) over their actions and the eﬀects thereof.262 An explicit argument for this
261. See On the Soul 3.3, 428a11-12. Why Aristotle thinks that imagination is “mostly false” is an interesting
question. My own suggestion is that phantasia “prepares desire” (Movement of Animals 8, 702a17-19) by
representing the desired object or state of aﬀairs. What it represents cannot be something true, because
then the desire would be satis!ed. Defending this proposal at length would distract us from the present
discussion.
262.e term archê is prominent in Aristotle’s theory of eﬃcient causation, which he characterizes as the
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kind of view occurs early in book 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle considers the case
of a captain forced to throw his trade goods overboard to stay a&oat in a storm. He asks
whether the captain willingly threw the goods overboard (a precondition for
responsibility), and seems genuinely torn. He concludes:
But he acts willingly, for the source (archê) of moving the organic parts in
actions of these kinds is in him, and those things the source of which is in a
man, are up to him both to do and not do.263 Such actions are of course done
willingly, though simply as such perhaps they are done unwillingly, for no
one would chose any of them on their own merits.264 
“Such actions” are the family of cases where the agent is unable to endorse his action
wholeheartedly, such as throwing away valuable goods. e element of pain and regret
pose an aporia for Aristotle, because pain and regret are signs of actions done unwillingly,
for which the agent cannot be blamed.265 He appeals, however, to a general view about
which actions are up to us: we are accountable for those actions the source of which lay
inside us. e captain may not have felt he had a choice, but no one made him move his
mouth to give the order, and his own hands seized the cargo and tossed it. e mark of
responsibility, it seems, is whether the agent has causal control over his action. Other
remarks in Nicomachean Ethics book 3 bear this out.266
Aristotle also seems to have causal control in mind when he asserts that “thinking”
(to noêsai, which includes the active exercise of our knowledge) is up to us, while
perception is not. Here is the passage from On the Soul 2.5 again:267
But there is a diﬀerence [between perception and knowledge], namely that
those things which produce sensation are external: what is seen, what is
heard, and so on for the other senses. e reason for this is that sensation, as
an activity, concerns particulars, while knowledge is of universals, and these
are in the very soul, in a way. For this reason thinking is up to someone,
“source of change or rest.” A paradigm case of such a cause is a man who has deliberated and so made
an unforced choice. See Metaphysics 5.2, 1013a29-34, b12-16 and b23-24.
263. See also Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1111a20-22, Rhetoric 1.4, 1359a38-40.
264. Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110a15-19: πράττει δὲ ἑκών· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ
μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν· ὧν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ
πράττειν καὶ μή. ἑκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἁπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἕλοιτο
καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.
265.Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b17-19.
266. See especially 3.5, 1114a13-20 (quoted above) and 3.5, 1115a1-3.
267. See also above at page 88.
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whenever he wishes, but perceiving is not up to him, for the perceptible must
be present (huparchein).268
Aristotle argues thusly: knowledge concerns universals. Universals are not objects out in
the world that we encounter, but are already “in the soul,” in a way. Aristotle’s pôs
(somehow, in a certain way) is apologizing for a metaphor. When he says that universals
are “in the soul,” he is not giving us their physical location in space, or suggesting that we
carry the universals around in our heads, a claim which it would be hard to make literal
sense of. Rather, he is referring to his doctrine that when we think, our conceptual
thought is mediated by mental images.269 Such representational states supervene and
depend on the state of our bodies, not the state of the world at large.270 ought is
therefore available to us whenever we want to use it, provided nothing actively opposes us.
Once we have done the necessary cognitive work to have access to a universal, the world
need not be any particular way for us to use it in our thinking.271 Perception works
diﬀerently; we perceive things by encountering them in the world. is is why Aristotle
says that “external things” are what produce perception as an activity. Again, causal
control is salient. Perception is not “up to us” because the cause of perception lies outside
us, so the source of the perception is not inside us.
Based on these texts, one might conclude (falsely, I think) that Aristotle employs
the same idea in his argument that belief is not up to us. His argument in On the Soul 2.5
accounts for why perception is not up to us in much more detail than his argument about
belief does in On the Soul 3.3. If we assume that Aristotle is raising the same issues and
deploying the same kind of idea in the perception-passage as he is in the belief-passage,
then we can provide a rational reconstruction of the argument that captures Aristotle’s
train of thought and !lls in what his enthymematic presentation merely gestures at. His
268. On the Soul 2.5.417b19-25: διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι τοῦ μὲν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔξωθεν, τὸ
ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τῶν καθ'
ἕκαστον ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου· ταῦτα δ' ἐν αὐτῇ πώς
ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ. διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται, αἰσθάνεσθαι δ' οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ·
ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τὸ αἰσθητόν.
269. See On the Soul 3.7, 431a16-19, b2-6 and On Memory 1, 449b30-50a4 for other references to this
doctrine.
270. For a detailed discussion of how phantasmata come to be, and Aristotle’s naturalistic theory of
representation, see Caston 1998.
271. For a more detailed discussion of this passage, see Wedin 1989.
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technical discussion of moral responsibility in the Nicomachean Ethics provides even more
detail, so this approach seems promising. is approach fails to make sense of our
argument from On the Soul, however, and it is important to see why. 
We should become suspicious when we try to understand the analogy between the
account of perception’s falling outside our causal control and belief ’s not being up to us.
Perception is not under our control because the world has to be a certain way in order for
us to perceive its being that way. e perceiver, in other words, must come into direct
sensory contact with the perceptible.272 A direct analogy with belief would then require
that the believer come into “direct doxastic contact” with the state of aﬀairs that is believed
to obtain. Aristotle’s theory of cognitive processing does not, however, work on a contact
model. In fact, he criticizes his predecessors for putting forward the notion that the mind
cognizes things by reaching out and touching them in some sense.273 at diﬃculty aside,
belief does not labor under the constraint that perception does. If it is false that p, then
there is no state of aﬀairs such that p. A subject can still, however, believe that p.
Furthermore, even if we set aside the problems of characterizing “direct doxastic contact,”
it remains that someone need not encounter (in whatever sense we spell that out) the very
state of aﬀairs about which she forms a belief. In other words, a person must see that p in
order to perceive that p, but someone can form a belief that p on the basis of hearing
something that implies or merely suggests that p. Belief does not, therefore, fail to be “up
to us” in the same way that perception fails to be “up to us.”
One might respond by loosening the principle of analogy. Belief does not come
about through “direct doxastic contact” (whatever that might mean), but the relevant
point about perception is that it is a process with an external cause: it comes from without,
whereas thinking comes from within. e lesson, so this story goes, is that belief also has
an external cause. e source of our beliefs is external to us, because we form our beliefs
in response to the world. e cause of the belief is not necessarily the state of aﬀairs that it
272.is account applies to exclusive objects of perception, and this seems to be the kind of perception
Aristotle is talking about. e story becomes more complicated when we turn to incidental perception,
because that kind of perception is prone to error: see especially Bäck 2009, 102-15.
273. See especially Caston 1998, 260-62.
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represents. In the case of false beliefs, it cannot be, since there is no such state of aﬀairs.
Our beliefs are, however, formed by the impingement of external circumstances, and we
cannot control that any more than we can control what we perceive, because the source
does not lie within us. is repair strategy is not going to work, either. First and foremost,
the account commits Aristotle to saying that we are helpless in the face of input from the
outside world. It is part of what makes humans rational, however, that we are able to
withhold commitment from what appears to be the case, and be open to doubt.274 ere is
a direct causal connection between the state of the world and our perception of it, but the
connection between the state of the world and our beliefs about it is much more
complicated. e state of aﬀairs about which we form the belief plays no straightforward
role in the mechanics of belief-formation, and this should make us doubt the existence of
a helpful analogy between perception and belief with respect to this topic.
Nor is it even true that the only things that produce belief are external to us.
Beliefs about one’s own mental or physical state are counterexamples. is kind of
metacognition !gures in Aristotle’s characterization of scienti!c knowledge. In the
Posterior Analytics, he says that we think that we know something when we take our grasp
of the matter to meet certain conditions:
We believe (oiometh’) that we know each thing simply as such—but not
incidentally, in the manner of sophistry—whenever we believe that we
recognize (1) the explanation (aitia) through which the fact of the matter
obtains (pragma estin), (2) that it is the explanation of that thing, and (3) that
it cannot be otherwise. It is therefore clear that knowing is something of this
sort; for both those who know and those who do not believe themselves to be
in this position…275
Aristotle puts the point this way, I think, to suggest that his account of scienti!c
knowledge accords with our pre-theoretic intuitions about knowledge ascription. We take
ourselves to know something, he says, when we think we know the explanation for it, and
274. I substantiate this point in Chapter 4.
275. Posterior Analytics 1.2, 71b9-14: Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθ' ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν
σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν τήν τ' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ
πρᾶγμά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν. δῆλον τοίνυν
ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι τὸ ἐπίστασθαί ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι οἱ μὲν
οἴονται αὐτοὶ οὕτως ἔχειν.
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that the explanation renders it inevitable.276 Aristotle does not use the world doxazein, but
rather oiesthai. e fact remains, however, that Aristotle is referring to beliefs about one’s
own mental states. What is more, the reference to metacognition !gures in a central piece
of argument, which entitles us to think that Aristotle would have been generally aware of
the phenomenon and the issues that it presents. is in turn entitles us to think it odd if
an interpretation of our target argument is open to a counterexample that concerns the
very phenomenon Aristotle is presumably aware of.
Yet open it is. My beliefs that I have a certain desire, or that I know something,
should be no more “up to me” than any of my beliefs about the world. Yet the source
(archê) of those beliefs is inside me, which Aristotle gives as the condition for an action,
event or state to be “up to us,” when that term denotes causal control. If Aristotle’s use of
“up to us” in On the Soul 3.3 is supposed to denote causal control, and if Aristotle cashes
that notion out in terms of the “source” of the aﬀection or experience, then his account of
why belief is not up to us amounts to the claim that the sources of our beliefs do not lie
within us. Our desires and other mental states, however, are inside us if anything is, so this
would imply that beliefs about those things are up to us aer all.
A last way to preserve the spirit of the assumption about causal control is to say
that Aristotle is not concerned with the sort of downstream causal control by which he
argues that we are responsible for our state of character. When he says that imagining is
up to us “whenever we want,” he is instead saying that we can imagine at will, which is a
stronger statement than simply saying that imagining is “up to us.” Imagining is, to put it
another way, under our immediate conative control, while believing is not. Aristotle’s
argument in Nicomachean Ethics book 3 implies that we are responsible for our state of
character because our state of character is molded by the actions we perform. We
therefore have causal control over our character, but we cannot adopt a new character at
will.277 is is the relevant diﬀerence between belief and imagination: we cannot believe at
276. See Kosman 1990.
277. See especially Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1114a12-19, where he compares a person becoming willingly
unjust to someone who makes themselves ill (and cannot then wish their illness away), and also to a
person who throws a stone and cannot then will it back.
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will.278 Simplicius gestures at this kind of solution, though he ultimately prefers the one
already discussed:279
Because we do not fashion those impressions entirely in keeping with the
facts, nor do we put forward our imaginings wholly while keeping the truth
in mind.280
Simplicius seems to be saying that imagination is more &exible than belief in the following
way: one can imagine contrary to what the facts are, by one’s own lights. Simplicius does
not explicitly add the “by one’s own lights,” instead just saying that we do not fashion
those impressions in ways that abide by the facts. His second claim, however, that we do
not “keep the truth in mind” when we imagine, suggests that we ought to supply it for
him. If he means only that imagining can be false, then he completely misunderstands
Aristotle’s argument; the reason Aristotle needs a more sophisticated argument to
distinguish belief and imagining is that both of them can be either true or false.281
Imagining, then, can go against what we take to be true, while believing cannot. If we
could believe what we wanted, then we could believe regardless of whether what we
believed was true or false. Since we care about whether our beliefs are true, this constrains
our believing and we cannot believe at will.282
is account helps itself to two distinct mental states, taking-true and belief, and
then claims that the latter cannot con&ict with the former, but must follow where it goes.
ere are two reasons to be suspicious of this. e !rst is that Aristotle does not have an
independent type of mental state that we might call “taking-true.”283 e closest we might
come to that is pistis, which is not itself a committal attitude. Rather, it is the cognition
that underlies various committal states like belief and knowledge. e point is that belief is
278.anks to Greg Salmieri for bringing this possibility to my attention.
279. See “e Argument, and Two Crucial Assumptions,” page 86.
280. Commentary On the Soul 206.13-15: διότι οὐχὶ τοῖς πράγμασι πάντως ἑπομένως ἀναπλάττομεν
τοὺς τύπους, οὐδὲ προβάλλομεν τὰς φαντασίας τῆς ἀληθείας φροντίζοντες πάντως.
281. See On the Soul 3.3, 428a18.
282.is interpretation, therefore, attributes to Aristotle the reasoning found in Williams 1973.
283. Hupolambanein does not work because there is non-committal hupolêpsis, so the state as a kind is not
the sort of “taking-true” I have in mind, though it is considering as true, in the way we might consider a
working hypothesis as true in order to test its consequences. In this regard, it is no diﬀerent from
imagining, since when we imagine something, we imagine it as true.
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a way that subjects take things to be true, as far as Aristotle is concerned, so it does not
make sense to ask whether we can believe contrary to what we take to be true.
Even if my account of pistis does not allow me to put the objection in this form,
the argument itself still gives us no reason to think that we cannot alter what we “take to
be true” at will and thereby come to believe whatever we like. e intuition seems sound;
we encounter resistance when we try to just will away what seems to be true to us. Denial
is diﬃcult, and exacts a toll on people who practice it. e intuition, however, does not
support the idea that we cannot believe at will. Instead, it supports the intuition that there
are typically considerations against willing to believe something, and so most people will
not do it. To see this, consider an ethical parallel. A person with a good state of character
is made to do something shameful in order to secure something he greatly desires. He
resists doing it. Aristotle devotes attention to cases like this in his discussion of moral
responsibility. ere is a sense in which a good man cannot perform a bad action “at will,”
because there are deep-seated psychological forces acting against the impulse. e
virtuous man !nds doing evil inconceivable, in a way. We cannot conclude from this,
however, that he is unable to perform the action “whenever he wants.” It is not literally
impossible for him to do evil, but so long as he is genuinely a good man, he will encounter
psychological resistance to acting wrongly. e constraint itself is normative: a good man
cannot do evil and remain good. Good men in general, however, wish to remain good,
and this gives rise to a further psychological constraint. 
If this resistance in the ethical case does not undermine the idea that we have
control over our actions, then resistance in the doxastic case should not undermine the
idea what we have control over our beliefs.284 ere is a diﬀerent way for us to explain the
felt diﬃculty in believing and acting contrary to our convictions, and it does not rely on a
notion of causal control or the ability to enter the state “at will”. Rather, it relies on the felt
obligation generated by belief ’s normative connection to the truth.285
284. Montmarquet 1986 makes a similar but distinct point: our actions are determined by practical reasons,
our beliefs by theoretical reasons. ere seems therefore to be a parity of determination: any reason to
think that one is not up to us is reason to think that the other is not. See also Osbourne 1990 and
Montmarquet 1993.
285. See the next section, “Concluding Remarks: How Belief is Normative,” page 116.
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We can pound a !nal nail into this idea’s coﬃn. First, we note that Aristotle
deploys the term “up to us” in Nicomachean Ethics Book 3 to provide an account of moral
responsibility. An agent cannot be held accountable for something if it is not up to her.
is is why Aristotle feels the need to argue that we are ultimately responsible for our own
states of character. He responds in the following way to an objection against his view that
someone should be held responsible for the eﬀects of his ignorance and carelessness:
But perhaps he is of such a kind as not to take care. But they themselves are
responsible for becoming that sort of person because they live carelessly, and
for being unjust and greedy, the latter by acting wrongly, the former by
spending their time in drinking parties and things of that sort. For the
activities concerning each thing make people of that sort.286
e statement of the objection is enthymematic (and Aristotle makes no eﬀort to spell it
out), but the argument seems to be that certain people habitually do bad or careless things
because that’s just the kind of people they are. Since, however, people do not control the
kinds of people they are, they cannot be held responsible for the actions they perform as a
result of having that character. Aristotle denies the second claim of the objection: such
people are in fact responsible for their bad characters, because we form our bad character
through our actions. I oﬀer this passage to illustrate Aristotle’s view that, in order to be
held responsible for something, it has to be the result of something that is under our
control. is means that the event’s or state’s being “up to us” (still taking that term in the
sense of causal control) is a necessary condition for us to be held responsible for it. If that
were not the case, Aristotle would not answer the character-based objection in the way he
does. So if something is not up to us, we are not responsible for it.
Next, we note that Aristotle associates praise and blame with those things that are
under our control. e way he introduces the topic of responsibility at the beginning of
Nicomachean Ethics book 3 makes this clear:
Since virtue is concerned with aﬀections and actions, and since praise and
blame attach to willing [aﬀections and actions], sympathy and pity on those
286. Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1114a3-7: ἀλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ
τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι,
οἳ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἳ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα
ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν.
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unwilling, it is perhaps necessary for those who study things that have to do
with virtue to delineate the willingly and unwillingly done.287
e things that are under our control (and which are therefore willingly done) are the
sorts of things that can be praised and blamed.288 If Aristotle meant that belief is not up to
us in the sense that it is not under our causal control (or that we cannot do it at will), it
would follow that he does not think they can be the subject of praise and blame. Yet he
does think beliefs are objects of praise and blame. He says so when he distinguishes choice
from belief in book 3, chapter 2:
And choice is praised for being [a choice] of what one should do, or rather
for being the right choice, and belief [is praised] for being true.289
Aristotle might easily have said that we do not praise people for having certain beliefs, but
that we do praise people for making the right choices. He chooses instead to distinguish
the respect in which we praise people for their choices and for their beliefs. is
presupposes that beliefs are objects of praise, which they could not be if we did not
exercise causal control over them. I conclude from all this that, when Aristotle says that
belief is not up to us in On the Soul 3.3, it is a mistake to read into his remark the account
of something’s being “up to us” that we !nd in his technical discussion of responsibility in
the Nicomachean Ethics. at is, it is a mistake if Aristotle is being consistent across these
discussions. On my way of reading him, he is not only consistent, but holds a more
interesting view than he would hold if he simply contradicted himself.
6. Replacing the Second Assumption: As You Please
ere are two passages where Aristotle denies that various activities are “up to us,” but
where a proper understanding of his argument rules out the idea that “up to us” denotes
causal control. Rather, something is up to us if we can do it “as we please,” that is, if we
287. Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1109b30-34: Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ
μὲν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης,
ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ
ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι.
288.emistius also seems to have this taxonomy in mind when he paraphrases our main passage (On the
Soul Paraphrase 88.38 - 89.10), since he calls belief an “unwilling aﬀection of the soul.” 
289. Nicomachean Ethics 3.2, 1112a5-7: καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὗ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ
τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς.
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face no relevant constraints in doing the thing in question. Sometimes those constraints
are causal or physical, as in his discussion of perception at On the Soul 2.5. is does not,
however, imply that “up to us” just means “facing no causal or physical constraints.” ere
are other contexts, other options. 
We !nd the !rst passage in book 5, chapter 9 of the Nicomachean Ethics. One of
the puzzles Aristotle considers about justice is whether it is possible to willingly be
wronged (adikeisthai). To help consider this question, he raises a further issue about
whether it is possible for someone to wrong himself. Someone who lacks self-control (the
akratês) might be said to harm himself willingly, and if wronging someone amounts to
harming them willingly, it would follow that someone who lacks self-control can wrong
himself and therefore be wronged willingly:
If the akratic harms himself willingly, then he would be wronged willingly
and it would be possible for someone to wrong himself (and this is also one
of things in question, whether it is possible to wrong oneself). Furthermore,
a man might willingly (due to akrasia) be harmed by another willing person,
so that he would be wronged willingly.290
Here we have two cases that meet the !rst-pass de!nition for wronging someone, which is
to harm someone willingly. In the !rst, someone who lacks self-control acts contrary to
his own best judgment and ends up worse oﬀ for it. He acted willingly, and the result was
that he himself was harmed. e second case involves a second agent, but the mechanics
are the same: the subject ends up worse oﬀ on account of his lack of self-control, so that
even though he is wronged, he is also a willing participant. For our purposes, the !rst case
holds more interest because it seems to admit another possibility about which Aristotle
has his doubts, namely whether someone can wrong himself. His response to the former
puzzle is straightforward; he re!nes his de!nition of unjust treatment to exclude it:291 
Or is our de!nition not correct? Must we add to “doing harm while knowing
the object, means and manner” [the further clause] “against the will of that
[wronged] person?” Someone, then, is harmed willingly and willingly suﬀers
290. Nicomachean Ethics 5.9, 1136a32-b2: ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἑκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὑτόν, ἑκών τ' ἂν
ἀδικοῖτο κἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἓν τῶν ἀπορουμένων, εἰ
ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔτι ἑκὼν ἄν τις δι' ἀκρασίαν ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο
ἑκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἑκόντ' ἀδικεῖσθαι.
291. He makes his !rst attempt at a de!nition in the previous chapter, at 5.8, 1135a19-28.
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things which are unjust (tadika paschei), but no one is willingly wronged
(adikeitai). For no one, even someone who lacks self-control (akratês), wishes
[to be wronged], but he does act against his own wish. For neither does
anyone wish for what they do not consider worthy, but the man who lacks
self-control does not do what he thinks he should.292
No one wishes for something that they do not think is good, according to Aristotle. From
this, plus the tacit assumption that everyone thinks that it is a bad thing to be treated
unjustly, he infers that unjust treatment always occurs against one’s wishes.293 e
emendation therefore brings the de!nition in line with intuition: no one is wronged
willingly, although they might willingly suﬀer things that, had they not suﬀered them
willingly, would constitute wronging.294 One cannot say that they were wronged willingly,
because the person who lacks self-control acts contrary to their own wish. e action is
performed willingly, but still done against the person’s wishes. e new de!nition does
not, however, exclude wronging oneself. It speci!cally rules out cases where one is
wronged willingly, since being wronged requires, by de!nition, that the person suﬀer
injustice against her wishes. Aristotle notes twice, however, that lack of self-control implies
a break in the default connection between one’s wishes and one’s actions. is leaves open
the possibility that someone could wrong themselves. ey willingly perform the action
that constitutes the wrong, yet receive it unwillingly. It is clear that Aristotle is considering
both puzzling cases at the same time, yet his suggested emendation precludes only cases of
willingly being wronged. We ought to conclude, then, that he thinks it is possible for
someone to wrong himself. 
e akratics who wrong themselves have causal control over their actions, since
the source of their action is within them. is is important, because Aristotle immediately
goes on to argue that being wronged is not up to us, with no sense of contradiction:
292. Nicomachean Ethics 5.9, 1136b5-9: ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ βλάπτειν
εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὣς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἑκὼν
καὶ τἄδικα πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἑκών· οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ
παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐδεὶς ὃ μὴ οἴεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὅ τε
ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ οἴεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει.
293. Without this assumption, Aristotle’s conclusion does not follow, and it seems uncontroversial enough
that there is no harm in granting it to him.
294. I take this to be what Aristotle means when he says at 5.9, 1136a25 that we can “share in just things”
(metalambanein tôn dikaiôn) incidentally. 
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e one who gives what is his own, as Homer says Glaucus gave Diomedes
“gold for bronze, 900 heads of cattle for 9”—that man is not wronged, for
giving is up to us, while being wronged is not up to us, but there must be
someone present who is wronging. With regard, then, to being wronged, it is
clear that it is not suﬀered willingly.295
e argument takes the same form as his argument in On the Soul 2.5296 that perception is
not up to us. He infers from the fact that a certain object (a perceptible, a perpetrator)
must be present (huparchein) to the intermediary conclusion that the experience in
question (perception, being wronged) is not “up to” the person who suﬀers it. Unlike the
argument about perception, however, the present argument does not make reference to
unjust treatment being outside our causal control. Aristotle does not say that what is
“productive” of injustice must be external to the subject, nor does his argument have
anything to do with where lies the “source” of injustice. One might object that his using
the crucial term “up to us” is meant to import those sorts of considerations into this
context. at interpretive strategy, however, begs the question against my proposal that
there are contexts where “up to us” does not come freighted with the causal baggage of the
Ethics passages. We have no reason to assume that “up to us” just means that the event in
question is under our causal control, so importing that discussion is illegitimate.
Nor is Aristotle’s claim that “there must be someone present who is wronging” any
reason to think that the argument turns on a notion of causal control. One might say that
there is an implicature or presupposition in eﬀect, that the perpetrator is a diﬀerent
person from the victim. e discussion beforehand, wherein he allows the possibility of
wronging oneself while emending his de!nition to exclude willingly being wronged,
cancels this presupposition. Aristotle has already established that it is possible to treat
oneself unjustly. e one perpetrating the injustice can therefore be oneself, if one suﬀers
295. Nicomachean Ethics 5.9, 1136b9-14: ὁ δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησι δοῦναι τὸν
Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει “χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων,” οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ
γάρ ἐστι τὸ διδόναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον, δῆλον.
e Oxford translation (1984, page 1794) starts its rendition of b9-14 with “again,” giving the false
impression that Aristotle is oﬀering a new, separate argument, and that we are not to import the
conclusion of the previous argument, including the amendment of the de!nition (b3-9). e Greek has
only the weak conjunction de, which implies a continuation of the thought, rather than a break (which
something like eti would indicate).
296. See above at page 88.
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from a lack of self-control. I propose that being treated unjustly fails to be up to us instead
because it is conceptually impossible to be wronged willingly. We cannot, for lack of a
better phrase, be wronged “as we please.” It is impossible, in other words, for someone to
be wronged in accordance with her wishes.297 is is consistent with an agent’s having
causal control over actions which will result in his being treated unjustly, as when
someone acts against their own wishes.
e discussion at Nicomachean Ethics 5.9 is an instance of a broader sense of “up
to us” where something is not “up to us” if we cannot do it as we please because we face
some kind of contextually-relevant constraint. In Aristotle’s discussion of treating oneself
unjustly, the constraint seems to be conceptual. We can be the perpetrators of our own
unjust treatment, but that does not contradict the claim that being wronged is not up to
us. e reason for this is that we cannot be wronged willingly; Aristotle is so committed to
this principle as to revise his de!nition of wronging to accommodate it, and his later
discussion about wronging oneself is guided by it.298 Aristotle himself draws the
distinction between suﬀering injustice and being wronged.299 A man can willingly do
things to himself, the consequences of which he accepts. ose consequences might, as a
matter of fact, amount to unjust treatment in the sense that doing those things to an
unwilling party would be an instance of wronging. It does not follow, however, that he
thereby wrongs himself. Being wronged includes the provision that the treatment which
constitutes the injustice happen contrary to the person’s wish. If the person accepts the
consequences that he brings on himself, this condition goes unmet. In order for being
wronged to be “up to us,” then, it would need to be possible for us to be wronged willingly.
is is a conceptual impossibility, so being wronged is not up to us. is might strike us as
a terminological point, and there is something to that. If the move is largely conceptual or
even terminological, my account is strengthened, for it is clear that Aristotle takes his
297.at is, someone’s having the thought “I am being treated unjustly in accordance with my wishes”
requires that she be conceptually confused about either unjust treatment (perhaps she thinks it is a good
thing) or about wishing (perhaps she thinks it can be directed at things she takes to be bad).
298. I refer to Nicomachean Ethics 5.11, which introduces nothing of novel relevance to our main point
about how “up to us” and causal control can come apart.
299. See Nicomachean Ethics 5.9, 1136a25-31.
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emendation to entail that being wronged is not up to us, even if we have causal control
over whether we suﬀer unjust treatment. is strengthens the view that “up to us” is here
deployed in a broader sense which has nothing to do with causal control as such.
e lesson of this !rst passage is broadly negative: it gives us reason to think that
Aristotle’s use of the term “up to us” does not always denote causal control, as it does in his
technical discussion of moral responsibility. It does not by itself, however, give us a clue as
to what Aristotle is trying to say about belief. Our second passage, on the other hand, does
directly suggest a way to understand our passage from On the Soul, and is much more
compact besides. Aristotle motivates his discussion of friendship in the Eudemian Ethics
by saying that “everyone says that the just and unjust exist foremost among friends” (7.1,
1234b25-26), and aer some observations about friendship and virtue, concludes with this
strange remark in propria persona:
Private just actions toward our friends are up to us alone, while those [just
actions] taken toward strangers have been legislated (nenomothetêtai), and
are not up to us.300
Aristotle is not arguing here that the just actions we take toward strangers are those for
which the “source” lies outside us. If that were true, we could be neither praised nor
blamed for them, and there could be no laws about them.301 We require something other
than causal control to make sense of Aristotle’s distinction. He says immediately
beforehand that friends are among the greatest of goods because “all willing (hekousia)
company is kept with them” (1234b35). e point he is getting at, I think, is that among
friends there grows a complex web of justice and reciprocity that extends far beyond the
minimum norms of treatment mandated by law. ey make informal promises to each
other and depend on each other in various ways. Aristotle does not refer only to “just
actions” between friends, but to “private just actions.” e law does not impose any of
these relationships, either in their speci!c form or towards the speci!c people with which
we form them.302 In this sense, we are free to treat our friends “as we please,” and what has
300. Eudemian Ethics 7.1, 1235a2-3: καὶ τὰ ἴδια δίκαια τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν μόνον,
τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους νενομοθέτηται, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.
301. See above, at page 108.
302. Elite citizens, however, oen used prosecution in the law-courts to settle their own personal enmities.
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been legislated is not a relevant constraint. is does not mean that the law suddenly does
not apply to people once they become friends: the minimum obligations of legislated
justice still apply, and if someone wanted to take illegal advantage of one of their friends,
they would !nd themselves afoul of the law. If one could, however, actually question
whether the way someone treated her “friends” was illegal, this would be very good reason
to doubt that the people in question were even friends.  
We treat our friends well, then, because we want to, and act justly toward strangers
because the law compels us. e law mandates that we treat strangers in certain ways: it
establishes both negative and positive obligations that we have towards them. We cannot
therefore treat strangers “as we please.” It is possible, of course, for someone to treat
strangers well because she wants to; this will be the case for someone with a just state of
character. ere remains a sense, however, in which even the person who acts willingly is
constrained. e constraint in this case is normative: one cannot treat strangers wrongly
without facing the consequences of being a lawbreaker. Again, someone with a just state of
character would encounter psychological resistance to the thought of mistreating a
stranger, and resist doing so. e relevant constraint is not psychological, however, since it
applies equally to people who would not face such diﬃculty (e.g. bad people). In this way,
Aristotle can say that treating strangers justly is not “up to us” even though we are in
control of our actions in the narrow causal sense. His point is that we cannot treat
strangers “as we please,” but must (in a normative sense) instead treat them as the law
dictates.
I propose that belief is not “up to us” in our passage from On the Soul in this
normative sense. Believing is TRUTH-NORMED, which means that beliefs are in their right
state when they are true, and false beliefs are in a wrong state. We are not, therefore, at
liberty to form any old belief at any given moment in our epistemic lives. Oen we pursue
and latch onto the truth gladly and take pleasure in doing so, and abandon false beliefs
e legal system had a place both for public and private suits, but litigators oen seemed guided more
by convenience than legal principle in choosing their venue. See especially Ruschenbusch 1957,
Osbourne 1985, and more recently Kurihara 2003.
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without regret. Even if the truth brings no pleasure, though, it is no less wrong to be
indiﬀerent to it. We do not form any given belief that p because we want that particular
belief, but because of some compulsion. Just as there are norms that governs how we treat
strangers, so are there norms that governs how we form our beliefs, and we violate them
on pain of irrationality. 
Here, then, is Aristotle’s argument. We can imagine as we please; imagination is
not TRUTH-NORMED, so we have no obligation to imagine the truth. We can instead, as
Aristotle says, visualize various objects and states of aﬀairs for our own purposes. Aristotle
uses the middle voice (poiêsasthai) at 427b19, which suggests that the “making” is for the
subject’s own bene!t, and not due to some external compulsion. It is best to understand
the phrase “whenever we want” (hotan boulomai) in the sense of “as we please.” I am not
suggesting that the phrase just means this, but that Aristotle uses this form of words to
express that someone craing mental images is not under the contextually-relevant
constraint that belief is. Beliefs, on the other hand, are supposed to be true, so we cannot
believe as we please. Belief and imagination are therefore not the same.
7. Concluding Remarks: How Belief is Normative 
I suggested at the outset that a proper understanding of Aristotle’s argument tells us new
things about Aristotle’s conception of human rationality. e broad lesson is that Aristotle
is committed to a kind of epistemic normativity. Non-rational cognition is not subject to
normative constraint, and therefore this subjection to norms is, in part, what makes for
rational cognition. What is more, the normativity is peculiar to belief, since there is no
“correctness” or “error” when it comes to knowledge. Considerations of truth, then,
regulate belief formation in a way that they do not regulate other cognition. How, though,
can we characterize this regulative connection? Aristotle calls truth the “correctness” of
belief, and it is worth noting that he recognizes at least two diﬀerent kinds of normative
constraint. e distinction he draws gives us some ground consider which of the
constraints best characterizes the relationship between belief and truth. 
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We !nd Aristotle’s distinction in book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, during his
discussion about excellence in deliberation.303 ere is a sense in which an agent can
deliberate “correctly” in a purely procedural way, but still come by a bad result. In other
words, the correct execution of means-end reasoning does not mean that one has
deliberated “correctly” by choosing the correct end:
And since correctness [is spoken of] in a variety of senses, it is clear that
[excellence in deliberation] is not every kind. For the akratic person and the
trivial man will attain by their reasoning what they put in front of
themselves, so that they will have deliberated “correctly,” even though they
acquired a great misfortune. But deliberating well seems to be something
good, for the correctness of one’s deliberation seems to be of that sort,
namely that which tends to attain the good.304
It is not enough simply to avoid procedural mistakes in one’s reasoning. at is not the
correctness that makes for excellence in deliberation, because a vicious person can
&awlessly reason their way to all sorts of base ends.305 Aristotle is nonetheless willing to
call this a kind of correctness, which means that he acknowledges a sort of normative
connection that does not derive from the value of the goal attained. Aristotle goes on to
say that it is possible to attain a good end through erroneous means, and neither is that
the correctness that constitutes excellence in deliberation.306 A lucky idiot is no more wise
in counsel than a clever scoundrel.307 e normative regulation between belief and truth
obtains, for Aristotle, because hitting on the truth is the function of everything that is
connected with thinking, whether it be practical or theoretical. e reasoning faculty is in
its right state when it hits on the truth, and there are functions of that faculty (i.e.
303. See also above at page 96. 
304. Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142b17-22: ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ
ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὃ προτίθεται †ἰδεῖν† ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται
βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι· ἡ γὰρ
τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική.
e text is corrupt, indicated by the obelus, but the passage makes good sense without whatever was
inside the corrupted portion.
305. Aristotle’s discussion of cleverness at Nicomachean Ethics 6.12, 1144a23-29, implies this claim as well.
Cleverness is a capacity for to act and attain what one sets out to do, which is distinct from excellence in
deliberation but seems to include it. If the aim is good, says Aristotle, then cleverness deserves praise,
but if not, then not.
306. Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142b21-26.
307. See also Nicomachean Ethics 7.10, where Aristotle argues that practical wisdom (which includes
excellence in deliberation) is incompatible with akrasia, but one can still be clever and akratic. His
explanation is fully in line with the passage quoted above: someone can be very good at reasoning their
way to unworthy ends.
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believing) where the attainment of the truth is not guaranteed. e “correctness” which
governs belief might therefore be this sort of procedural correctness, re&ected in a
subject’s ability to form true beliefs, quite apart from any value the truth has on its own.
ere is textual evidence for this. It seems that belief aims at the truth, for
Aristotle, because of what we might call GUIDANCE VALUE.308 Actions we take on the basis of
true beliefs are more likely to achieve our ends than actions taken on the basis of false
beliefs.309 is says nothing, however, about whether having a true belief is valuable in and
of itself. is is why I use the term “procedural correctness:” the belief has value in terms
of its place in a procedure for securing some further value. On this picture, true beliefs are
correct in the way that a deliberation that attains the reasoner’s end is correct, regardless
of whether that end is good or not. We cannot believe as we please, because what we
believe is constrained by the role that belief plays in achieving our ends. Anyone who
believes at random, yet relies on beliefs for guidance, could be considered irrational, and a
particularly grievous oﬀender—who seemed to care nothing about whether her beliefs
were true or false—could not even be considered a rational agent. 
Aristotle evinces this sort of view in his discussion in Metaphysics 4.4 against
Protagoras and his ilk. Protagoreans assert that either some or all contradictions are
true.310 Aristotle presses the objection that such an attitude is pragmatically impossible;
no rational agent can accept both sides of a contradiction:
For one does not seek out and suppose all things equally when, upon
thinking that it is better to drink some water or see a man, he then seeks
them out. He would have to, though, if the same thing were alike man and
not-man. But, as was said, there is no one who is not clearly concerned with
some things and not others, so that, as seems likely, everyone supposes
things to hold absolutely, if not about all things, then at least about what is
better and worse.311
308.e term is Gibbard’s (2007, 143-44). On Gibbard’s view, the only way to make sense of the idea that
belief is TRUTH-NORMED is in terms of GUIDANCE VALUE, and not INTRINSIC VALUE, on which see more below. 
309. So the story goes. For an argument against the idea that beliefs with GUIDANCE VALUE must for that reason
be true, see Plantinga 1993, 228-38, though he does not use the term itself. Gibbard does not, however,
require that there be a necessary connection, just that agents who act on beliefs with high GUIDANCE
VALUE tend to fare better than agents who act on beliefs with low GUIDANCE VALUE.
310. Metaphysics 4.4, 1007b19-22.
311. Metaphysics 4.4, 1008b20-27: οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ἅπαντα ζητεῖ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει, ὅταν οἰηθεὶς
βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ πιεῖν ὕδωρ καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄνθρωπον εἶτα ζητῇ αὐτά· καίτοι ἔδει γε, εἰ ταὐτὸν
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is quote immediately precedes the passage previously quoted from Metaphysics 4.312
Aristotle observes that rational agents take care to pursue some outcomes and avoid
others. From this, he infers that people make de!nite judgments, i.e. they assent to one
side of a contradictory pair of claims. Seeking out water requires us to have beliefs about
where water is and is not, what is water and what is not. Correct beliefs about this will aid
the subject in getting water and avoiding substances that are not water, like lamp oil. e
beliefs therefore have GUIDANCE VALUE, and that value evaporates if belief is an activity that
we can do as we please. A belief formed capriciously or at random provides guidance for
nothing. Even if such a belief happens to be true, there is a far more important sense in
which it is failing to do its job.
GUIDANCE VALUE cannot, however, fully capture the normative connection Aristotle
takes to hold between belief and truth. Per our passage from Nicomachean Ethics 6.9,
Aristotle recognizes another kind of correctness, whereby one deliberates correctly if the
end towards which one deliberates is a good end. In addition to their GUIDANCE VALUE,
Aristotle thinks that truth is an end that believing must attain, regardless of whatever
procedural value that attainment may have. True beliefs have greater GUIDANCE VALUE than
false beliefs, but this does not impose an obligation to believe the truth, the way that we
have an obligation to treat strangers justly. GUIDANCE VALUE measures how eﬀectively a
belief guides the subject to achieve her aims and goals. A true belief that p has GUIDANCE
VALUE for an agent only insofar as believing the truth with respect to p helps that agent to
attain her ends. It seems to follow that, if the agent’s ends have nothing to do with matters
p-related, then the agent need not care about whether her belief that p is true or not. ere
is no room for this kind of value to come into con&ict with the agent’s other ends, because
believing the truth only has GUIDANCE VALUE insofar as believing the truth contributes to
securing those other ends. is cannot ground a general obligation to believe the truth
and so cannot ground a general claim that believing is not up to us. Aristotle, however,
ἦν ὁμοίως καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐθεὶς ὃς οὐ φαίνεται τὰ
μὲν εὐλαβούμενος τὰ δ' οὔ· ὥστε, ὡς ἔοικε, πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν ἁπλῶς, εἰ μὴ
περὶ ἅπαντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ χεῖρον.
312. See above, at page 98.
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sees our obligation to the truth as capable of coming into con&ict in just this way. is is a
diﬀerent kind of value, which we might call INTRINSIC VALUE. at is, belief aims at the the
truth for its own sake, and not just because this is the best way to advance one’s other
ends. Aristotle relies on this kind value for truth when he opens his critique of Plato’s
conception of the good in book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics:
It would seem, perhaps, that it is better to, and indeed that we must, do away
with what it near and dear to us for the preservation of the truth, especially
us philosophers. For though both are dear, it is a righteous thing to hold the
truth in higher esteem.313
Aristotle uses a word with normative or obligatory force (dein),314 and his vocabulary has a
touch of the religious (hosion, subject of the Euthyphro). If we take Aristotle seriously here
(and I see no reason not to), he commits himself to the view that the value of truth
imposes an obligation on those who inquire about any given question. is obligation can
lead those who inquire into con&ict with their other values (what is “near and dear” to
them). is value is of a diﬀerent kind from GUIDANCE VALUE, because it does not make
sense to compare the GUIDANCE VALUE of beliefs to one’s other values. We might call it
INTRINSIC VALUE. Felt con&ict is possible between the INTRINSIC VALUE of truth and the value
of other goods. Aristotle’s substantive view is that one’s obligation to the truth is greater.
Since the above passage concerns the good, one might consider it further evidence
that, for Aristotle, the value of truth consists in its GUIDANCE VALUE, rather than bringing in
a diﬀerent notion of value. Aristotle insists that we study ethics not merely to know what
goodness is, but to become good.315 A correct conception of the good life and the virtues,
it stands to reason, has immense GUIDANCE VALUE for cultivating those virtues and living
the good life. is is consistent with Aristotle’s remarks at Nicomachean Ethics 1.6.316
313. Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, 1096a14-16: δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε
τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν
φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
314. For a comprehensive discussion of this word and the kind of obligation it denotes in Aristotle’s ethical
works, see Kraut 2006, especially 168-171, on this passage. Kraut’s main contention, that dein does not
generally connote moral obligation or duty, bolsters my view, since then it makes all the more sense that
Aristotle is using the word here to denote a kind of normative force that is nonetheless non-moral.
315. Nicomachean Ethics 2.2, 1103b27-29.
316. See especially Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1098b4-8: beginnings determine “more than half ” of the journey,
and this is Aristotle’s reason for starting the ethics course with high-level concerns before discussing
individual virtues.
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Aristotle’s objection to Plato’s view, however, has nothing to do with the GUIDANCE VALUE of
one conception of good versus another. Rather, his reasoning consists of weighing the
value that truth has against the value of various other goods in one’s life. His cites none of
the pragmatic considerations we !nd in Metaphysics 4.317 He claims that it is righteous to
value the truth more highly than what is near and dear to oneself, which is diﬀerent from
claiming that paying attention to truth is the only viable way to achieve one’s ends. We
conclude, then, that truth has INTRINSIC VALUE as well as GUIDANCE VALUE for Aristotle.
One further remark on belief ’s normative connection to truth is possible. In On
the Soul 3.7, Aristotle discusses how mental representations of non-present goods and
evils can impart the same type of motivation to a subject as present perception.318 He then
compares the good to the true, saying that they are the same kind of thing:
And when [the thinking faculty]319 says that in this place there is something
pleasant or painful, in that case it pursue or avoids, and so generally in
action.320 And the truth and falsehood which occurs without action is in the
same category (en tôi autôi genei) as good and bad; but the diﬀerence is that
one is taken absolutely (haplôs) and the other relative to someone.321, 322
e good and the bad are the same kind of thing as the true and the false. is is what we
would expect Aristotle to say, given his view that belief is TRUTH-NORMED. Just as subjects
pursue good and shun evil in action, they pursue truth and shun falsehood in belief. e
truth therefore regulates inquiry and belief in a way similar to how the good regulates
deliberation. Practical truth and falsehood, which implicates action, has GUIDANCE VALUE.323
e subject aims at the truth because they want to secure the good and avoid the bad.
Truth and falsehood without action (e.g. theoretical reasoning) still aims at the truth, but
317. GUIDANCE VALUE is a concern later in the passage, however, when Aristotle questions whether crasmen
would bene!t at all from knowledge of a simple Platonic good. See Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, 1097a7-13.
318. On the Soul 3.7, 431b2-10.
319.e anaphora goes all the way back to to noêtikon at b2.
320. Reading holôs en praxei with Hicks 1907 and Hamlyn 1968, against Ross 1961 and Jannone 1966, who
read holôs hen praxei, with praxei a verb instead of the dative singular of praxis.
321. On the Soul 3.7, 431b9-13: ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, ἐνταῦθα φεύγει ἢ διώκει – καὶ ὅλως ἓν
πράξει. καὶ τὸ ἄνευ δὲ πράξεως, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ τῷ
ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ· ἀλλὰ τῷ γε ἁπλῶς διαφέρει καὶ τινί.
322. Grammatically, the last clause is very diﬃcult; my translation is in agreement with Rodier 1900, Hicks
1907, Hamlyn 1968 and Jannone 1966. Hamlyn’s view (1968, 148) that Aristotle merely means that the
true and the good fall on the same side of a “table of opposites” does not explain why Aristotle would
mention truth in this context rather than, say, blackness, being high-pitched, or anything else. 
323. See above at note 239 on page 92.
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because of truth’s INTRINSIC VALUE. Aristotle draws a further telling distinction in the last
clause of the quoted passage. What is good and bad are so relative to a given subject in a
given set of circumstances.324 Truth, however, is the same for all subjects, whether or not
they know or want it to be so.
e question of whether to believe is simpler, for Aristotle, than the question of
whether to pursue. e practical deliberator must !rst ask of the end, “is this good for
me?” and, when the end is set, deliberate about how to achieve it. Whether an end is
correct to pursue depends on many things about the end, the subject and the
circumstances. Whether a belief is correct to hold, on the other hand, depends only on
whether it is true.325 e desires and goals of the subject are irrelevant. Believers are
therefore bound by a norm to believe truly, just because they are in the business of
believing.326 Given this, it is tempting to say that the prescription to form true beliefs is a
constitutive norm of rationality.327 Indeed, Aristotle suggests that those who run afoul of
this requirement relinquish their position as rational creatures worthy of epistemic
consideration.328 Aristotle’s argument that truth is the good state (to eu) of believing lends
some credence to this reconstruction. Discerning matters of truth and falsehood is the
ergon of thinking, and the thinking subject which arrives at the truth performs this
function well. True belief therefore has INTRINSIC VALUE, since the value of arriving at truth
derives from the characteristic activity (ergon) of thinking, and not from any positive
324.is does not commit Aristotle any kind of relativism about value as we deploy that term in
contemporary philosophy. e good for S need not be relative to S’s desires or beliefs about what is
good.
325.is claim is similar to the contemporary claim that deliberation about whether to believe that p is
“transparent.” is means, roughly, that our consideration about whether to believe that p reduces to
consideration of whether p is true. I hesitate to frame Aristotle’s view in these terms because he does not
speak of belief-formation as a type of deliberation which is parallel to practical deliberation. What
transparency further implies about belief is controversial. For some recent discussion, see Shah 2003,
Shah and Velleman 2005, Steglich-Petersen 2006b (a response to the !rst two) and Steglich-Petersen
2006a, which argues against the idea that transparency entails doxastic non-voluntarism. 
326.e term “business of believing” is Velleman’s; see Velleman 2000, a locus classicus for discussions about
belief ’s connection to truth (though he has since changed his view on the connection; see Shah and
Velleman 2005). 
327. Shah and Velleman 2005 take this view. See Steglich-Petersen 2006b for arguments against. Situating
Aristotle’s apparent view in this debate would take more space than available, as would consideration of
how Aristotle’s view stands outside, and prompts reconsideration of, the terms of the debate.
328. See especially Metaphysics 4.4, 1006a11-15, 1008b7-13, and Metaphysics 11.5, 1062a29-34 and 11.6,
1063b8-14. In these passages, Aristotle meets Heracliteans and Protagoreans not with demonstrative
argument, but accusations of bad epistemic behavior, and twice compares them to plants, which do not
cognize anything.
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consequences that truth-seeking might have (though of course it has many). is value
exists independent the potential negative consequences of truth-seeking. Aiming at the
truth therefore constitutes the sort of thinking that leads to belief. Since only rational
creatures can participate in this kind of thinking, such a norm (partially) constitutes
rational cognition.
8. Appendix: Text and Translation of 427b16-21
Several questions confront anyone who wants to understand what Aristotle is talking
about in this stretch of text. e !rst sentence states his conclusion: imagining is not the
same thing as thinking (noêsis) and it is not the same thing as entertaining (hupolêpsis).329
We would expect, then, an argument about thinking and apprehension. Instead, Aristotle
argues that imagining diﬀers from believing (doxazein), and takes that to establish his
point. He even oﬀers a further argument (b21-24) about imagining and believing, as if
that were his point all along. Why the change? Furthermore, why mention both noêsis and
hupolêpsis? is textual diﬃculty is exacerbated by the conventionally-accepted text (hê
autê noêsis kai hupolêpsis), which demands a translation like “thinking is not the same
thing as apprehension.” So the conventional text does not even mention imagining, which
is purportedly Aristotle’s main concern. 
Commentators agree that we need to get the passage to refer to imagination
somehow, but diﬀer about how to emendations the text.330 Our editorial choices will aﬀect
the conclusion of the argument, so we cannot separate philological and philosophical
considerations. From the standpoint of pure expedience, it is tempting to delete noêsis:
this would leave hê autê (the same) to refer anaphorically to phantasia, which appears two
lines before the present passage:
For imagination diﬀers both from perception and discursive thinking
(dianoias). It (hautê) does not occur without perception, and without it there
329. For a plausible view of hupolêpsis as the consideration of a propositional content, see Wedin 1984,
102-07.
330. For con&icting readings and proposals, see Philoponus (Commentary on the Soul 492.22-3),




is emendation would allow us to translate the passage as I did above, but amounts to
textual butchery. Noêsis is too well-attested in the manuscript tradition for us to think it
does not belong.332 It must, therefore, stay in the text. e solution, I think, is to delete the
article hê and read hautê (“this” or “it”) instead of hê autê (“the same”). e passage at
b14-16 immediately precedes the argument we are trying to understand, and the hautê
there clearly refers to phantasia. Without another anaphoric pronoun at b16, the argument
suddenly swerves oﬀ-topic with a claim about thinking and entertaining, then just as
suddenly resumes the argument about imagining. On my reading, no such issue arises.333 
If my reading is correct, Aristotle means in this passage to distinguish imagining
from entertaining. We must still understand why thinking (noêsis) comes up,334 but !rst a
more pressing issue: if Aristotle wants to argue that imagination is not the same as
entertaining (hupolêpsis), then why do his subsequent arguments deal only with belief
(doxa)? Belief is a species (diaphora) of entertaining, but establishing that imagining is not
the same as one species of a genus is not suﬃcient to put it entirely outside of that genus.
Knowledge and belief are not the same, aer all, but both are species of entertaining. Some
commentators claim that subsequent uses of “doxa” are meant to stand in for hupolêpsis as
a sort of metonymy, and so the argument is meant to establish that imagining is not a
form of entertaining.335 
331. On the Soul 3.3, 427b14-6: φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας, αὕτη τε οὐ
γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις.
332. It is missing only from manuscript y, from the late 13th century. For a description, see De Corte 1933,
365-67. Its transmission of the Meteorology is contaminated (see Fobes 1913 and Fobes 1915), which
warrants doubt about the remaining text as an independent witness. Another manuscript (U)
substitutes phantasia, which the commentator emistius either read or understood (On the Soul
Paraphrase 91.20-4); see also Chaignet 1883, 445. On the manuscript evidence see also Freudenthal
1863, 10, Rodier 1900, ii.405-06, and Hicks 1907, 457-58.
333. Hicks notes (1907, 458, ad b17) that noêsis and phantasia are closely connected in Aristotle and suggests
that the “thinking” Aristotle has in mind here is in fact phantasia: see also On the Soul 3.10, 433a10-11.
ere does seem to be some overlap between the capacities to which Aristotle refers with the those
words, but Aristotle just (at b9) used to noein with the same extension that he will give to hupolêpsis at
b26. is suggests that we should not take noêsis, a synonym of to noein, in the way Hicks suggests,
since phantasia and hupolêpsis clearly refer to very diﬀerent kinds of cognition.
334. See below, at page 126.
335. Most explicitly Simplicius (Commentary On the Soul 206.30-31), but see also Rodier (1900, 2:408), who
cites the commentator approvingly. Simplicius holds this view, however, because he takes all hupolêpsis
to involve endorsement, i.e. he does not think there is non-committal hupolêpsis, despite Aristotle’s
explicitly allowing for it: see Topics 4.5, 125b34-37.
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I do not think this is the best way to understand the argument. ey prove exactly
what they seem to, that belief and imagining are not the same thing, and it is true that this,
by itself, is not suﬃcient to establish that imagining does not belong in the family of
entertaining. We can !ll this hole, however, if we note that Aristotle introduces imagining
into his theory of cognition to account for false representations.336 With this new moving
part, Aristotle hopes to correct a widespread error in past thinking on the topic of mental
representation.337 If imagination is meant to allow for error, then it must be able to
represent falsehood, and this immediately rules out an identity with any mental state
which can only represent the truth. is includes, for Aristotle, any judgment which
expresses a person’s practical wisdom (phronêsis) or knowledge.338 ese mental states can
only apprehend the truth: one cannot know a falsehood, and false judgment cannot
express a person’s practical wisdom.339 Among the species of entertaining, this leaves only
belief. Aristotle’s argument, then, is by cases: if imagination is a species of entertaining,
then it is either a type that is always true, or a type that can be either true or false. It can
represent falsehood, so it cannot be any of the always-true states. is leaves belief, which
can be either true or false, but it can’t be belief either, for such-and-such reasons. No
metonymy is necessary.340
336. See especially Caston 1996, 27ﬀ.
337. On the Soul 3.3, 427b1-5.
338. Aristotle says as much later in the same chapter: see 428a16-18. ere he mentions knowledge
(epistêmê) and understanding (nous), but not practical wisdom (phronêsis). e references, however, are
for the sake of example; his argument applies to any of those states which always achieve truth (aei
alêtheuontôn).
339.e latter formulation shows that it is more diﬃcult to render the relation of practical wisdom
(phronêsis) to the sorts of propositional judgment that we deal with in contemporary philosophy. My
formulation is indebted to Taylor 1990. rasymachus makes a similar claim in the !rst book of the
Republic (340d-e) when he insists that, strictly speaking, doctors, accountants and other experts never
err insofar as they are experts. When we speak loosely and say that a doctor has made a mistake, we
mean that his knowledge has failed him in this case, which according to rasymachus makes him no
doctor (in this particular case). So when Aristotle says that practical wisdom is always true, he does not
mean that someone who possesses practical wisdom will never make a mistake, but rather that no
mistake on their part will amount to an expression of their practical wisdom.
340.ere remains a question of how to rule out an identity between imagining and the entertaining to
which we do not give credence, which Aristotle mentions at Topics 4.5, 125b34-37 (on which see
Chapter 1). We can rule this possibility out because Aristotle is clear in the Topics that someone can give
credence to and withhold credence from the same entertaining. Suppose, then, that imagination is non-
committal entertaining. If someone then gives credence to such an entertaining, then depending on
other epistemic conditions the entertaining can express belief, knowledge, practical wisdom or
understanding. We already established, however, that imagination is not any of these forms of
entertaining. So the entertaining would not be the same entertaining before and aer we furnish
credence on it, and we have a contradiction.
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My interpretation makes the predicate of the sentence noêsis kai hupolêpsis. We
need to explain why noêsis appears here: thinking as such !gures no further in Aristotle’s
argument. I propose this solution, which my translation incorporates: the kai in the
predicate is not a standard conjunctive “and,” but is instead used epexegetically. Rather
than joining two objects to form a compound referent, it clari!es what Aristotle meant by
noêsis, and so means something like “or should I say.” 
To establish this, we observe that noêsis and hupolêpsis are, in the context of this
passage, used to designate the same bundle of rational capacities which Aristotle
distinguishes from perception and imagination. At 427b8-11, he distinguishes thinking
(to noein)341 from perception on the grounds that thinking can be done correctly or
incorrectly, unlike perception. Aristotle lists three kinds of correct thinking: practical
wisdom (phronêsis), scienti!c knowledge (epistêmê), and true belief (doxa alêthês).
Someone’s thought can express states opposite these, various kinds of foolishness and false
belief, and still be considered thinking, while perception of those objects which are special
to each sense (idion) is always correct.342 Furthermore, perception belongs to every
animal. inking, on the other hand, belongs only to animals that have reason (logos), i.e.
only to humans (b13-14). Now comes the passage quoted before. In this stretch of text,
then, Aristotle refers to the process or capacity of thinking with four diﬀerent terms: to
noein (b8), dianoeisthai (b13), dianoia (b15) and noêsis (b16). ere are no doubt subtle
variations of meaning between these terms. e articular in!nitives, for instance, might
refer to the process of thinking, since Aristotle uses them when he talks about the process
turning out correctly or incorrectly. e nouns, by contrast, might refer to the capacities
as such. e main point, however, is that a continuous string of nouns with the common
root (noê-) connect the enumeration of kinds of thinking at b8 to the distinction claim at
b16. is suggests that Aristotle is referring to the same family of rational capacities at b16
that he is at b8. Furthermore, Aristotle lists the diﬀerent kinds of entertaining (hupolêpsis)
341. To noein is an articular in!nitive, which turns a verb into a noun: see Smyth 1920, §450-53. Noêsis is a
nominalization of the same verb.
342. For an explanation of this doctrine, which is puzzling and irrelevant to our discussion, see Turnbull
1978 and Hamlyn 1959, 11-13.
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at b25-26, and they are exactly the same states that comprise thinking at b8: practical
wisdom, scienti!c knowledge, true belief and “the opposites of these.” is suggests that,
at least in the con!nes of this discussion, Aristotle is using both terms to designate the
same family of rational capacities that diﬀer from both perception (because they can go
wrong) and from imagination (in the ways argued for at b16-24). is justi!es our
suggestion that the kai at b16 is, as I said, epexegetic; Aristotle is not distinguishing
imagination from two diﬀerent things in this claim, but is clarifying what he means by
“thinking.” e conclusion of the argument, therefore, is that imagining is not the same
thing as entertaining. e presence of noêsis poses no problem, because it is clari!ed by
hupolêpsis.
Eidôlopoiountes is a rare word, and does not occur before Plato (and there only
once). It occurs only in scholarly contexts, oen literary criticism or exegesis (especially
Longinus), and the remainder of the uses occur in commentaries on Aristotle and Plato.343
It has two main senses: the representation of something in words, and a more explicitly
psychological sense that denotes vivid mental representation, not necessarily visual. Plato
uses the term to describe the activity of the imitative poet, who sets up a “bad regime” in
the soul by fashioning pleasant images which the irrational part !xates on (Republic 10,
605b7-c4). Poetry uses language, but what makes the poetry bad is that it provokes images
in the soul that warp it. We can see, then, how Plato’s original usage could well be
responsible for both senses of the term. Aristotle clearly means the more explicitly
psychological sense. is word is the reason I feel comfortable translating phantasia as
“imagination,” i.e. the more or less free play of mental imagery. It denotes a (perhaps
distinctly human) ability to represent something in thought without proximate external
stimulus.344 We can deploy this faculty pretty much as we please, for our own purposes
(which does not mean that it is under our complete control). As an example, Aristotle
oﬀers a person putting a mnemonic system together.345
343. Results derived from TLG searches of eidôlopoieô and its two composites.
344. Some past perception of the imagined object is nonetheless necessary: see On the Soul 3.3, 427b15-17
and 428b12-16.
345. Wedin (1984, 75-77) denies that this argument implies that imagination is any sort of faculty on its





e last characteristic of rational cognition that we will consider involves Aristotle’s
argument that having beliefs about scary and encouraging things shares a special
connection to the respective emotional responses (fear and encouragement) that
imagining those scary and encouraging things does not. Some rational reconstruction is
necessary before we can understand what Aristotle takes the distinction to be. is is
because his distinction relies on a simile which he does not explicate: as he puts it, in the
case of imagination we are “just as if we saw terrible or encouraging things” in a picture.
It is conventional to interpret Aristotle’s simile as a claim that imagination does
not cause emotional arousal, while belief does. I argue instead that the comparison is
more subtle: there is a default causal connection between forming certain kinds of belief
and feeling certain emotions, while no such default connection exists between imagining
similar things and feeling those emotions. Aristotle’s analogy involves our interaction with
mimetic representation, and he is committed to the idea that we can respond emotionally
to mimetic representation even if we do not believe that it represents goings-on in the
world, which speaks against the conventional interpretation.
So we can respond emotionally both to what we believe and what we imagine. e
diﬀerence is that we do not act on the basis of our emotional responses to what we
imagine, though we do act on the basis of our emotional responses to what we believe.
Imagination is motivationally inert because it does not encode our commitments about
its deployment, the relevant imaging is only of things that have been committed to memory, and so the
faculty being used is actually memory (rather than imagination). is seems plausible for deploying the
mnemonic system, but not at all for the construction of the system itself. Even if one must learn the
system by rote, there must have been a !rst imagining which could not plausibly be called memory.
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the world. is distinction, however, between motivationally-inert representations and
those which motivate only exists among rational creatures. Non-rational creatures—both
animals and people whose judgment is obscured—commit to the appearances of their
imagination, and indeed cannot help but do so: they lack the rational faculty which
discriminates and withholds commitment by contradicting the deliverances of perception
and imagination. is is, therefore, a third constituent of rational cognition: the ability to
doubt and withhold commitment, to go unaﬀected by what appears.
2. Fitting Aﬀections and Causal Connections
Here is Aristotle’s argument in full:
Moreover, when we believe that something is scary or alarming we are
immediately aﬀected accordingly, and similarly if it is something
encouraging; but in virtue of imagination we are just as if we saw the terrible
or encouraging things in a picture.346
is argument has the same form we have observed in the two other passages from On the
Soul 3.3 to which we have devoted our attention. Aristotle contrasts belief and
imagination, asserting that one has a property or characteristic that the other lacks. is
gives us a basis for distinguishing belief and imagination, which is Aristotle’s goal.347 Like
the argument about the normativity of belief, but unlike the argument about credence and
rationality, this passage restricts our attention to human cognition. Aristotle uses the !rst-
person form of verbs throughout, talking about how we are aﬀected when we form a belief
or look at a picture. is lets us assume the full range of human cognitive capacity in
trying to understand Aristotle’s argument. We will soon see upshot for animal cognition,
but there are important diﬀerences between belief and imagination even at the human
level.348 When we believe that something is scary or encouraging, we “immediately” feel
346. On the Soul 3.3, 427b21-24: ἔτι δὲ ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς
συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν θαρραλέον· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα.
I read the aorist doxasômen, with Torstrik 1862, Rodier 1900, Hicks 1907 and Ross 1961, against
Jannone 1966, who reads the present. Jannone’s (Budé) translation, however, is “form a belief,” which is
more suggestive of the unmarked aspect of the aorist than the progressive aspect of the present.
347. We !nd the conclusion of the argument earlier, at 427b17: “It is clear that it [sc. imagination] is not
thinking (noêsis), that is to say, apprehension (hupolêpsis).” For this passage and my reasons for reading
it the way that I do, see Chapter 3, page, 123.
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the corresponding emotion, but imagining scary and encouraging things lacks this
immediacy, however we end up understanding it. 
We need to understand his claim about what happens when we form the belief, as
this will aﬀect how we understand the contrast. Start with “aﬀected accordingly.” Forms of
sumpaschein are rare before Aristotle, appearing twice349 in Plato and, so far as I can tell, in
no earlier authors. Both instances in Plato work on what we might call a “contagion”
model. at is, being aﬀected “accordingly” by something means coming to share some
relevant characteristic with the aﬀecting object (sun- in the sense of “together”). In the
Charmides, for instance, Socrates says:
And Critias, when he heard these things and saw me puzzled, seemed to me
to be fettered by my puzzlement and conquered by perplexity—just as when
those who see people yawning across from them suﬀer the same thing in
accordance (sumpaschousin).350
If someone sees someone yawning, they start to yawn themselves. In this example, the
object passes its own condition to the subject who is sumpathês. is is also the scheme at
work in Plato’s more conspicuous use of sumpaschein in the Republic. Socrates warns that
even the best men can fall prey to the presentation of a putative hero’s lamenting and
grieving excessively:
…We know that we enjoy [watching the hero’s laments] and, giving ourselves
up to it, we follow along suﬀering the same feelings (sumpaschontes) and,
since we are eager for this, we praise as a good poet the man who can put us
the most in this mood.351
Plato’s objection to the presentation of excessive grieving makes no mention of how we
come to pity the heros, identify with or excuse them. His problem is not that we might feel
348. See especially Osborne 2007, 87-93, who argues that imagination accounts for a psychological
continuity between the impulse-driven movement of animals and the abstract thought of which
humans are capable. For a diﬀerent view on which phantasia serves as a synthesizer of perceptual data,
see Frede 1992, though her account seems to apply just as much to the more cognitive animals as it does
to humans.
349. Sumpeisêi at Laws 4, 720d7 is actually a form of sumpeithein. Plato makes no use of the derived adjective
sumpathês.
350. Charmides 169c3-6: Καὶ ὁ Κριτίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα καὶ ἰδών με ἀποροῦντα, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς
χασμωμένους καταντικρὺ ὁρῶντες ταὐτὸν τοῦτο συμπάσχουσιν, κἀκεῖνος ἔδοξέ μοι ὑπ'
ἐμοῦ ἀποροῦντος ἀναγκασθῆναι καὶ αὐτὸς ἁλῶναι ὑπὸ ἀπορίας.
351. Republic 10, 605d3-5: οἶσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑπόμεθα
συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα
οὕτω διαθῇ.
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sympathy for the wrong person, but that we might come to act like they do. e quoted
passage comes at the end of a string of argument meant to establish that the good man
controls himself in a crisis and that the part of the soul that should rule in a subject is the
part that constrains emotion. A page later, Socrates generalizes his point to sexual desire,
anger and other aﬀections.352 Plato’s point is that tragic poetry causes the audience to
suﬀer the same objectionable emotions that it portrays and implicitly endorses. Poetry
gives free rein to our negative emotions and impulses when they should be subdued and
discouraged. e depiction of lamenting heroes is a contagion that passes the negative
emotions on to its audience. Plato’s use of sumpaschein, therefore, seems limited to the
sense of a contagion that causes the subject to take on its own characteristics.
is contagion model does not !t our passage from On the Soul; Aristotle’s claim
under such an interpretation would be that when we believe that something is scary, we
become scary ourselves. ere is no reason to credit this claim, and no evidence that
Aristotle makes it. He uses the term in a broader sense than Plato, to denote a matching or
calibrated aﬀection instead of a simple contagion. When we form a belief that something
is scary, we immediately experience fear, the aﬀective response calibrated to scary things.
is is not a normative claim: it says nothing about whether the reaction to the scary
stimulus is appropriate or praiseworthy. Aristotle is not, that is, committing the
“moralistic fallacy” by con&ating the question whether an emotion !ts a stimulus with
whether it is right to feel that emotion in that circumstance.353 Even a coward’s excessive or
misdirected fear is the “!tting” response in this non-normative sense.
Even if this sense of the term were unattested elsewhere in Aristotle, charity would
make it the most attractive choice. Aristotle does, however, use the term elsewhere in this
sense. e Posterior Analytics gives us a short discussion about the possibility of
physiognomics, the science of reading the conditions of the soul from the conditions of
the body. Such a science can only get oﬀ the ground, he argues, if there is an evident
352. See Republic 10, 606d1-4.
353. For the moralistic fallacy and its widespread appearance in the contemporary literature, see D'Arms and
Jacobson 2000. Not to be confused with what Edward Moore (1957) calls the “moralistic fallacy,” which
is really the assertion of some kind of fact-value distinction.
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connection between what the soul undergoes and characteristics of the body to which it
gives form:
…and if we were able to grasp the peculiar aﬀection of each class and the
sign as well, then we would be able to do physiognomy. For if there is an
aﬀection that belongs separately to some class as a whole—as courage for
instance belongs to lions—then of necessity there will also be some sign, for
it is assumed that they are aﬀected in accordance with one another.354
e soul and the body have diﬀerent sets of native aﬀections; the sorts of things that
happen to the body and the sorts of things that happen to the soul are diﬀerent. Souls
cannot be cut in half or nourished with food, and bodies cannot grasp universals or be
saddened. If the assumption, then, is that body and soul coordinate their aﬀections in an
orderly way, the coordination is not one of convergent aﬀections. It must be that the
aﬀection of the body is a sign of some !tting aﬀection in the soul. To make sense of the
above passage, then, we must take the sun- in sumpaschein to connote a matching or
calibrated aﬀection, not a mirror one.
We should distinguish what I take to be Aristotle’s plausible claim—which still
needs some interpreting—from one that is super!cially similar but implausible. Aristotle
is saying that there is some kind of immediate connection between forming certain beliefs
and feeling the matching emotional response. e nearby implausible claim is that all our
beliefs have an immediate emotional eﬀect on us. Many beliefs have no emotional eﬀect
whatsoever on their believers. My belief that gold has an atomic number of 79, for
instance, does not make me feel any particular way. One might defend the general claim
against this counterexample by pointing to situations where believing that gold has an
atomic number of 79 does prompt an emotional response. One might feel smug
superiority when one sees an annoying classmate base a chemistry presentation on the
proposition that gold has an atomic number of 85. If one notices the chemistry teacher
write “GOLD - 77” in what is meant to be a column of elements opposite their atomic
354. Posterior Analytics 2.27, 70b11-16: καὶ δυναίμεθα λαμβάνειν τὸ ἴδιον ἑκάστου γένους πάθος
καὶ σημεῖον, δυνησόμεθα φυσιογνωμονεῖν. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἰδίᾳ τινὶ γένει ὑπάρχον ἀτόμῳ
πάθος, οἷον τοῖς λέουσιν ἀνδρεία, ἀνάγκη καὶ σημεῖον εἶναί τι· συμπάσχειν γὰρ ἀλλήλοις
ὑπόκειται.
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numbers, one’s true belief might contribute to nervousness at the prospect of speaking up
to correct her. In general, so the response goes, it is ill-advised to limit, as a conceptual
matter, the sorts of belief that prompt aﬀect. Believing almost any proposition can cause
someone to feel something if it interacts in the right way with her desires and interests.
Even beliefs with content that is necessary and a priori can cause aﬀect. One might be
comforted by the thought that God is great and knows all, though the claim is necessary if
true. A mathematician who has put many hours of fruitless labor into proving Goldbach’s
conjecture might come to believe that it is unprovable, which would annoy him greatly
even though the claim is necessary and a priori if true.
is response does not touch the objection, because it remains implausible that all
of our beliefs have an immediate emotional eﬀect on us. We have not yet discussed
Aristotle’s notion of immediacy, but the connection between belief and emotion in the
above examples is not “immediate” in any sense that Aristotle would—or that we should—
recognize. Given some combination of interests, desires, tastes, etc., almost any belief can
cause almost any emotional response. For someone who thinks that homosexual
relationships are deeply immoral and their tolerance a sign of societal turpitude, the belief
that gay marriage will become more widespread in America might cause anger and
distress. For those with no such prejudice, it is a matter of indiﬀerence, even cause for
celebration. e belief ’s power to cause aﬀect depends on aspects of the subject, and in
diﬀerent subjects those same beliefs can have diﬀerent eﬀects. is kind of connection
cannot ground a general claim that our beliefs aﬀect us emotionally in a certain way,
because there is quite simply no certain way in which beliefs aﬀect their subjects
emotionally. e con!dence and lack of argument with which Aristotle makes his claim in
our passage from On the Soul should, therefore, caution us against attributing the
completely general, and highly implausible, claim to him.
e connection Aristotle is claiming between belief and emotional response is
therefore tighter than the causal connection that can hold between any belief and any
agent so disposed as to be aﬀected by said belief. We need to characterize this connection,
and we can start by noting that Aristotle’s claim is not about belief and emotion in general.
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Rather, it concerns the connection between coming to believe that something is scary or
encouraging and becoming scared or encouraged. One might suggest that he is only
oﬀering these cases as examples, and means the point to apply generally. Nothing in the
text requires this, however, and since generalizing yields the implausible claim discussed
above, we do Aristotle no favors if we attribute this thought to him. Furthermore,
Aristotle needs no such general claim to make the point that he wants to make about the
diﬀerence between believing and imagining. If the two work diﬀerently when it comes to
scary things, then a fortiori they work diﬀerently, and are therefore distinct as types. Best
then to give Aristotle the bene!t of the doubt and assume he is only talking about fear and
encouragement. Since the two are structurally analogous, and the references to
encouraging situations seem tacked-on,355 the discussion will lose nothing if we
concentrate on fear and leave encouragement by the wayside.
How then, do we characterize the connection between believing that something is
scary and feeling fear? Aristotle gives us a clue in book 2 of his Rhetoric, which oﬀers some
discussion and provisional de!nition of the emotional responses that an orator would
need to be most familiar with to sway his audience. He de!nes fear as a pain that results
from the prospect of some imminent danger:
Let fear be a certain pain or disturbance resulting from the appearance
(phantasias) of some imminent destructive or painful evil. For people do not
fear all evils, like whether they will become unjust or slow-witted, but those
which are able [to bring] great pains or destruction, and those if they do not
seem far away but rather near at hand, so that they are imminent.356
Fear, according to Aristotle, is the disturbance one feels when confronted with the
appearance of imminent danger.357 e “imminent” part is important: people do not fear
evils which are unlikely ever to aﬄict them (the virtuous man does not fear becoming
wicked) or that lie far from them (e.g. an army half-way around the world). It is not
355. As with most of his references to encouragement in his ethical works: see primarily Garver 1982 for
citations and discussion, and also Heil 1994, 69-71.
356. Rhetoric 2.5, 1382a21-25: ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ
φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς,
ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δύναται, καὶ ταῦτα ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς
φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν.
357. “Danger” is a more convenient way to refer to Aristotle’s “destructive or painful evil.”
134
immediately clear what he means when he says that “people do not fear” certain things.
He does not mean to rule out such fear as a matter of de!nition, nor even to claim that
people never, as a matter of contingent fact, fear those things. It is best to take it as a
descriptive claim about normal psychological functioning, however he wishes to
understand that. A de!nition of fear alone is not enough for our purpose; to understand
the claim in our main argument, we need to understand what makes an object scary. We
are in luck, for Aristotle goes from his de!nition of fear to de!ne scariness in a way that
falls right out of said de!nition. If fear is pain caused by confronting imminent danger,
then scary objects are those objects which prompt the appearance of imminent danger:
Now if this is what fear is, then it is necessary that scary objects are such
things as seem to have a great power to destroy or cause harm that is bound
up with great pain. For this reason even evidence (sêmeia) of such things is
scary, for it seems that the scary object is nearby. For that is what danger is,
the approach of something scary.358
e “seem” in Aristotle’s de!nition is not a hedge or urbane understatement, the way
someone might politely open with an “it would seem that…” His point is that what makes
an object scary is its power to make things appear a certain way to relevant subjects. e
word phainetai (“seems”) occurs within his attributive relative clause (“such things as seem
to…” rather than “seem to be such things as…”) and so is part of the characterization, not
a modalizing auxiliary verb. Whether an object is scary or not depends, therefore, on its
ability to cause the appearance of imminent danger. is is why Aristotle says that
evidence of scary things is itself scary, even when it is not itself dangerous. A shark’s !n,
for instance, cannot wreak much havoc on its own, but it tends to be attached to a shark.
It is tempting, given these two quotes, to understand Aristotle’s claim in our On the
Soul passage like so: to believe that something is scary just is to be afraid of it, and to
believe that something is encouraging just is to perk up in response to it. e response is
“immediate” because it constitutes the belief, and nothing can come between something
358. Rhetoric 2.5, 1382a27-32: εἰ δὴ ὁ φόβος τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερὰ εἶναι ὅσα
φαίνεται δύναμιν ἔχειν μεγάλην τοῦ φθείρειν ἢ βλάπτειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην
συντεινούσας· διὸ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν τοιούτων φοβερά· ἐγγὺς γὰρ φαίνεται τὸ φοβερόν·
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κίνδυνος, φοβεροῦ πλησιασμός.
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and its constituents. On this account, Aristotle takes SCARY and other structurally-
analogous properties to be response-dependent. On one standard account, a property is
response-dependent just in case instantiation of the property is constituted by a
community or individual’s relevant responses to that object.359 To take a simpli!ed
example, a joke is funny just in case it makes the right people laugh. is cannot, however,
be what Aristotle has in mind. From the claim that SCARY is response-dependent in this
way, it follows that if someone is not afraid of something, then she does not believe that it
is scary. As we will see when we try to !gure out what “immediately” means in this
passage, the aforementioned claim contradicts Aristotle’s express views about courage.360
In short, someone does not have courage because they believe that nothing is scary; that is
the mark of a fool. Rather, a courageous person lacks fear even in the face of what they
believe is scary. is is impossible if believing that something is scary entails being afraid
of it, as is the case if the feeling of fear constitutes the belief.
e relationship between believing that something is scary and feeling the fear
must, therefore, be looser than constitutive, but at the same time tighter than the
relationship whereby any belief can cause aﬀect in concert with the right desires or
interests. Aristotle’s remarks in the Rhetoric give us a way to characterize this middle-of-
the-road connection. According to Aristotle, fear is a painful disturbance that results from
the representation (phantasia) of some imminent destructive or painful misfortune. Let us
call imminent destructive or painful misfortune DANGEROUS for short. From this
characterization of fear, Aristotle takes it to follow that something is SCARY if it either
appears DANGEROUS or evinces something DANGEROUS. We can distinguish three moving
parts in Aristotle’s discussion. First there is the feeling of fear itself, which Aristotle calls a
kind of pain or disturbance (tarachê). Second, we have the appearance of something as
359.e paradigmatic response-dependent properties are the so-called “secondary qualities” like color,
which depend for their instantiation on certain responses in relevant subjects: see McDowell 1997,
Yablo 2002 and Egan 2006. As the McDowell piece indicates, there is a family of views which take moral
and aesthetic properties to be response-dependent on the model of secondary qualities: see also
Wiggins 1997, Lebar 2005, Prinz 2006 and Gert 2009a. e claim that properties like SCARY and FUNNY
are response-dependent is less controversial, I think, than respective claims about color (which might
be analyzed as re&ectance properties, which are primary qualities) and moral properties.
360. See page 139.
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DANGEROUS, which prompts the disturbance and so is distinct from it. ird, we have the
property SCARY. Aristotle says that something has this property if it prompts in us the
appearance of something DANGEROUS.361 e resulting view is that things are SCARY insofar
as they are able to prompt a certain response in us. e determining response, however, is
not the feeling of fear itself, but the experience of the thing in question as DANGEROUS, i.e.
able to cause painful misfortune. is suggests that Aristotle’s claim about the connection
between believing that something is SCARY and feeling fear is not a conceptual or
constitutive claim. Rather, believing that something is SCARY is constituted by having an
experience of the object in question as DANGEROUS, and committing to that experience.362
SCARY is still, therefore, what we would call a response-dependent property: to be SCARY for
a certain individual just is to prompt the appearance of imminent danger for that
person.363 e instantiation of the property, however, is not constituted by the ability to
prompt a certain feeling. e claim in our passage from On the Soul—that we are
“immediately aﬀected accordingly” by believing that something is scary—does not,
therefore, have the force of de!nition or conceptual truth. It is instead a substantive
assertion about the causal relationship between belief and aﬀect. Aristotle is not de!ning
the property SCARY in terms of the power to cause observers to feel fear, and he is not
de!ning belief that something is SCARY in terms of feeling fear. Nor is he making a
completely general claim about the relationship between forming beliefs and experiencing
aﬀect; his claim applies only to beliefs about objects that have a certain property, which in
turn depends on the subject’s having a certain experience. 
None of this, however, tells us what the close-but-not-de!nitional connection is
between these sorts of beliefs and their !tting emotional responses. Aristotle evinces in
361.is slightly diﬀerent formulation captures both a case where something appears DANGEROUS and cases
where something is evidence of something else DANGEROUS.
362. For a discussion on commitment and the role it plays in Aristotle’s argument, see page 158.
363. What is more, the connection between the response and the property is a priori and necessary. is is
because it follows necessarily from the de!nition of fear, and the de!nition of fear is an a priori truth.
ough Aristotle does not speak of it in those terms, he characterizes fear by a stipulative de!nition,
and it is fair to say that someone who thought fear was a diﬀerent feeling entirely, or a disturbance felt at
the sight of something one desires, would simply not understand what fear is. Scariness therefore meets
the commonly-proﬀered criteria for response-dependence: see Gert 2009b and Menzies and Pettit 1993
especially. ese criteria are not universally accepted, however; see Lebar 2005.
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other works, particularly the Eudemian Ethics, that he has the conceptual resources to
characterize this connection, and my suggestion is that he is deploying these resources in
the background of our passage from On the Soul. When Aristotle discusses courage in the
Eudemian Ethics, he makes a distinction between two diﬀerent kinds of SCARY. Some
things, he says, are scary simply as such (haplôs), which he takes to mean that they are
scary to people in general, or scary because human nature is the way it is.364 Other things
he describes as SCARY “for someone” (tini).365 ese are things which a particular person
!nds SCARY, and may or may not match up with what is SCARY simply as such:
In the same way,366 some things are scary without quali!cation, some scary to
a certain person. What frightens a coward, of course, insofar as he is a
coward, is not scary at all, or at least only a little. But things that are scary to
the majority, and what is scary according to human nature, these we say are
scary without quali!cation.367
As one would expect from the way Aristotle de!nes fear in the Rhetoric, he here allows for
idiosyncratic conceptions of what is SCARY and what is not. is does not mean that the
potential disagreement between subjects is faultless, or that scariness is “all relative,” as we
might say. e example Aristotle gives in the Ethics passage in fact concerns a deviant
subject; calling someone a coward presupposes that we are not meant to share his
conception of what is scary. is, however, is merely giving us an obvious example to
motivate the distinction. In our passage from On the Soul, Aristotle could be using either
of these senses of SCARY, and the character of his claim changes depending on the sense he
is using. 
If he means SCARY simply as such, his claim is that, when we form a belief that
something is SCARY either to the majority or according to human nature, we immediately
364. See also Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110a22-26, where Aristotle says that we oﬀer pardon and sympathy to
people who do what they are not supposed because of what “overstrains human nature.”
365. Aristotle uses the haplôs/tini contrast elsewhere to draw a distinction between evaluation which takes
the peculiarities of a certain subject into account and evaluation which does not do so. See especially
On the Soul 3.7, 431b9-13, on which see Chapter 3 at page 121.
366. Aristotle motivates his example with an analogy (b19-22): it is natural to say that some things are not
good without quali!cation, but rather just for a speci!c person: what is helpful for worthless men or
pleasant to children should not be called helpful or pleasant tout court.
367. Eudemian Ethics 3.1, 1228b22-26: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἐστί, τὰ δὲ τινί. ἃ
μὲν δὴ δειλὸς φοβεῖται ᾗ δειλός, τὰ μὲν οὐδενί ἐστι φοβερά, τὰ δ' ἠρέμα· τὰ δὲ τοῖς
πλείστοις φοβερά, καὶ ὅσα τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ταῦθ' ἁπλῶς φοβερὰ λέγομεν.
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become afraid. is claim is implausible on its own merits: there is no reason to think that
someone would become scared of something simply because he came to the judgment
that it would appear DANGEROUS to lots of other people. Such a belief might form part of an
internal dialectic that terminates in becoming afraid; for instance, if someone believes that
a situation would scare most everyone else, this might lead her to think that it is actually
extremely dangerous, which in turn would make her question her own resolve and so
become afraid. Aristotle’s claim that we become afraid “immediately,” however, does not
seem to describe that kind of case. We have yet to discuss what Aristotle means when he
says that the aﬀection is immediate, but the connection between the belief and the fear in
the case I just described is not immediate in any plausible sense. e connection would be
closer if the believer included herself in the “majority,” since the set of people that took the
situation to be scary, according to her judgment, would include herself. ere seems to be
a diﬀerence, however, between conceiving of something as scary for people of a certain
description that includes oneself, and conceiving of something that is scary for oneself. In
the !rst case, it seems possible for it to escape the believer’s notice that the situation in
question is scary for her. e belief in the second case, however, seems to be intrinsically
self-regarding.368 In the !rst case, there still seems to be some distance between forming
the belief and becoming afraid. Aristotle himself seems to be aware of this sort of
distinction, so our discussion has interpretive relevance as well. At the beginning of the
discussion of courage from which I drew the earlier quote, Aristotle asks what sort of
SCARY thing the courageous man endures, and concludes that it must be things that he
himself would !nd scary:
What sorts of things does the courageous man endure? First of all, [does he
endure] what is scary for himself or for another person? Well of course if [he
endures] what is scary for another person, one would say that this is nothing
worthy of respect. But if [he endures] what is scary for himself, then many
great things would have to be scary for him.369
368. In other words, the second case is a de se attitude, while the !rst case is not. For this distinction see
primarily Lewis 1979, and also to an extent Perry 1979, though he approaches the issue from a diﬀerent
angle and with a very diﬀerent vocabulary.
369. Eudemian Ethics 3.1, 1228b9-12: ποῖα οὖν ὑπομένει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; πρῶτον πότερον τὰ ἑαυτῷ φοβερὰ ἢ τὰ
ἑτέρῳ; εἰ μὲν δὴ τὰ ἑτέρῳ φοβερά, οὐθὲν σεμνὸν φαίη ἄν τις εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τὰ αὑτῷ, εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ μεγάλα
καὶ πολλὰ φοβερά.
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Aristotle actually uses this line of argument to set up a paradox, which the later passage
(quoted above at page 138) is an attempt to dispel. If someone is courageous by virtue of
resisting what they !nd SCARY, then they need to be scared of a lot of things, in order to
exercise their virtue. We do not say someone is courageous, however, if they are scared all
the time: the courageous person is supposed to be fearless, hence the paradox.370 Aer he
draws the distinction, Aristotle suggests that the courageous man !nds SCARY those things
which are SCARY simply as such, but that he does so in a special way. Here is what he says
immediately aer he draws the crucial distinction:
e courageous man is fearless when it comes to these things [that are scary
simply as such], and endures scary things of this sort, namely those which
are in one way scary for him, i.e. scary insofar as he is a man, but in another
way not scary (either a little or not at all), i.e. insofar as he is courageous.
ese things are scary, though, for they are scary to the vast majority.371
e thrust of this argument seems to be the following: the courageous person is still a
member of the human community relative to which we de!ne what is SCARY simply as
such. at is, they do not become some other sort of creature in terms of whose responses
it is no longer appropriate to de!ne the property. e SCARY things that the courageous
person endures is, therefore, SCARY to her, because she is still a human being. On the other
hand, those same things are not SCARY if we take the relevant responses to be the responses
only of courageous people, because these are the very people who stand !rm against them.
is is the sense in which the things in question are not SCARY to her. It is sometimes
suggested, contrary to my own view, that the distinction Aristotle has in mind is between
the feeling of fear itself and acting in a fearful way, for instance by running away.372 e
brave person, on this solution, feels the fear that anyone else would feel, but she stands
!rm because of a noble motivation. is does not, however, seem to be the distinction
370.e most thorough discussion of the paradox itself, and Aristotle’s mixed success in resolving it, is Heil
1994. If my interpretation of Aristotle’s thinking in our passage from On the Soul is correct, then we
need not accept the problem Heil diagnoses: that courage implies a struggle against one’s own
inclination and hence strength of will, but not virtue (1994, 62-65).
371. Eudemian Ethics 3.1, 1228b26-30: ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς ταῦτ' ἔχει ἀφόβως, καὶ ὑπομένει τὰ
τοιαῦτα φοβερά, ἃ ἔστι μὲν ὡς φοβερὰ αὐτῷ, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ, ᾗ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, φοβερά, ᾗ δ'
ἀνδρεῖος, οὐ φοβερὰ ἀλλ' ἢ ἠρέμα ἢ οὐδαμῶς. ἔστι μέντοι φοβερὰ ταῦτα· τοῖς γὰρ
πλείστοις φοβερά.
372.e best example, again, is Heil, especially 1994, 58-61.
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Aristotle draws in the text. ere we !nd a distinction between the ways in which
something can be SCARY for a person, not a distinction between the ways in which
someone responds to something that she !nds SCARY. e paradox dissolves because
Aristotle has found a way to deny the intuition that gave rise to the paradox in the !rst
place. is is the intuition he voices at 1228b10-11, that enduring that which is SCARY to
someone else (but not, presumably, to oneself) is not something worthy of respect.
Enduring what is SCARY simply as such is worthy of respect because it takes a special kind
of person to do so.
So the type of SCARY we !nd in our passage from On the Soul must be what the
believer herself !nds SCARY, not what is SCARY in general. However Aristotle resolves the
paradox he diagnoses in his community’s unexamined intuitions about courage, the point
that motivates the paradox seems sound: we have no reason to think that there is any
connection between feeling fear and experiencing things that we believe are SCARY for
other people but not for ourselves. is is why Aristotle says that facing down what is
scary for other people is not emblematic of courage. e lesson for our interpretation of
On the Soul 3.3 is that Aristotle must be talking about SCARY in the sense of things that are
SCARY to the person who forms the belief, and not things that are SCARY for other people or
SCARY “simply as such” (which he de!nes as things that are SCARY to the majority of people).
is is important, because it means that Aristotle’s claim about imagining must
also be about things that are SCARY for the person doing the imagining, rather than SCARY
simply as such. He means for his argument to show us that belief and imagination are not
identical as types, and it would fail if all Aristotle could claim is that believing that
something is SCARY for us aﬀects us immediately, while imagining something simply SCARY
does not. Aristotle must argue that believing and imagining behave diﬀerently under
relevantly similar circumstances. It will help us understand Aristotle’s distinction if we
understand what he takes his picture-analogy to amount to. We therefore turn to this
before our discussion of what he means by “immediately.”
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3. Imagining Scary ings
We are examining Aristotle’s arguments in On the Soul because of what their claims about
belief tell us about rational cognition. His own stated aim, however, is to distinguish belief
and imagining. Since he claims that there is an immediate connection between forming a
belief that something is scary and feeling fear, all that he needs to establish his distinction
is to deny an immediate connection between imagining something scary and feeling fear.
e bulk of ancient and modern commentary, however, take him to draw a stronger
distinction. According to this tradition, the distinction runs as follows: forming beliefs
lead to emotional response, and imagining does not make us feel anything. Call this the
“feel-nothing view.”
Reading the target On the Soul passage this way attributes to Aristotle a stronger
claim than he needs to make, which is cause for concern. e response to this worry is
that there is some evidence that Aristotle holds and argues for such a view elsewhere in
the corpus, and that it is therefore sensible to read him as deploying it in this argument,
since it represents his considered view on the issues at stake. Among ancient
commentators, emistius gives us the clearest statement of the feel-nothing view. For
him, imagination provokes no response whatsoever:
But although people oen bring upon themselves imaginings of earthquakes
or onrushing beasts, they undergo nothing in accordance with this, but
rather as with those looking at the lines drawn in a painting they feel
nothing, so are those who look at images in the soul.373
Imagining earthquakes and attacking beasts (presumably attacking us) does not aﬀect us
in any way whatsoever (sumpaschomen ouden). For emistius, the picture analogy
signals the complete severance of any aﬀective connection. We do not even feel the bodily
response correlate to the emotions, such as trembling or going pale.374 Above the quoted
passage, he claims that, when we believe that something is terrible or scary, we are
373. Paraphrase of On the Soul, 89.17-20: φαντασίας δὲ προβάλλοντες ἑαυτοῖς πολλάκις μὲν
σεισμῶν, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπιόντων θηρίων οὐ συμπάσχομεν οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς
πίναξι τὰ γεγραμμένα θεώμενοι πάσχομεν οὐδέν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα.
374. See On the Soul 3.9, 432b29-433a1, where Aristotle allows that contemplating something scary will not
always cause someone to be afraid, but may nonetheless cause a physiological reaction that we associate
with fear, such as a quickening of the heart. On this see Sorabji 1993, 45.
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“aﬀected in our body as well, by trembling or going pale” (89.15-16). He is not, therefore,
making a comparison between a “full-blooded” emotional response and some lesser
simulacrum of emotion. We must suppose that emistius was not aesthetically sensitive,
or at least took Aristotle not to be.
e author of the commentary for On the Soul attributed to John Philoponus375
takes a similarly stark view. We immediately feel fear when we form the belief that
something is scary, but when we imagine something scary, nothing happens at all:
In the case of imagination, he says that we are just the same, that is that we
neither feel fear nor are we terri!ed, but as we were previously, so are we still,
not changing in any way.376
Pseudo-Philoponus’ reading is curious because he ignores the picture analogy completely.
He seems to have understood “we are the same” without its correlative clause, and from
there inferred that imagination leaves us unaﬀected, since we do not change at all. We
need not, then, attribute the same impoverished view of aesthetic interaction to pseudo-
Philoponus as we do to emistius, but his view on the relevant passage seems to be
identical: imagination does not move us at all. is is the starkest feel-nothing view in the
historical record, and the bulk of modern commentators adopt it.377 
I !nd this interpretation implausible. If Aristotle’s point were that emotionally-
charged belief aﬀects us according to its content (as belief that something is scary leads us
to fear) and imagining does not, then there would be no reason for him to say that the
belief aﬀects us “immediately,” thereby implying that imagining aﬀects us some other way.
Furthermore, as we will see later, Aristotle would not agree to the claim that phantasia
375. For authorship of this commentary, see Charlton 2000, 1-7.
376. Commentary On the Soul, 493.17-19: ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς φαντασίας, φησίν, ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν, τουτέστιν
οὔτε φοβούμεθα οὔτε ταραττόμεθα, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ πρώην, οὕτω καὶ ἔχομεν μηδὲν
παρατρεπόμενοι.
377. See especially Freudenthal 1863, 11-12, Rodier 1900, 2:408, and Hicks 1907, 459, beyond which
understanding of this passage has not much advanced. Hamlyn (1968, 132) states that what Aristotle
says in this argument “seems quite correct,” but does not say what he thinks Aristotle says, or what the
picture analogy amounts to. Sorabji (1993, 57) cites this passage to support the claim that “the mere
imagining of terrible things does not provoke fear in humans,” though it is unclear whether he would
assent to the true feel-nothing view or something more sophisticated. Polansky (2007, 411-12) is the
most recent proponent, and seems to come by the view himself: he cites none of the ancient
commentators. ere are exceptions; Heil (1994, 53-54) acknowledges in passing that imagination can
lead to emotional response, as does Everson (1997, 170). I am not, however, aware of any systematic
discussion of the argument.
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never represents our commitments about the world. Sometimes they do, in ways relevant
to his view of rational cognition. More on that later. Last but not least, Aristotle’s
de!nition of fear in the Rhetoric says that it can arise from imagination (phantasia) and
not simply belief (doxa). is does not mean that every imagining of painful misfortune
will make one afraid, but it does seem to allow the possibility of fear without belief.
Aristotle’s claim in our passage from On the Soul is not straightforward enough to suggest
an interpretation that rules the possibility out.378
Even if we dismiss these objections, however, the interpretation contradicts
Aristotle’s settled view about how humans use and engage with imitative representation,
what Aristotle calls mimesis. In the Poetics, he de!nes tragedy as an imitation of action
which arouses pity and fear in order to subject such emotions to clarifying scrutiny
(katharsis):379
Tragedy, then, is the imitative representation (mimêsis) of an action which is
solemn and, having magnitude, complete; [enacted] by means of pleasant
speech, each of the forms separate in the parts [of the work]; acted out and
not merely recited; and such that it, by means of pity and fear, accomplishes
the clari!cation of emotions of that sort.380
Tragedy is meant to bring about the clari!cation of pity and fear through the imitative
representation of human actions. e imitations prompt this re&ection “by means of pity
and fear.” e de!nition of tragedy therefore presupposes emotional response. It is
possible, one might say, to “work through” one’s emotions about something without
having an occurrent episode of that emotion. Anger management counseling, for example,
does not require that one be enraged for the duration of every session. It is far more
diﬃcult to believe, however, that tragedy induces clari!cation “by means of pity and fear”
378.ere is some controversy in the literature over the extent to which the phantasia that triggers an
emotional episode must nonetheless represent something that the subject believes in, or commits to.
See Fortenbaugh 1975, Fortenbaugh 2006, 109-37 and Dow 2010 for the view that they must, and
Sorabji 1993 and Sihvola 1996 for considerations against. For my part, I do not think Aristotle has a
general theory that delivers a verdict on whether emotions as a kind require beliefs or not, though
arguing that point is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
379. I reject the view found in Veloso 2007 that we must delete references to pity and fear from the de!nition
of tragedy. His argument amounts to a lectio facilior. On my rendering of katharsis, a much-disputed
word, see Nussbaum 1986, 378ﬀ and Lear 1988. Nothing in my argument depends, however, on a
particular understanding of katharsis or its signi!cance.
380. Poetics 6, 1449b24-28: ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος
ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι'
ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.
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without any pity and fear occurring. One cannot claim to drive the nail with a hammer
and also claim that no hammer is present during the driving of the nail. Speci!cation of
means presupposes their presence during the action in question, so when Aristotle says
that tragedy works “by means of pity and fear,” we should assume that pity and fear are
aroused during one’s appreciation of the tragedy (assuming that the tragedy is not a
laughable mis!re).381
Audiences in a tragedy do not, according to Aristotle, feel fear and pity because
they mistake imitation of action for the real thing. Humans delight, he says, in viewing
imitations of things that, in real life, are painful to look at. His examples are particularly
ugly animals and corpses.382 ere are, therefore, aﬀective diﬀerences between experience
we take to be of real goings-on and experience we take to be of imitations. Consider now
Aristotle’s claim about imagination: when we imagine scary or encouraging things, it is as
though we were looking at them in a picture. Aristotle asks us to understand the
emotional impact of imagination in terms of the emotional impact of imitations. An
interpretation on which he claims that imagination is emotionally inert (again, dominant
in the commentary tradition) therefore commits him to saying that our interactions with
imitations are emotionally inert. ey are clearly not, so this interpretation fails.
I do not mean to attribute to Aristotle an imagination-based theory of !ctional
engagement, certainly not on the basis of our passage from On the Soul. Any attempt to
reconstruct a theory of !ctional engagement from Aristotle’s writings is bound to be
speculative.383 e argument is not that 
a) Aristotle thinks that !ctional engagement can prompt emotion, 
b) imaginative experience is constitutive of !ctional engagement,  
therefore c) imagination can prompt emotion, in Aristotle’s view.
Rather, I would put it like this:
381.Εven if the pathemata toiauta which are subject to katharsis are not real emotions but rather !ctional
simulacra, the argument stands, for the emotions denoted in the instrumental phrase are not quali!ed
so as to give the impression that they are anything other than genuine. 
382. Poetics 4, 1148b9-12.
383. Taylor 2008 attributes a broadly Waltonian view—for which see especially Walton 1990—to Aristotle,
based on no direct textual evidence. His purpose, however, is to make salient for a contemporary
audience Aristotle’s views on learning via sympathy, so the speculation does little harm.
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a*) It is central to Aristotle’s theory of imitation that imitative representation
can prompt emotions
b*) Aristotle explains the aﬀective power of imagination by comparing it to
engagement with a form of imitation
therefore c*) It is not reasonable to think that Aristotle’s point is that
imagination does not prompt emotion.
One might object that watching a tragedy is diﬀerent enough from seeing something in a
picture that I am not entitled to use Aristotle’s views in the Poetics to explicate the analogy
in our target On the Soul passage. Tragedies and paintings are very diﬀerent: the former
are extended in time and on the whole resemble things going on in the world more than a
painting ever could.384 We might think it is easier to get drawn into the experience of a
drama in such a way that our belief about the non-reality of the proceedings does not
cancel our emotional reactions to it. If this is how tragedies engage our emotions, then
they are not relevant for the picture case.
Aristotle is aware of the possibility of getting drawn in by a performance, and says
explicitly that tragedy can make its audience feel fear and pity through how it is presented.
e phenomenon is familiar to us: movie soundtracks can cause us to feel certain things
about what is going on onscreen, sometimes against our own wishes; a good performance
can elevate mediocre material; great eﬀects and stagecra can be awe-inspiring. All this is
true, but poses no threat to my interpretation, because Aristotle also thinks that
consideration of !ctional content alone can provoke emotion, absent the trappings of
performance. Indeed, he considers it the test of a superior author to cra plots that aﬀect
people in this way:
It is possible for the scary and the pitiable to come about due to the spectacle
(opsis), but also from the very combination of events, which is prior and [the
mark] of the superior poet. For one must frame the story in such a way that
one who hears the events that take place [in the plot] both frets and feels pity
as a result of what happens: this is how someone who hears the story of
Oedipus would be aﬀected.385
384. Worth noting, though, that Plato at least seems to think that it is fairly easy to deceive people into
thinking that the representational content of a painting is part of the real world. Perhaps the Greeks
were just gullible?
385. Poetics 8, 1453b1-7: Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινὸν ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως γίγνεσθαι, ἔστιν
δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ
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A dramatic production can be scary and pitiable simply in virtue of how it is performed
(literally from “how it looks” on stage). It is better, however, not to rely on cheap tricks,
and cra such a plot that people cannot help but be moved, even when they just think
about it. Here is why the objection fails: in the current passage, Aristotle describes the
following case: a subject who a) hears about what happened to Oedipus, b) understands
that it is the plot of a story (a muthos) and not, say, something that happened to the
speaker’s uncle, yet nonetheless c) frets and feels pity from thinking about those events.
Imitations, therefore, do not provoke emotion primarily by “taking in” their audience and
dazzling them with presentation. e emotion prompted by hearing a summary of the
!ctional content is prior in importance to the emotion prompted by the spectacle. 
For Aristotle, the content of an imitation, though disbelieved, can cause emotional
response.386 Since this is true in the case of tragic drama, it ought also to be true in the
case of paintings, which are imitations as well. An aural depiction of some !ctional
content can move someone to fret and feel pity, so I see no reason to deny that same
power to visual depiction. Since the distinction Aristotle draws between belief and
imagination in our target On the Soul passage is not the clean but implausible “emotion
over here, no emotion over there” type of distinction that the tradition has settled on,
what sort of distinction is it? Aristotle says that, when we believe that something is scary,
we immediately feel accordingly. I propose that his intended distinction is that, in the case
of imagination, we do not immediately feel accordingly (which does not entail that we
never do).
ἀμείνονος. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὁρᾶν οὕτω συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον ὥστε τὸν ἀκούοντα τὰ
πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων· ἅπερ ἂν πάθοι τις
ἀκούων τὸν τοῦ Οἰδίπου μῦθον.
386. See also Worth 2000, 335.
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4. e Diﬀerence: What “Immediately” Amounts To
So Aristotle’s view cannot !t the clean but implausible “emotion here, no emotion over
there” type account. e distinction depends on what Aristotle means when he says that
the connection is “immediate,” so we must now turn to that. 
e most common sense of euthus in Greek seems to be temporal.387 at is, if one
event follows another euthus, then no relevant event occurs between the !rst event and
the one that follows.388 If this is what Aristotle means in our target passage, then his claim
is that there is no temporal delay between forming a belief that something is scary and
feeling the fear. Aristotle does discuss the speed with which a subject acts, given the type
of cognition which led to the action, so this would not be a bizarre claim for him to make
about the relationship between belief and aﬀective response.389 e argument would then
imply that there is a temporal delay in imagination. I can think of instances where this is
true: it may take a while for the horror of an imagined scenario (e.g. a world without zinc)
to become fully apparent. Such a problem never arises in the relevant cases of belief, since
the aﬀective connection has already been made (e.g. the subject already believes that the
situation is scary). Still a stretch, though, to claim that such a diﬀerence always holds, and
constitutes the relevant diﬀerence between belief and imagination. It is unlikely that
Aristotle would draw the line between belief and imagination in this way, because he
seems to think that imagination has immediate motive consequences in animals.390
Temporal immediacy does not, therefore, seem the best way to understand the argument.
Aristotle uses the word, however, in several other senses. In all of its uses, euthus
contributes the idea that there is nothing that occurs or exists between the two elements.
e elements in question are determined by context. Here is a range of passages that
387. LSJ gives euthus as the temporal adverb, and euthu without the ς as the adverb of place, as we might say
“it’s directly in front of you.”
388. A more-or-less random scattering of examples from notable authors: Plato Apology 29e4, Phaedo 70a4;
ucydides 2.54.5.3, 2.71.1.5 (where it seems to mean something like “without delay”) and 4.107.3.6
(used along with meta for an explicit temporal ordering); Aristophanes Lysistrata 1231; Plutarch against
Colotes 1122D3. ere are, of course, hundreds more.
389. See especially Movement of Animals 7, 701a28-32. 
390. See Movement of Animals 8, 702a18-21.
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suggest that this is how Aristotle uses the term. In the History of Animals, Aristotle uses
euthus with a spatial connotation during a discussion of the bone structure of birds
relative to the four-footed animals. Here is why birds have a long hip-joint that looks kind
of like a thigh bone:
As in the case of men and the four-footed creatures, the thigh and the rest of
the leg would come straight from the hip-joint, however small. eir whole
body would then lean too far forward [to support themselves].391
Birds, unlike quadrupeds and humans, have a long hip joint that “kind of looks like
another thigh” and allows the birds to stand erect on two legs despite their upper bodies
being disproportionately larger than their legs.392 Euthus here conveys a spatial
relationship; quadruped thighs connect directly to their short hip joints. Birds, on the
other have, have a whole other bone coming out of their hip that “looks kind of like a
second thigh.” e conceptual ingredient that euthus contributes to the claim that men
and quadrupeds have a leg that comes straight oﬀ the hip-joint is that nothing else
intervenes.
Aristotle also uses the term in a logical context, where there are no causal, spatial
or temporal relationships. In the Prior Analytics, he discusses the relationship between
deduction which establishes its conclusion positively (deiktikôs) and which does so by
deriving a contradiction from an assumption (dia tou adunatou). He concludes that every
problem can be proved using both methods:
It’s clear, then, that it is possible to prove each of the problems both positively
and per impossibile. In the same way, it will be possible also, when syllogisms
are done probatively, to reduce them to what is impossible in the terms that
have been assumed, whenever a premise is assumed that negates the
conclusion. For the syllogisms come to be the same as those we get through
conversion, so that right away we have the !gures through which each
syllogism will be. It is clear, then, that every problem is proven using both
methods, per impossibile and probatively, and that it is impossible to pull
them apart.393
391. Progression of Animals 11, 710b2-4: ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς τετράποσι ζῴοις,
εὐθὺς ἂν ἦν ἀπὸ βραχέος ὄντος τοῦ ἰσχίου ὁ μηρὸς καὶ τὸ ἄλλο σκέλος· λίαν οὖν ἂν ἦν τὸ
σῶμα πᾶν προπετὲς αὐτῶν.
392. Aristotle says as much right before the quoted passage. Men can stand erect with short hip joints
because their legs are long enough relative to their upper bodies (Progression 11, 710b9-11). is is why
children cannot walk; they are out of proportion until they grow (b11-3).
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Aristotle’s syllogistic allows for the conversion of certain premises into other forms, which
in turn transforms certain forms of syllogism into other valid forms.394 In any given valid
syllogism S, the !rst two premises S1 and S2 entail the conclusion C. C therefore cannot
be false without negating at least one of the premises. So from a given valid syllogism {S1
S2 C}, we can obtain {not-C S1 CONS2} or {Not-C S2 CONS1}, where CONS denotes the
contrary of S. e passage therefore makes a point about how syllogisms are arranged in
logical space. e two methods “cannot be pulled apart,” in that once we perform the
requisite formal operation, we “immediately” obtain the other kind of syllogism. Aristotle
seems to think, at least, that there are no conclusions open to one method of proof, but
not the other. If euthus carries any causal or temporal connotation in this context, it is
metaphorical; Aristotle perhaps imagines someone bending and turning the syllogisms in
various ways to turn the probative proof into proof ad impossibile. Whatever his imagery,
the point is that the transformation is suﬃcient to convert one deduction into the other.
From these examples it would appear that euthus just means that nothing
intervenes between the two elements. If we interpret our passage from On the Soul along
these lines, Aristotle’s claim becomes the following: when we form the belief that
something is scary or encouraging, then fear and encouragement inevitably follows along,
just as we immediately obtain a proof ad impossibile from a probative deduction when we
take the negation of its conclusion as a premise. is makes for a necessary connection
between the relevant belief and its !tting emotional response. is, however, does not
seem the right way to interpret the claim. First, the claim so interpreted expresses a view
that has little plausibility on its own merits. It dismisses as literally impossible any scenario
where someone can believe that something is SCARY and yet not feel any fear. Such cases
are possible, however: consider a soldier who has fought in many battles and no longer
393. Prior Analytics 2.14, 63b12-21: φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅρων καὶ δεικτικῶς ἔστι
δεικνύναι τῶν προβλημάτων ἕκαστον [καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου]. ὁμοίως δ' ἔσται καὶ
δεικτικῶν ὄντων τῶν συλλογισμῶν εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπάγειν ἐν τοῖς εἰλημμένοις ὅροις, ὅταν ἡ
ἀντικειμένη πρότασις τῷ συμπεράσματι ληφθῇ. γίνονται γὰρ οἱ αὐτοὶ συλλογισμοὶ τοῖς
διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς, ὥστ' εὐθὺς ἔχομεν καὶ τὰ σχήματα δι' ὧν ἕκαστον ἔσται. δῆλον οὖν
ὅτι πᾶν πρόβλημα δείκνυται κατ' ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς τρόπους, διά τε τοῦ ἀδυνάτου καὶ
δεικτικῶς, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι τὸν ἕτερον.
394. For discussion of proof ad impossibile and its place in Aristotle’s logical theory, see Lear 1980, 34-5,
39-41, 44-47, Rose 1968, 35-36, and Ross 1949, 31-32.
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feels terror when he faces the enemy.395 If the connection between believing that
something is SCARY and feeling fear were necessary in the sense suggested, then the only
way to explain the soldier’s lack of fear would be to say that he does not believe that facing
down the enemy is scary. How plausible this claim is will depend on how we determine
what sorts of things are SCARY. e claim is true if scariness (for an individual) is fully
constituted by that individual’s feeling fear toward the object. Making such a move,
however, comes with a cost that no one, I think, should want to pay: if that is how we
determine what is SCARY, it follows that someone cannot even entertain a thought about
the object in question without feeling fear. Even a coward, however, can contemplate an
object of fear from a position of safety and not actually feel the emotional disturbance.
Aristotle himself seems to agree:
But neither does [practical reason], whenever it considers an object of this
sort [i.e. something to be pursued or avoided], at that very moment urge one
to pursue or avoid . For instance, oen it thinks (dianoeitai) about something
scary or pleasant, but does not urge us to be afraid, but the heart is moved
and, if it is something pleasant, some other part.396 397
Just thinking, even about something scary, can leave the subject unaﬀected, at least
emotionally; Aristotle allows for some involuntary physiological response. He seems to
share the view, then, that it is impossible to peg what is SCARY for individuals to their
emotional responses as such. Aristotle does not, in this passage, observe the distinction
between feeling the disturbance of fear and doing something on the basis of those feelings.
His main point is that practical reason can be inert, even when it considers something
with the power to move the subject. His general claim is that considering something to be
avoided does not always lead reason to “urge” us to avoid (pheugein) the object. He seems
395.is is distinct from Heil’s interpretation (1994) of the paradox of courage, wherein a courageous man
will feel fear but not let it determine what action he takes. It is not clear to me that this is a solution to
the paradox, since it seems a stretch to call the emotional state and the motivational state (as Heil calls
them) two diﬀerent ways of thinking that something is scary, which is how Aristotle casts the problem.
396. On the Soul 3.9, 432b29-433a1: ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον, ἤδη κελεύει φεύγειν ἢ
διώκειν, οἷον πολλάκις διανοεῖται φοβερόν τι ἢ ἡδύ, οὐ κελεύει δὲ φοβεῖσθαι, ἡ δὲ καρδία
κινεῖται, ἂν δ' ἡδύ, ἕτερόν τι μόριον.
397. Sorabji (1993, 40) cites this passage as an example of thinking that is not propositional, and hence not
related to truth or falsehood the way belief is. e syntax of the clause that depends on dianoeitai,
however, is identical to that which depends on doxasômen in our passage from On the Soul 3.3. e
diﬀerence, then, does not seem to be whether the state is truth-apt, but whether it makes a commitment
about how things are. is might be what Sorabji means by “aﬃrmation and negation.”
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to be making a point about action, but illustrates his point with an example that has to do
with emotion (phobeisthai), and the extent to which these two come apart, the plausibility
of his discussion suﬀers. is confusion does not, however, obscure his point that the
mere occurrence of something scary in the course of discursive thought need not trigger
the !tting emotional response.
e soldier in our example can think about facing down the enemy without
becoming afraid, and he furthermore can believe that facing down the enemy is SCARY
without feeling fear. Some sort of interruption must be possible between the act of
cognition (forming a belief that something is SCARY) and the aﬀect that it causes. Aristotle’s
analysis of fear in the Rhetoric helps spell that relation out.398 Fear, so the story goes, is a
disturbance caused by the appearance of something that is capable of bringing painful
misfortune. From this it follows necessarily, for Aristotle, that something is SCARY if it
appears (to the relevant observer) capable of causing great and painful misfortune, i.e. if it
appears DANGEROUS.399 Our soldier need not be misled about what is DANGEROUS to lack fear
when he faces the enemy.400 e enemy can appear DANGEROUS to him, since they have a
great power to kill him, and by Aristotle’s lights this means that he !nds the enemy SCARY.
e enemy is the sort of thing that produces fear in him, but he need not necessarily
become afraid. Interruption must be possible, even if the relation is “immediate.”
I propose, therefore, that we understand the connection between belief and fear in
the same way that we understand the relationship between concluding a valid practical
syllogism and performing the entailed action. ere we !nd the same dynamic: an act of
cognition brings about a bodily reaction “immediately,” but the connection is not
necessary or inevitable. Aristotle draws a parallel in Nicomachean Ethics book 7 between
theoretical thinking (which terminates in belief or assertion of the conclusion) and
practical reasoning, which terminates in an action:
398. See above at page 134 for discussion.
399. Or if, by extension, it is evidence that something capable of causing great and painful misfortune is
nearby.
400. Aristotle discusses this kind of “courage” at Eudemian Ethics 3.1, 1129a15-17, and says that children and
madmen typically possess it. I put “courage” in scare-quotes because he concludes his !vefold list
(a30-31) by saying that none of them are actually courage in the proper sense.
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Whenever one [proposition] emerges from these other [propositions], it is
necessary in the [theoretical] case that the soul assert what was concluded (to
sumperanthen), and in productive cases to do [what was concluded]
immediately (euthus). For example, if one should taste every sweet thing, and
this thing here (one of the particulars) is sweet, then it is necessary for one
who is able and not prevented at the same time also to act (sc. taste the sweet
thing).401
Aristotle here describes what he sees as the normal, everyday interaction between an
agent’s practical reasoning and her actions. In cases that do not involve action, the
dynamic is clear enough; if someone becomes aware that two claims in which they
believe402 entail some other claim, they must (presumably on pain of irrationality) come to
believe the entailed claim.403 In cases where the conclusion calls for action (the so-called
“practical syllogism”), it is further required that the agent act in accordance with the
conclusion. is is because the proposition concluded in the practical case is not a
description of how things are, but something with imperative or obligatory force. From
“all sweet things should be tasted” and “this is sweet,” the claim that this should be tasted
follows. When we conclude this, according to Aristotle, we naturally act as our reasoning
tells us we should. Aristotle uses the adverb euthus to characterize the relationship
between concluding the practical syllogism and acting accordingly. e connection is,
therefore, immediate in the way we are trying to understand. Nothing else needs to
happen for the agent to act beside the thought process that Aristotle formalizes using the
practical syllogism. ere is no step, in other words, that comes between the conclusion
and the action.
401. Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1147a26-31: ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν
ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς· οἷον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος
γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς ἕν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ
κωλυόμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν.
Translation and supplied words follow Charles 2009, 52.
402.e antecedents for the feminine pronouns in this passage are a matter of some debate; I accept the
argument of Charles (2009) that they refer to contents (hence “proposition”) and not psychological
states, such as beliefs. His reasoning is that Aristotle says in the theoretical case that the soul must
“assert what was concluded,” and one does not conclude beliefs, but rather their contents.
403. See Chapter 3 for the argument that the necessity here is a normative necessity derived from the
regulative relationship between belief and truth, and not something which suggests that the aﬃrmation
is something automatic or involuntary.
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So the relation is immediate, but also contingent, despite Aristotle’s use of anagkê
at a26. Not all practical conclusions result in their corresponding action.404 Aristotle
himself allows for cases where the agent is prevented by external forces.405 ere can also,
however, be interruption of a diﬀerent kind, interruption due to the agent’s other mental
states, especially desire. Desire, according to Aristotle, can lead us to do things our
reasoning bids us avoid:
Whenever, then, the universal [belief] is present which prevents from tasting,
and so is the [belief] that everything sweet is pleasant, and [the belief that]
this thing right here is sweet (and this [belief] is eﬀective), and when desire
happens to be present, then [the belief] tells us to avoid this [sweet thing],
but desire leads us on, for it is able to move each bodily part.406
Aristotle here changes the practical syllogism from one which orders that one taste the
sweet thing to one which orders that one abstain from it. e transition is abrupt, but
motivated, because indulging despite one’s intention not to is a more intuitive instance of
breakdown in self-control (akrasia) than intending to indulge but abstaining instead. e
psychological moving parts, in this passage, are (1) a universal belief407 that one should
abstain from things that are sweet, (2) a universal belief that everything sweet is pleasant,
(3) a particular belief that the thing in front of one is sweet, and !nally (4) a desire, which
motivates one to pursue what is pleasant, absent any explicit belief that this is the thing to
do. e particular belief is “eﬀective,” which means that it plays a role both in the agent’s
practical syllogism which orders her not to taste it, and in a separate piece of reasoning
that the thing in front of her is pleasant (since it is sweet).408 is separate, descriptive
conclusion interacts with the agent’s appetitive desire for the pleasant. e descriptive409
404.at of Charles 2009, 52-55 and Charles 1984, 117-32. Charles traces this interpretation back to
medieval logician Walter Burley (2009, 42).
405.ough see Charles 1984, 129-30 for text which suggests that Aristotle’s reference to things which
prevent the action from occurring is meant to include internal as well as external factors. If this is
correct, it can only strengthen the case I wish to base on this passage.
406. Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1147a31-35: ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἣ δέ,
ὅτι πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκύ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχῃ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἣ μὲν οὖν
λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει· κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων.
407. Charles continues to take the feminine pronouns to refer to propositions (feminine noun protasis), but
here Aristotle is talking about mental states. Furthermore, both the !rst feminine pronoun and desire (a
mental state) are given present participles which describe their psychological eﬀects. suggesting that the
pronouns refer to psychological states.
408. Charles 1984, 131-32 agrees that there are two overlapping pieces of reasoning in this passage, but takes
the universal premise to forbid tasting pleasant things, while I take it to be against tasting sweet things.
409.e participle is descriptive rather than circumstantial because we know that, as a matter of fact, the
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participial phrase “which prevents us from tasting,” as well as Aristotle’s description of the
result that “the belief tells us to avoid” the sweet thing, implies that the agent drew the
good conclusion from the practical syllogism. Her desire for the pleasant, however,
ultimately determines her action, in contradiction to that good conclusion.
In the case of akrasia, then, we have a psychological state (the prescriptive belief
formed from the conclusion of the practical syllogism) that “immediately” leads to the
agent behaving accordingly (i.e. performing the action that the conclusion characterizes).
e immediacy, I suggest, is causal: action enjoys a presumptive causal connection to the
execution of relevant practical reasoning. In the normal course of events, concluding a
practical syllogism causes the action, and nothing further needs to happen in order for the
action to follow. e connection between practical reasoning and action is literally
immediate in the sense of “not mediated.” is does not imply, however, that the
connection is necessary or inevitable.
I propose that we understand along the same lines Aristotle’s connection between
believing that something is SCARY and feeling an emotional response. ere is a natural,
presumptive causal connection between committing to the appearance that something is
DANGEROUS and becoming afraid. e connection is immediate: forming the belief is all
that has to happen for the agent to become afraid. is means that no further background
beliefs or any other positive circumstances are necessary in order to bring about the fear.
Short circuit is possible, however. Aristotle himself admits as much in his discussion of
courage. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he refuses to call sailors courageous who face a storm
undaunted, because their experience (empeiria) tells them how to handle the situation410:
Yet even at sea and in sickness is the courageous man fearless, but not in the
same way that sailors are. For those men (sc. the courageous) have given up
on safety and scorn this kind of death, while the others (sc. the sailors) are
hopeful due to their experience.411
belief does not prevent the tasting. One can call a belief “the one that prevents” as a means of
characterizing it, without saying that it prevents in that particular situation.
410. See in addition to the quoted passage Rhetoric 2.5, 1383a28-32, where Aristotle says that those
experienced at sea are con!dent in a storm because they have the resources to meet the challenge. is
puts them in a diﬀerent state of mind from those who are con!dent due to their lack of experience,
whom Aristotle mentions in the same breath.
411. Nicomachean Ethics 3.7, 1115a35-b4: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεὴς ὁ
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Aristotle describes both the courageous man and the sailors as “fearless.”412 Both of them
face terrifying circumstances (a storm at sea, a deadly illness), but in both their cases the
causal link between !nding one’s circumstances SCARY and actually feeling the fear is
broken. e courageous man does not feel fear because he thinks there is no hope for
escape. is is consistent with a further remark Aristotle makes in his discussion of fear in
the Rhetoric: when someone thinks that they have already “suﬀered every terrible thing”
and so have no hope for the future, they will not be afraid but rather grow cold and
indiﬀerent. In order for a situation to elicit fear, then, there must be some hope of
escape.413 e way Aristotle describes this case, however, implies that he takes the default
position to be hope of escape: most of us do not live our lives in extremis. at they have
suﬀered every horror already is something that these people acknowledge (nomizein), and
this causes a cold indiﬀerence (they are apopsugmenoi).414 eir belief and the resignation
to which it gives rise are additional mental ingredients, just as the imbalance between
desire and right reason in the person who lacks self-control is an extra mental ingredient
that throws the natural causal connection between practical reasoning and action out of
whack. at additional ingredient disrupts the causal connection between believing that
something is SCARY and feeling the natural response. e mechanism is much the same in
the sailor’s case, though easier to reconstruct. Being out in a storm at sea is something that
anyone would !nd SCARY, even experienced sailors. e sailors face it without fear,
however, because their sailing experience (empeiria) lets them see how, with the right
combination of luck and skill, they will come out of it alive. ey must still think that their
situation is SCARY, because their experience does not stop them from recognizing that a
storm at sea is DANGEROUS, even to them. Sailing in the ancient world had its dangers, even
ἀνδρεῖος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι· οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν
θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἳ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.
412. See also Eudemian Ethics 3.1, 1229a12-16, where Aristotle discusses courage that comes “from
experience and knowing,” though it is doubtful he has exactly the same case in mind, for two reasons.
First, he calls this kind of courage “concerned with soldiering,” and does not mention sailors. Second,
the discussion as a whole suﬀers from Aristotle’s con&ation of enduring what is scary (which leaves
open the question of whether those resisting feel fear or not) and being fearless. 
413. See Rhetoric 2.5, 1383a3-7.
414.e Greek that I paraphrase is οἱ ἤδη πεπονθέναι πάντα νομίζοντες τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀπεψυγμένοι
πρὸς τὸ μέλλον.
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to the most experienced. e sailors are not terri!ed because of their experience, not
because they stop recognizing the danger. e extra mental ingredient in this case is their
empeiria, a complex of memories and inductive belief about cases relevantly similar to
their circumstances. is experience breaks the causal connection between belief and fear
and lets them respond without fear.
So when Aristotle says that we are immediately aﬀected accordingly when we form
the belief that something is SCARY, he means that feeling fear is the immediate causal
result, under normal circumstances, of forming such a belief. It is immediate because
nothing else needs to happen, aside from the belief, for the fear to occur. e connection
is not inevitable or failsafe, however, because other aspects of the subject’s total mental
state can intervene and prevent the fear even with the formation of the belief. In order to
distinguish believing from imagining (which is his purpose in our passage from On the
Soul), Aristotle need only deny that the property by which he characterizes belief applies
to imagination. I suggest that this is how we read Aristotle’s claim that in the case of
imagination we are “in the same state as if we were looking at scary or encouraging things
in a picture.” His analogy, that is, amounts to the claim that there is no immediate causal
connection between imagining something SCARY and becoming afraid. is is not the same
thing as saying, however, that imagining does not cause emotional response. e
relationship between imagining and fearing is just not immediate; rather, it is mediated by
other aspects of our mental state and circumstances. 
5. Reason and Restraint
at said, we should recall that, on my interpretation, the phrase “being aﬀected
accordingly” concerns feeling the fear itself, not acting as a result of that fear. is leaves
Aristotle able to say that, though the emotion we feel when we imagine things is of the
same kind as the emotion we feel when we form beliefs, it does not follow that we do the
same things because of imagining-prompted emotion that we do as a result of belief-
prompted emotion. For instance, if we were to see an enraged woman draw a knife on the
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street, say that she is going to murder her children to spite their father, and then enter her
house, we would immediately start deliberating about how to stop her. When we see the
same scene in a theater as part of Medea, we do no such deliberation. e scene may !ll us
with dread, but we take no steps to stop it; we may even, as Aristotle observes, feel some
pleasure at our dread.
ere is no mystery here: in deliberating about what to do, we are guided by our
commitments, i.e. how we take the world to be. Our imaginings do not number among
our commitments about the world, and that makes them motivationally inert. When we
look at scary things in a picture, we may experience fright, but if we confront ourselves
with the explicit belief that it is just a picture, and represents no actual danger, we feel no
need to do anything about it. e fear we felt will likely evaporate or attenuate as well.415
e point is that our action and deliberation (not necessarily our emotion) are tied to
commitments about the world, and those are encoded in our beliefs, not our imaginings.
One might object at this point that non-human animals do not form beliefs,
according to Aristotle. ey only have perception and phantasia. If imagination interacts
with aﬀective and motivational states in the way that my account implies, we should
expect animals always to behave the way we do in movie theaters. is is absurd, of
course. Animals get around the world just as well with their perception and phantasia as
we can with our beliefs and deliberation (we have perception too, of course).416 Aristotle
(as I interpret him) should be able to accommodate this observation. Answering the
worry leads into our lesson about Aristotle’s conception of rationality. e diﬀerence
between the cognition humans possess and deploy, and those available to the non-rational
animals, does not lie in its ability to prompt and guide behavior. Belief is not special, that
is to say, because it represents commitments about the world. What we do is determined
415.is explanation most resembles a “ought eory” about our emotional response to !ction. When
we engage with !ction, our beliefs about the non-reality of the goings-on can become comparatively
inert in our thinking, allowing us to experience genuine emotion toward the !ction. is view opposes
various brands of !ctionalism, wherein the emotions themselves are part of an imagination-game we
play as part of our appreciating the !ction. For defense of ought eory, see especially Yanal 1999,
and also Wilkinson 2000. See Walton 1978 and Walton 1990, 195-204 for a motivation and defense of
!ctionalism.
416. See especially Lorenz (2006, 124-38) for the idea that phantasia allows animals to envision prospects
and thereby guide themselves eﬀectively in the world.
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in part by our commitments about the world, and the same goes for animals. Aristotle’s
discussion elsewhere in On the Soul 3.3 mentions how imagination, because its content
derives from perception, can cause and guide behavior:
…if this change [sc. phantasia] is not able to happen without perception or to
creatures who do not perceive, then the subject who has it can both do and
experience many things in accordance with it, and it can be both true and
false.417
Creatures react to the sensory world, which their perception reveals to them. e content
of imagination, according to Aristotle, is parasitic on the content of perception. is is
what Aristotle means when he says that imagination is “of what perception is of ” and
“cannot occur without perception.” is relationship imbues imagination with the motive
force of perception, at least when it comes to animals. Animals experience the mental
representations of phantasia as if they were perceptual states; they come from the same
source, and they have no way of telling the diﬀerence. Just as perception guides behavior,
then, phantasia (in the form of memory and a certain kind of expectation) can also guide
behavior.
What, then, makes belief special, and deserving of a status distinct from the
representation that guides animals? Belief, unlike phantasia, represents commitments with
the stamp of rational processing. Humans, like non-rational animals, receive a stream of
perceptual appearance. ey also, however, have a further faculty which can override that
stream and cause us not to commit to it the way that non-rational animals do. Aristotle
identi!es this faculty as reason (nous), the cognitive diﬀerence between the rational and
non-rational animals. When this faculty breaks down, so does the ability to withhold
commitment from phantasia:
Due to the fact that imaginings remain and are similar to perceptions,
animals do many things in accordance with it; some because they do not
have reason (nous), like beasts, and others because their reason is sometimes
clouded over by emotion (pathei) or illness or sleep, like men.418
417. On the Soul 3.3, 428b15-17: εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ
αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι
καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ.
418. On the Soul 3.3, 429a4-8: καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ'
αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ
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Imagination, again, does what it does because it has the same sort of representational
power that perception has, and because imaginings “remain.” at is, they continue to
in&uence the soul aer the episode that creates them has passed. Furthermore, animals act
in accordance with their imaginings because there is no higher faculty (such as nous) to
gainsay them. Humans, on the other hand, have nous, which lets them reason and form
beliefs. A subject’s reasoning capacities, however, can break down. When this happens, the
human subject’s behavior is guided the way an animal’s is guided: by perception and
imagination.419 e end of On the Soul 3.3 gives the impression that both humans and
animals use imagination as a source of information about their environment, but that the
circumstances under which imagination aﬀects humans and animals are quite diﬀerent.
For animals, there is no such thing as “mere” imagination. Mere imagination occurs in the
absence of or in direct contradiction to a belief about the content in question. It is the
imagining that makes us fear for Medea’s children without trying to do anything about it
(since we believe that no one is in any danger). When a person’s reason (nous) is obscured,
her position becomes the same as that of a non-rational animal, relying uncritically on the
deliverances of perception and phantasia.
Aristotle elaborates on this view of rational cognitive functioning in his treatise On
Dreams. ere, he observes that subjects in the grip of illness and other kinds of aﬀection
(pathê) will take at face value appearances that a healthy subject would dismiss. e
passage is worth quoting at length because of its telling detail:
In the same way everyone becomes easy to deceive when in the grip of
moods and appetites of all kinds, and the more so according as they are more
in the grip of the aﬀections. For this reason it is also the case that animals
sometimes appear on the walls to people who suﬀer from fever, due to the
slight resemblance of lines when they are put together. And these [sc.
appearances] sometimes agree in intensity with the aﬀections, so that if the
subjects are not sorely feverish, it may not escape their notice that [the
appearances] are false, but if the aﬀection is stronger, they may even move
ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσῳ ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι.
419.is does not imply that the stream of appearance that a rational creature receives is identical to the
stream of appearance that a non-rational creature would receive in the same circumstances. For
instance, dogs and cats do not see animals coming out of lines in the walls, the way that sick people do
(see discussion immediately below). is is because they are not conceptually equipped to perceive the
slight resemblances that prompt the sick person’s appearance.
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themselves on their account (pros auta). e reason these things happen is
that the authoritative faculty (to kurion) and that by which the images come
about do not discriminate on the basis of the same capacity.420
Imbalances in the subject can throw oﬀ his ability to make good judgments about what is
really going on. When someone is feverish, or drunk, or in a blind rage, he will accept the
world as it appears to him (however bizarre), and his rational faculty will be unable to
contradict the stream of appearance. Aristotle acknowledges diﬀerences of degree for this
phenomenon. e appearance of threatening shapes on the walls may not be compelling
enough to cause a reaction, if the person is not sick enough to be fully taken in. Still, he
presents the deceived subject as a straight-forward case of animal motion in response to
stimulus. e subject still receives information about his environment in the form of
imagination, and acts on it (“moves himself on [its] account”). e information received is
orderly, in a sense: absence or non-functioning of the rational faculty does not result in
cognitive chaos. What appears to the ailing subject is not a hellscape of random colors and
shapes, but animals, threatening objects that provoke fear and &ight. is line of argument
gives the impression that, even in rational subjects, the stream of data that comes from
imagination and sensation &ows constantly, ready to provide motivation and aﬀect if
reason breaks down.
e last sentence of Aristotle’s discussion is cryptic, and requires further comment.
“ese things” that Aristotle has been talking about—animals appearing to sick people, so
that they sometimes act in accordance with what they “see”—happen because “what is
authoritative and that by which images come about do not discriminate in accordance
with the same capacity.” Aristotle is referring to two mental faculties here—parts of the
soul, as he would call them. e second one Aristotle mentions is imagination itself; he
refers to the faculty by nearly identical words in On the Soul 3.3.421 What exactly the
420. On Dreams 2, 460b9-17: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν ὀργαῖς καὶ ἐν πάσαις ἐπιθυμίαις
εὐαπάτητοι γίνονται πάντες, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὦσιν. διὸ καὶ
τοῖς πυρέττουσιν ἐνίοτε φαίνεται ζῷα ἐν τοῖς τοίχοις ἀπὸ μικρᾶς ὁμοιότητος τῶν
γραμμῶν συντιθεμένων. καὶ ταῦτ' ἐνίοτε συνεπιτείνει τοῖς πάθεσιν οὕτως, ὥστε, ἂν μὲν
μὴ σφόδρα κάμνωσι, μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι ψεῦδος, ἐὰν δὲ μεῖζον ᾖ τὸ πάθος, καὶ κινεῖσθαι
πρὸς αὐτά. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ συμβαίνειν ταῦτα τὸ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν κρίνειν τό τε
κύριον καὶ ᾧ τὰ φαντάσματα γίνεται.
421. On the Soul 3.3, 428a1-2: “If, then, phantasia is that due to which we say that an image comes about for
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“authoritative” faculty is, is less clear. Aristotle gives us an example to provide evidence for
his claim, and the example seems to imply that the “authoritative faculty” is reason, which
would be in line with the rest of our discussion. Here is the text immediately following the
long quote above:
e evidence of this is that the sun seems to measure a foot across, but
something else oen speaks against this impression.422
is passage uses the same example as a more picked-over passage from On the Soul 3.3:
But even false things can appear [to be the case], about which one has at the
same time a true entertaining (hupolêpsis). For instance, the sun appears to
be a foot across, but one is convinced that it is greater than the earth.423
It is not clear from visual inspection alone that the sun is a huge sphere. e bright thing
we see in the sky never looks more than about a foot across, but in normal circumstances
we do not stop at naive visual appearance: astronomy and other considerations (such as
why we can’t reach out and touch it) tell us it must be very far away, and anything that far
away that still looks a foot across must be huge. is scenario, according to the passage
from On the Soul, is an example of our having a false appearance coupled with an
overriding true belief.424 Aristotle then says in On Dreams that this very same scenario is
evidence (sêmeion) that two faculties can con&ict because they “do not discriminate in
accordance with the same ability.” We can conclude, then, that the “authoritative” faculty
that butts heads with phantasia is the faculty responsible for our judgments and beliefs,
many of which are formed on the basis of something other than perception. As we have
already seen, that faculty is reason (logos or nous).425
In these passages Aristotle gives us an example using two representational
faculties, and subjects use both to navigate their environment. He does not, however, seem
us…”
422. On Dreams 2, 460b17-19: τούτου δὲ σημεῖον ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, ἀντίφησι δὲ
πολλάκις ἕτερόν τι πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν.
423. On the Soul 3.3, 428b2-4: φαίνεται δέ γε καὶ ψευδῆ, περὶ ὧν ἅμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἷον
φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πιστεύεται δ' εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης.
424. For more on this example, its elaboration in On the Soul 3.3, and Aristotle’s disagreement with Plato
over how to interpret the data, see especially Lycos 1964 and Heil 2003.
425. Aristotle uses the words more or less synonymously in these texts (though perhaps they give diﬀerent
emphasis), so we should not pause too long over his use of diﬀerent words in the diﬀerent texts I cite.
See Lorenz 2006, 177-78.
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to think that appearances must stop at some cognitive gate so that we can evaluate them
and stamp them with reason’s imprimatur, whereby they might in&uence us. at picture
is implausible: most of our interactions with our environment do not require this kind of
conscious oversight. On the contrary, we very oen take our stream of appearances as
veridical, putting our trust in them unless some other consideration or appearance gives
us pause. Aristotle seems to hold to this more reasonable picture. In the normal course of
things, he seems to think, our perceptual appearance goes unchallenged. For evidence that
he thinks this, we have another passage from On Dreams, where he argues that
hallucinatory experience feels no diﬀerent from genuine sensory experience; nothing
inside the experience tells us we are hallucinating. is is because perception enjoys a
presumptive privilege unless something overrides it:
e same goes for the other sense organs. For one seems to see and hear and
perceive because the motion comes to the ruling principle from there [sc.
from the sense organs], and we say that we see because sometimes the sight
seems to be moved without actually moving…for in general (holôs) the
ruling principle asserts what comes from perception, unless another more
authoritative movement contradicts it.426
We accept information from the perceptive/imaginative faculty as a matter of course,
though it is always defeasible by something more authoritative, since we are creatures with
access to something more authoritative which could override it. e content of the
appearance does not change, however, when it is overridden. Perception and imagination
can in&uence a subject’s beliefs, but the in&uence does not run the other way. Aristotle is
clear that the sun still looks like it measures a foot across, even if we know better. e fact
that the ruling principle does not aﬃrm “what comes from perception” does not prevent
what comes from perception from impinging on the subject. Immediately aer the
passage just quoted, Aristotle makes exactly this claim:
In all cases something appears, but one does not believe the appearance in
every case, unless the discriminating faculty (to epikrinon) is fettered or is
426. On Dreams 3, 461a30-b5: ὁμοιοτρόπως δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητηρίων· τῷ μὲν γὰρ
ἐκεῖθεν ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐγρηγορὼς δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν
καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ὄψιν ἐνίοτε κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖν, οὐ κινουμένην, ὁρᾶν φαμεν,
καὶ τῷ τὴν ἁφὴν δύο κινήσεις εἰσαγγέλλειν τὸ ἓν δύο δοκεῖ. ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἀφ' ἑκάστης
αἰσθήσεώς φησιν ἡ ἀρχή, ἐὰν μὴ ἑτέρα κυριωτέρα ἀντιφῇ.
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not moving in its proper manner.427
Believing that not-p does not prevent it from appearing to you that p, according to
Aristotle. e appearance is only believed, however, when there is something wrong with
our faculty of judgment (the faculty responsible for our belief that p), as with our sick
person who sees animals coming out of the walls. e authoritative beliefs that stable
subjects take for granted—that wild animals cannot appear out of walls, that they usually
make some kind of noise, that terror makes people more apt to see things that aren’t
there—do not register because the judgment of unstable subjects is “fettered.” 
Non-human animals “do many things in accordance with imagination” because
their perception (and accompanying imagination) is the only system they have to
represent the world. ey take everything at face value, because they have no faculty
which overrides commitment to the content of perception and imagination. Humans, on
the other hand, do many things in accordance with phantasia when their reason (nous)
gets occluded by sickness or emotion. He revisits his comparison later, at On the Soul 3.10,
433a10-12, though there he is vaguer about how and why humans act in accordance with
their imagination rather than their reason. He just says that people “oen follow
imaginings contrary to their knowledge,” and leaves it at that. e comparison to animals,
however, is just as explicit: humans use this information against their better judgment,
animals use it because they have no better judgment. Since the judging/believing faculty is
what contravenes imagination and perception, and makes sure we don’t buy into them, it
follows that animals, who lack this additional faculty, can’t help but buy into the contents
of their imagination and perception. ere are, in short, no skeptical animals.428
e important point is that the perceptive/imaginative faculty provides a stream of
information to the subject, and it takes an imposition by the rational faculty to prevent the
subject from taking it at face value. e imposition is not necessarily conscious and
deliberate, though it can be. Animals do not have this second level of processing to
427. On Dreams 3, 461b5-8: φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἂν
τὸ ἐπικρῖνον κατέχηται ἢ μὴ κινῆται τὴν οἰκείαν κίνησιν.
428. See On Memory 2, 453a7-15, where Aristotle describes recollection as a kind of inquiry (zêtêsis tis),
which is something that animals are incapable of. 
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question the input that their perceptions, and resulting imagination, give to them. is
ability to question the input of one’s perceptual system and override it with further
considerations is partially constitutive of human rationality. Animals receive un!ltered,
uncritical guidance and motivation by default. Part of what makes humans rational is
their ability to correct that stream of information with other information, and restrain
themselves from believing or acting upon any old appearance that comes their way.
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Conclusion
Now is an opportunity to take stock of the previous discussions and address general
questions about the account. Each chapter of this book sets out a diﬀerent condition that
cognition needs to meet in order to be constitutively rational, according to Aristotle. e
!rst two chapters set out his notion of credence, a mental state that varies by degree and
responds to evidence that a claim is true or false. Evidence can weigh in favor of a claim
without entailing it or guaranteeing that it is true. Credence therefore amounts to
evaluation of likelihood, and our binary commitments—whether they amount to belief or
knowledge—supervene on our credences. Non-human animals do not have these graded
mental states, which suggests that they do not respond to evidence. is gives us the !rst
condition:
1) Rational cognition results from a special way of processing information.
Rational creatures can regard events and circumstances in the world as
evidence. is entails that the subject is capable of epistemic evaluation with
a !ner grain than binary acceptance or rejection. ese binary assessments
then grow out of those !ner-grained evaluations.
e third chapter discussed belief ’s normative connection to the truth. In order to qualify
as rational, we must endeavor to believe truths and avoid believing falsehoods. is
amounts to the claim that we cannot believe “as we please,” since such liberty would imply
that there are no relevant constraints in place when we form our beliefs. Truth is the right
condition for every form of thinking, according to Aristotle, but truth has a special
regulative connection to belief, because beliefs in particular can go wrong. is gives us
the second condition:
2) Rational cognition constitutively depends on the subject’s adhering to
certain normative demands. Rational subjects are obliged, on pain of
irrationality, to seek the truth. As a result, they cannot believe as they please.
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In the !nal chapter, we examined Aristotle’s claim that an immediate connection holds
between certain beliefs and their !tting emotional response. Imagination and other forms
of mental representation do not share such a connection in rational creatures. Belief has
this connection to how we respond to the world because it encodes our commitments, the
claims we take to represent the world. Aristotle argues that, in rational subjects, there is a
critical faculty that can intervene in our perceptual and imaginative experience and
thereby prevent us from committing to it. Non-rational animals and malfunctioning
rational subjects do not have this critical faculty and so commit to all of their perceptual
and imaginative experiences. is gives us our third condition:
3) Rational cognition implies the existence of a critical faculty that can
contradict and override what perception and other forms of mental
representation put forward.
All three of these conditions !t together into a coherent and interesting view of rational
cognition. We have so far, however, only discussed them in isolation, and it is fair to raise
questions about how they are supposed to interact. 
Start with condition (2), which imposes normative constraints on forming beliefs
(doxa). ose constraints pertain to binary assessments that, I argue in Chapters 1 and 2,
supervene on credences. e !rst question, then, is how belief can be TRUTH-NORMED and
also supervene on mental states that are not even TRUTH-APT. e answer is that subjects
form beliefs when they are convinced, i.e. when they have suﬃcient credence to commit to
the claim. On my interpretation, credence tracks how likely a subject takes it that a claim
is true. Credences themselves are neither true nor false, but they do pertain to truth and
falsehood. If one has an obligation to believe the truth, and beliefs supervene on credence,
then one should have high credence in what is true and low credence in what is false. is
in turn means that one should do one’s best to believe in accordance with one’s evidence,
which includes evaluating that evidence correctly. e story is more complicated with
credence involved, but there is nothing to suggest any incompatibility between credence
and belief just because credence is not TRUTH-APT. Its status as an epistemic evaluation
gives it an orientation toward the truth in a broader sense. is makes it a !tting candidate
for the state on which binary belief supervenes. 
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One might say that this does not address the spirit of the worry. e real objection
concerns the nature of the relation between belief and credence. Credence, so my story
goes, determines belief in the sense that a subject with suﬃciently high credence in a
claim will come to believe that claim. One’s credence in a claim, on the other hand, seems
to be a function of the putative evidence to which the subject has access. is makes belief
formation what we might call a “pneumatic” process: evidence exerts a certain amount of
epistemic pressure on the subject and forces her credence upwards or downwards. What
beliefs she has depends on where her credence rests at any given time. If her credence in
true claims is suﬃciently high, she will have true beliefs, and if not, then not. Nothing in
this picture seems to leave any room for an obligation to believe the truth. Ought implies
can, one might say, and if one’s beliefs are simply responses to how one sees the world,
then one can no more be obliged to have certain beliefs than one can be obliged to have
certain perceptual experiences. Condition (1) therefore con&icts with condition (2).
My response to this objection is to deny that the pneumatic picture of belief-
formation entails that subjects have no ability to aﬀect what they believe. If a subject’s
binary belief supervenes on her credence, then any diﬀerence in binary belief implies a
diﬀerence in her credence. Subjects can do many things, however, to aﬀect their
credences, and through that in&uence their beliefs. ey can, for example, seek out more
evidence, consider whether there is any more evidence to !nd, or wonder whether more
evidence is even necessary. ey can decide that the question is not important enough to
remain skeptical, given how likely they now take the claim to be. is is all compatible
with the pneumatic picture, but also implies that subjects can aﬀect what they believe.
ere is textual evidence that Aristotle cares about this issue and takes my side on
it. I claim he has these sorts of considerations in mind when he says that someone who
merely believes has to “pay more attention to the truth,” compared to those who have
knowledge.429 His comparison of the believer to a sickly person suggests that the believer
has to be more careful in matters of truth and falsehood, since belief goes wrong much
429. Metaphysics 4.4, 1008b27-31.
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more oen than knowledge, which has no chance of going wrong at all. Someone might
uncritically accept as decisive some putative evidence that actually leaves room for doubt.
A person who does this fails to fully respect her obligation to the truth, and we need not
deny the pneumatic picture of belief-formation for this to be true. e obligation that
condition (2) imposes is not, therefore, incompatible with the pneumatic picture of belief-
formation that I prefer for explicating condition (1). In a similar way, we can see that
condition (1) and condition (3) !t together. Reason’s critical faculty allows the subject to
withhold commitment from perception and imagination in a way that subjects without a
critical faculty cannot. Commitment is, on my picture, binary, and in the case of rational
creatures it supervenes on the subject’s level of credence.430 A rational subject is able to
question whether the fact that it appears that p makes it likely enough that p for her to
believe that p. In many circumstances, having a perceptual experience to the eﬀect that p
does provide good evidence that p is true. Sometimes, however, other information
intervenes and removes the presumptive in&uence of perception and its associated faculty,
imagination. is is fully consistent with a pneumatic picture of belief-formation. One
might even go further and say that such a picture is a plausible way to !ll in Aristotle’s
remarks about the “intensity” of appearances and the conditions under which subjects fall
under their sway.431
e best way to see how conditions (2) and (3) cohere is to address an apparent
tension between them. As I put it in Chapter 4, the critical faculty present in rational
subjects allows those subjects to withhold commitment from their perception and
imagination. is does not prevent things from appearing a certain way to them. To use
Aristotle’s example, the sun still appears about a foot in diameter, even to someone who
knows her astronomy. e critical faculty does, however, prevent the subject from being
“taken in” by the appearance and basing any action or reasoning on it. is might make it
sound as though the subject gets to decide which bits of perception and imagination she
430. Non-rational creatures, of course, have no credence, so their commitment cannot supervene on
credence. Animals commit to all of their perceptual and imaginative experience, so the set of their
commitments just is the set of those experiences. For some reasons to worry about this view and some
responses Aristotle might make, see below.
431. I have in mind his argument at On Dreams 2, 460b9-17, on which see below.
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commits to and which she does not. Such a claim would con&ict, however, with condition
(2), which states that rational subjects are constrained to form true beliefs and do not get
to choose what they will believe and what they will not. If rational subjects must aim to
believe the truth on pain of irrationality, it is diﬃcult to see how they could also decide
which information they are going to base their beliefs on. If subjects get to decide what
counts as evidence and what does not, they can get themselves to believe as they please,
which violates condition (2).432
is tension is only apparent, because condition (3) makes no claim about whether
the subject has any direct control over the “interception” her critical faculty sometimes
makes with respect to perception and imagination. Consider Aristotle’s example of the
sick man who sees animals coming out of the walls and gets scared.433 e objection
presupposes that the subject consciously chooses what to believe. e healthy man gets to
choose whether he to believe that animals are coming out of the walls, and the sick man
does not get to choose. Nothing in the way that Aristotle describes the case, however,
suggests that he thinks the mechanism works in that way, nor that he suggests the
mechanism works the same way in every case. His view is much more subtle and
correlates the credibility of the appearance with the strength of the distorting in&uence.
Whether the subject is able to make a choice or not never comes up. e appearances
“agree in intensity” with the distorting in&uence, which I take it means that the subject
!nds the appearances more compelling the more she falls under the sway of the distorting
in&uence. If the distorting in&uence is not too strong, the critical faculty is still able to
override the appearance with other cognition, thereby preventing the subject from
committing to the appearance (which entails, among other things, “moving [herself] on
their account”). Condition (3) does not state or imply that it is part of being a rational
subject that one can be freewheeling or capricious about forming one’s beliefs. Since it is
432. It is true that, in cases where we have con&icting evidence from diﬀerent sources, we must indeed
decide which evidence to trust. is sort of activity still, however, aims at truth in the relevant way. e
objection is that condition (3) allows for caprice in such decisions. It is mistaken in this: see below.
433. On Dreams 2, 460b9-17.
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not a question of whether the subject decides to commit or not, there is no chance for
condition (3) to come into con&ict with the normative demands implied in condition (2).
is discussion provides, I hope, a sketch of how Aristotle’s three conditions for
rational cognition !t into a coherent and interesting picture. ese conditions emerge
from interpretation of Aristotle’s systematic views on belief and its status as a form of
rational cognition. As I said in the introduction, these views give us data about Aristotle’s
conception of rationality that goes unheeded if one assumes the only relevant types of
cognition to be higher achievements like knowledge and practical wisdom. Such states are
also, however, instances of rational cognition. ere should, then, be some way in which
our conditions also show that knowledge and other higher cognitive achievements are
constitutively rational. For the sake of simplicity, we will concentrate on knowledge
(epistêmê). Knowledge does not result from a subject’s response to evidence in the same
way that belief does. ere are conditions which cognition must ful!ll in order to rise to
the level of knowledge that go beyond what it would need to qualify as a belief. For
example, in order to know that p, one must a) know that q, where q is an explanation for p
and b) recognize that q is the explanation for p. Knowledge, for Aristotle, seems to be
inherently systematic: one’s knowledge of a claim depends in part on having a grasp of
other claims that explain or ground it. Belief does not have such a requirement, so such a
requirement is not re&ected in the three conditions. 
Despite this complication, we saw in Chapter 1 that whether one knows something
through a demonstration does in fact depend on the state of one’s credence. In order for
someone to have knowledge through a demonstration, two things must be true about her
credence. First, she must put more credence in the starting-points of the demonstration
than she puts in the conclusion. Second, she cannot put more credence in any set of
starting-points from which she might deduce a claim contrary to the claim she supposedly
knows through the demonstration. If either of these conditions go unmet, then her
cognition of the claim does not amount to knowledge through demonstration. is means
that, for Aristotle, at least one higher cognitive achievement depends for its character on
the kind of gradational epistemic evaluation that is partially constitutive of rational
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cognition, according to Aristotle. is discussion is itself, of course, no more than a
starting-point. A detailed reckoning of the relation between belief and knowledge, and
how both manage to express constitutive rationality despite their radically diﬀerent
characteristics and relationships to the truth, is a worthwhile subject for future work.
Two last nagging questions: if my interpretation of Aristotle is correct, and these
conditions describe rational human cognition, then what does animal cognition look like,
and in what way does it not !t these three conditions? A full examination will have to wait
for subsequent work, but a sketch of an answer is possible. Animals are not, for Aristotle,
automata in the way that term is standardly meant. ey have genuine conscious
experience, including the morally-relevant conscious experiences of pain, distress and
delight. He is explicit, however, that the cognition of non-human animals fails to meet
conditions (1) and (3). We can also assume that it fails to meet condition (2), because
attributions of normative rationality only make sense if the creature in question is
constitutively rational. Animal cognition does not include credence. Since credence
expresses epistemic evaluation of likelihood, animals are incapable of evaluating
likelihood. is entails that animals never experience a broad range of mental activity.
ey cannot, for instance, wait for more evidence before acting on a suspicion: they do
not recognize facts as evidence for other facts, and none of their mental states amounts to
suspicion, insofar as that means having a positive but sub-committal level of credence that
something is true. Hand-in-hand with this lack of what we might call an “internal
epistemology,” they also lack a critical faculty to override the information that their
perception and imagination furnishes. is means that they act on what appears to them,
be that false or true. ey are always in the position of a man whose judgment is clouded
over by sickness, drink or emotion: what appears to an animal is always fully “intense,” as
Aristotle puts it, which means it is always a candidate for being the basis of pursuit or
avoidance.
is view is open to an objection that is based on our intuitive experience with
animals. Anyone who has ever played fetch with a dog and faked it out by only pretending
to throw the ball has an example of an animal who is (eventually) unwilling to accept that
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you have thrown the ball, even when you seem to have thrown it. Anyone who has ever
sprayed a cat for getting on the dining room table can observe how suspiciously it will
approach that table the next time around, unsure of whether it will be sprayed again.
Aristotle’s response to these objections would likely be that they anthropomorphize the
animals in a way that mistakes the actual cognition that animates their behavior. We do
not need an internal epistemology to explain either case. e dog does not run to chase
the ball aer multiple fake-outs because it does not appear to the dog that the ball was
thrown: its perception and imagination does not convey the information THROWN BALL, so
of course it does not chase aer it. Its frustration may be very real, but has nothing to do
with whether its “decision” to stay put is the result of any kind of reasoning. An analogous
story explains away the cat’s “suspicion.” e table, which before appeared to be a nice
place to climb, now appears to be THE PLACE WHERE I GOT SPRAYED. Animals act in
accordance with their perception, memory, and desire. e cat wants to get up on the
table, but she also wants to stay dry. To her, the table appears both to be where she wants
to sit and where she will get sprayed. An internal struggle between her two desires ensues,
and which one dominates at any given moment will account for whether she proceeds to
the table or shies away from it. If this oscillation happens quickly enough, it may look like
the cat is deliberating about whether to get on the table, and it is not a huge leap to
attributing a view to her about how likely she is to get sprayed. ose last two steps go too
far, in Aristotle’s view: we need attribute no internal epistemology to the cat to account for
her behavior. Aristotle can even say that she is undergoing a genuine internal struggle,
since she has two competing desires, and there is a question which will win out. Such
cases happen even with people, but they are quite distinct from cases where one suspects
or doubts something. e point is that the cat will never have the latter experience.
One can, however, press the further objection that this bifurcation in the
explanation of behavior is ill-conceived. Why is behavior that signals reasoning and
credence in humans a sign of nothing more than desire and perceptual appearance in
non-human animals? Is Aristotle right to assume that only humans could ever evince
rational cognition? e short answer is “probably not.” Anytime a theorist makes a claim,
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from the armchair, that some characteristic marks humans oﬀ from all the other animals,
smart money is on an advance in our understanding of animal cognition that falsi!es it.
Aristotle provides no exception that I can see. When any given attempt at demarcation
fails, we have two options: accept that the concept RATIONAL ANIMAL will include some non-
humans, or redraw the boundaries of rational cognition to exclude the upstart animal who
falsi!ed our previous attempt. It is impossible to know which option Aristotle would
choose: in a way, he lies at the very beginning of this “what makes humans special” game,
or at least the beginning of its recorded history. e virtue of his account, in my view, is
not that he succeeds in marking oﬀ humans where all other attempts to do so have failed.
It is rather that his view of what makes cognition rational is far more nuanced and
insightful than he has previously gotten credit for, and his views suggest a robust
framework for understanding rationality as a cognitive category. In particular, his view
that rational cognition proceeds from a particular kind of internal reckoning is fascinating
and worth further study, if we can operationalize and test for that kind of internal
epistemology. His views about the constitutive normativity of rational cognition cut ice
even in contemporary debates about the ethics of belief, and their interest is independent
of whether the function argument he himself favors is any good. Some non-human
animals may turn out to be rational, in the sense that they have an internal epistemology,
even if we hesitate to hold them to the epistemic norms to which we hold each other. Even
that hesitation might, in the !nal analysis, be debunked as a form of speciesism. Whatever
the answer to those empirical and further philosophical questions, Aristotle’s conception
is an intriguing way in to why we should care about the distinction. 
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